Explaining State Violence in the Guatemalan Civil War: Rebel Threat and Counterinsurgency

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 48-71
Author(s):  
Yuichi Kubota

AbstractLiterature on the Guatemalan Civil War has debated whether or not state violence was triggered by rebel activities. Did the government respond to each insurrection caused by the rebels, or did it blindly target regions where antigovernment antipathy and movements had historically prevailed? Because state violence was extensive during the civil war period, the dynamism of the war could have been the reason for its occurrence. Relying on the threat-response model of state violence, this article argues that human rights violations occurred when the government perceived a rebel threat that would have seriously degraded its capability in future counterinsurgencies. The article employs propensity score matching to address the problem of confounding in empirical analysis, and reveals that rebel attacks, particularly those targeting security apparatus and resulting in human injury, increased the likelihood of state violence in the Guatemalan Civil War.

2017 ◽  
Vol 59 (03) ◽  
pp. 48-71
Author(s):  
Yuichi Kubota

Abstract Literature on the Guatemalan Civil War has debated whether or not state violence was triggered by rebel activities. Did the government respond to each insurrection caused by the rebels, or did it blindly target regions where antigovernment antipathy and movements had historically prevailed? Because state violence was extensive during the civil war period, the dynamism of the war could have been the reason for its occurrence. Relying on the threat-response model of state violence, this article argues that human rights violations occurred when the government perceived a rebel threat that would have seriously degraded its capability in future counterinsurgencies. The article employs propensity score matching to address the problem of confounding in empirical analysis, and reveals that rebel attacks, particularly those targeting security apparatus and resulting in human injury, increased the likelihood of state violence in the Guatemalan Civil War.


2018 ◽  
Vol 55 (6) ◽  
pp. 774-786 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacqueline M Sievert

Authoritarian regimes are not known for adopting independent courts, yet the frequency of states empowering their judiciaries has steadily increased. In 1961 only 9% of autocracies had a partially or fully independent court, but by 1987 more than one-third of authoritarian states had reformed their judiciaries. Initiating judicial reform is risky for a regime that seeks to maintain its authority over its populace, including risks to their preferred policy positions and judgments that run contrary to the preferences of the regime. Given these risks, why do authoritarian leaders often relinquish authority to independent courts? This article argues regime leaders will choose to empower at least nominally independent courts in order to resolve information problems that lead to bargaining failures and civil war. This project uses propensity score matching to account for the complex relationship between institutional arrangement and civil war, and finds that states that adopt an independent court reduce their risk of civil war between 54% and 75% when compared to states that are equally likely to have adopted an independent court, but did not. These results suggest that leaders seeking to reduce uncertainty when bargaining with potential oppositions groups have strong incentives to implement independent judiciaries, and improve our understanding of how and why authoritarian leaders choose to delegate authority to independent judicial institutions.


AGROFOR ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Eularie MUTAMULIZA ◽  
Edouard MUSABANGANJI

Microfinance in Rwanda is considered as one of the most crucial mechanisms in the implementation of the Government program to reduce poverty and to increase economic growth. However, despite the effort made by the Government of Rwanda to put in place microfinance institutions in rural areas, little is known about the effects of microfinance on smallholder farmers’ income in Nyamagabe District of Rwanda. This study aimed at examining the contribution of microfinance services to the income of smallholder farmers in Nyamagabe District. Primary data were collected from 240 respondents randomly selected in 3 sectors of Nyamagabe District using structured questionnaires. Data were analyzed using descriptive statistics to describe the socio-economic characteristics of the respondents and Propensity Score Matching was used to assess the effect of microfinance on smallholder farmers’ livelihood. The results from descriptive statistics showing that 117 respondents were participants in microfinance services and 123 were nonparticipants and more men were committed to participate and to access microfinance services than women. Results from Propensity Score Matching Model using both Kernel Based Matching and Nearest Neighbor Matching showed that the households participating in microfinance services increased their total annual income by 256,674 Rwandan francs and 228,246 Rwandan francs more than non-participants, respectively. The study recommended that smallholder farmers should be encouraged to participate in microfinance services to increase their income and agricultural productivity. The use of SACCOs and microfinance services needs to be promoted in order to provide an instrument for mobilizing savings and extending credit.


Author(s):  
Regina Bateson

From 1982 to 1983, General Efraín Ríos Montt presided over an especially bloody period of the Guatemalan civil war. Under Ríos Montt’s watch, the state killed approximately 75,000 of its own citizens. Yet less than a decade later, the former dictator emerged as one of the most popular politicians in newly democratic Guatemala. How did a gross human rights violator stage such an improbable comeback? Using process tracing, I argue that Ríos Montt’s trajectory is best explained by his embrace of populism as his core political strategy. This analysis deepens our knowledge of an important case, while shedding light on broader questions about how and when actors with profoundly undemocratic values can hijack democracy for their own ends.


2015 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 489-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tania Masi

AbstractThe United Nations established in 2005 the United Nations Democracy Fund (UNDEF), whose objective is to support projects submitted by national NGOs aimed at increasing government accountability. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of NGOs activity on democracy exploiting the UNDEF database. An empirical analysis based on a propensity score matching (PSM) method is implemented on a sample of 102 developing countries. The findings indicate that the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) is positive and significant only when countries receive UNDEF-funded NGOs projects for three rounds or more. In this case the Polity IV indicator improves by an average of 1.08 points with respect to the level of 2005.


2020 ◽  
pp. 073889421989900
Author(s):  
Sabine C Carey ◽  
Belén González

How do wartime legacies affect repression after the conflict ends? Irregular forces support the government in many civil wars. We argue that if this link continues after the war, respect for human rights declines. As “tried and tested” agents they are less likely to shirk when given the order to repress. Governments might also keep the militias as a “fall-back option”, which results in more repression. Analyzing data from 1981 to 2014 shows that pro-government militias that were inherited from the previous conflict are consistently associated with worse repression, but newly created ones are not. Wartime pro-government militias target a broader spectrum of the population and are linked to worse state violence. New militias usually supplement wartime ones and use violence primarily against political opponents. This study highlights the detrimental impact of war legacies.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nils W Metternich

What are the conditions under which post-conflict elections take place and why do only few post-conflict elections result in democratic post-conflict orders? This is the main puzzle raised in this paper. The argument is that the decision to stage elections and democratize is highly strategic and depends on the ethnic size of the post-conflict government leader. Especially post-conflict leaders with large ethnic support are able to utilize quick post-conflict elections to stabilize and legitimize their political position. However, in the long run the government leaders prefer institutions that maximize their time in office and therefore will hinder full scale democratization. The empirical analysis demonstrates that the timing of elections and democratization depend on the ethnic support of the new government and the civil war outcome.


2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (2) ◽  
pp. 113
Author(s):  
Eka Rastiyanto Amrullah ◽  
Ani Pullaila

<strong>English</strong><br />Combined Harvester (CH) aid is part of the Indonesian government policy instrument for accelerating rice production and increasing farmers’ income. In addition to reducing harvesting cost and time, CH may also reduce harvest loss. This study intends to quantify rice yield loss reduction if CH is used for harvesting. The study was conducted in Banten Province in 2014 using primary data collected from 119 CH user farmers and 116 non-user farmers selected purposively. Preliminary analysis was conducted using regression which was estimated with the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method. Since OLS estimated regression is prone to sample selection bias, subsequent analysis is conducted using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimator with a logistic regression. The PSM analysis support the regression analysis that CH reduces harvest loss. Based on the Stratification Matching, it was found that the CH reduces harvest loss by up to 200.39 kg per hectare or around 3.52% of total yield. It is recommended that the Government facilitates provision of technical assistance and training for CH operator farmers or farmers’ groups particularly the first users aid recipients. The harvest reduction advantage is an additional reason for supporting feasibility of CH scaling out policy in Indonesia.<br /><br /><br /><strong>Indonesian</strong><br />Bantuan combined harvester (CH) padi adalah salah satu instrumen kebijakan pemerintah Indonesia untuk mendorong peningkatan produksi dan pendapatan petani padi. Walau manfaat utamanya adalah untuk menghemat ongkos dan mempercepat panen, CH juga dapat mengurangi kehilangan panen. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menghitung kuantitas pengurangan kehilangan hasil usaha tani padi jika panen dilakukan dengan CH. Penelitian dilakukan menggunakan data primer dari 119 petani pengguna dan 116 petani nonpengguna CH yang dipilih sengaja di Provinsi Banten pada tahun 2014. Analisis awal dilakukan dengan regresi yang diduga dengan kwadrat terkecil biasa (OLS). Untuk mengatasi potensi bias sampel pada analisis regresi OLS, selanjutnya digunakan penduga Propensity Score Matching (PSM) dengan mempergunakan regresi logistik. Hasil analisis PSM memverifikasi efek positif penggunaan CH terhadap kehilangan hasil berdasarkan analisis regresi OLS. Berdasarkan Stratification Matching didapatkan bahwa penggunan CH dapat menekan kehilangan hasil sebesar 200,39 kg per hektare atau sekitar 3,52% dari total hasil. Disarankan agar pemerintah memfasilitasi pendampingan dan pelatihan teknis kepada petani atau kelompok tani operator, utamanya pengguna pertama penerima bantuan. Manfaat mengurangi kehilangan panen memperkuat kelayakan kebijakan perluasan penggunaan CH di Indonesia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document