scholarly journals Winner of the SLS Annual Conference Best Paper Prize 2013: Bogeymen, lunatics and fanatics: collective actions and the private enforcement of European competition law

Legal Studies ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruce Wardhaugh

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (14) ◽  
pp. 43-67
Author(s):  
Tihamér Tóth

The paper explores the changes the EU Directive on harmonizing certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions will bring about in Hungary, with a special focus placed on damages liability rules, the interaction of public and private enforcement of these rules, and the importance of class actions. Amendments of the Competition Act introduced in 2005 and 2009 had created new rules to promote the idea of private enforcement even before the Directive was adopted. Some of these rules remain unique even now, notably the legal presumption of a 10% price increase for cartel cases. However, subsequent cases decided by Hungarian courts did not reflect the sophistication of existing substantive and procedural rules. There has only ever been one judgment awarding damages, while most stand-alone cases involved minor competition law issues relating to contractual disputes. The paper looks at the most important substantial rules of tort law (damage, causality, joint and several liability), the co-operation of competition authorities and civil courts, as well as at (the lack of) class action procedures from the perspective of the interaction of public and private enforcement of competition law.


Significance With the new rules, the United Kingdom is making it easier for consumers to bring collective legal actions for alleged violations of competition law, although it has largely rejected adopting US procedures that incentivise lawyers to bring class actions. Further reforms under the 2014 EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions will apply throughout the EU from December 2016. In the United States, the class action regime has been tightened in recent years, and a recent decision by an influential federal appellate judge is increasing court scrutiny of class action settlements. Impacts Safeguards will prevent the UK system from evolving along the lines of the more litigation-friendly US class action model. The UK system is unlikely to be broadened to make it easier for plaintiffs to bring collective actions in areas other than competition law. Legal decisions and statute changes that have discouraged US class actions are unlikely to be reversed. This applies especially in securities actions.


2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-414
Author(s):  
Alexandra P. Mikroulea

AbstractOpt-in or opt-out? That is the basic question to be answered. The decision to promote actions of “opt-in” type as opposed to those of the “opt-out” type, for the sake of private autonomy, does not ensure the effective application of european competition law. On the contrary, it may decrease the application’s intensity and effectiveness. Recent reforms among European state members such as in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway are powerful indications that the opt-out principle may result in the effective implementation of competition law. There is no doubt that a mixed system (hybrid system), providing the court with the power to decide in favour of either the opt-in or the opt-out system, will result in better implementation of competition law. At the present time there are two pending cases in England (Dorothy Gibson and Mastercard) for which the decision on opt-out or opt-in are highly anticipated. Should the court decide, in one or both of the cases, on an opt-out approach, this will bring a momentous reevaluation of the entire collective redress concept.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 33-59
Author(s):  
Katalin J. Cseres

The aim of this paper is to critically analyze the manner of harmonizing private enforcement in the EU. The paper examines the legal rules and, more importantly, the actual enforcement practice of collective consumer actions in EU Member States situated in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Collective actions are the key method of getting compensation for consumers who have suffered harm as a result of an anti-competitive practice. Consumer compensation has always been the core justification for the European Commission’s policy of encouraging private enforcement of competition law. In those cases where collective redress is not available to consumers, or consumers cannot apply existing rules or are unwilling to do so, then both their right to an effective remedy and the public policy goal of private enforcement remain futile. Analyzing collective compensatory actions in CEE countries (CEECs) places the harmonization process in a broader governance framework, created during their EU accession, characterized by top-down law-making and strong EU conditionality. Analyzing collective consumer actions through this ‘Europeanization’ process, and the phenomenon of vertical legal transplants, raises major questions about the effectiveness of legal transplants vis-à-vis homegrown domestic law-making processes. It also poses the question how such legal rules may depend and interact with market, constitutional and institutional reforms.


Author(s):  
Chagny Muriel

This chapter examines how the Antitrust Damages Directive has been transposed in France. It begins with an overview of the transposition procedure, focusing on the French private enforcement context from the Ordinance of 1 December 1986—the ‘Magna Carta’ of French competition law—to Law no. 2008-776 of 4 August 2008 and the Consumer Law Act of 17 March 2014 (Hamon Law). It then discusses the scope of the transposition measure, noting that the French government went beyond the Directive and instituted a single regime for damages actions, before analysing specific issues that arose during the transposition, including those relating to the concept of an undertaking, the binding effect of competition authorities' decisions, the presumption of harm, the passing-on of overcharges, types of harm and assessment of damages, joint and several liability and the recovery of contributions from co-infringers, consensual dispute resolution, time-barring deadlines, access to evidence, and class actions.


Author(s):  
Rachael Mulheron

More than twenty years ago, Lord Woolf MR recommended the implementation of a regime which could cater for opt-in or opt-out class actions. It was not until 1 October 2015 that such a regime was enacted—and solely for competition law grievances of either a follow-on or a stand-alone nature. A key aspect of any class action design is how to handle limitation periods for the representative claimant and for class members. In his seminal report, Lord Woolf flagged up that appropriate provisions for limitation periods would be a proper subject for primary, rather than secondary, legislation. Accordingly, limitation periods duly became the subject of careful drafting in the 2015 regime, courtesy of section 47E of the Competition Act 1998. This chapter reflects upon some of the key comparative drafting lessons of class action regimes elsewhere which were helpful and instructive for that drafting exercise.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 ◽  
pp. 14-22
Author(s):  
Astrid Stadler

The article provides a brief overview of the background of the new European Union directive on representative actions for protection of the collective interest of consumers (Directive 2020/1828). It describes the basic elements of the directive and explains the major changes that have occurred since the European Commission issued its Recommendation document on collective redress in 2013. The author highlights the issues of the scope of application of the directive, of legal standing to bring a representative action, of collective settlements, and of the problem of funding for collective actions. This discussion puts emphasis on the need to extend legal standing to individual members of the group and articulates an appeal to national legislatures, particularly in Germany, to be more open-minded towards commercial litigation funding and the establishment of a public access-to-justice fund designed to guarantee the effectiveness of Directive 2020/1828 and its implementation.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Klára Hamuľáková

Summary The paper deals with the questions of funding of collective actions. Proper funding has significant influence on the right to the access to the court and is a precondition for the efficient course of litigation in general, specifically in connection with a collective redress. Funding of class actions is also closely related with other issues such as costs and lawyer’s fees, reimbursement of legal costs and moreover.


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