Fiscal Rules Cause Lower Debt: Evidence from Switzerland’s Federal Debt Containment Rule

Kyklos ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 73 (4) ◽  
pp. 605-642
Author(s):  
Michele Salvi ◽  
Christoph A. Schaltegger ◽  
Lukas Schmid
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Federal Debt

scholarly journals The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A Niskanen
Keyword(s):  
Price Level ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Public ◽  
General Price Level ◽  
Federal Debt ◽  
Fiscal Constitution ◽  
The Government

For the first 140 years of U.S. history, the federal budget was effectively constrained by two fiscal rules: the formal limits within the Constitution on the enumerated spending powers and an informal rule that the government could borrow only during recessions and wars. At the end of the 1920s, federal expenditures were 2.6 percent of GNP. The federal debt was constrained to about equal to 16 percent of GNP. The general price level was roughly stable over this long period. Over the past six decades, however, federal expenditures have increased to nearly 25 percent of GNP. Larger and more frequent budget deficits have increased the federal debt held by the public to an amount equal to about 50 percent of GNP. And the general price level is now about nine times the level at the beginning of this period. This dramatic change in fiscal and monetary conditions occurred without one amendment to the Constitution to authorize a change in the fiscal rules. Our effective fiscal constitution has been transformed into one in which Congress and the President may authorize any type or amount of expenditures and taxes, subject only to the voting rules for routine legislation. How did this happen? Should economists be concerned about this change in the fiscal constitution? What, if anything, should be done about it?

scholarly journals Die Durchsetzung der Haushaltspolitik und der Haushaltsführung

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Markus Huber
Keyword(s):  
Financial Management ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Budget Management ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
Fiscal Rule ◽  
Federal Debt

Adopting the debt break as the highest fiscal rule for the Swiss federal budget has ended the long legalization process surrounding the federal budget management. The debt break guarantees a passive-anticyclic budget policy by allowing discretionary measures during extraordinary circumstances. Through its standards in law and regulation, it binds the financial management to a supervisory fiscal rule. Furthermore, the Swiss federal debt break served as a model for the German federal debt break. It also functions as an addition to the various cantonal fiscal rules. While the German Federal Constitutional Court is able or even obliged to check whether each and every proposal is compliant with the debt break, the Swiss equivalent lacks any possibility for legal review. The cantonal budget laws, too, lack any judicial protection. To ensure that supervisory fiscal rules are enforced, financial policy actors can choose to follow the implementation laws. Also, the implementation of such is supervised by financial control authorities and independent control mechanisms within the budget laws. These enforcement mechanisms are supported by the principles of budget management that are valid throughout the entire budget and accounting process. Comparing the enforceability of the Swiss federal budget with its cantonal equivalents as well as the German federal debt break leads to the question whether the Swiss rules are sufficiently actionable. For the Swiss federal budget, the possibilities for legal enforcement or even individual legal protection are indeed only indirect and very limited. Still, expanding legal measures for enforcing standards under the current financial legislation would be alien to the system and cannot be accomplished without additional friction between their enforcement and other financial laws and policies. In addition to simply expanding enforcement capabilities, it is worth considering and evaluating alternatives. It is especially recommended to continuously examine whether current budget laws are compatible with and suitable for achieving a medium- to long-term budget balance.

Analysis of tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Evsey T. Gurvich ◽  
Natalia A. Krasnopeeva
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
National Economy ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Federal Level ◽  
Regional Budgets ◽  
Econometric Technique

We study the tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets. Causal relationship running from taxing to spending is found, thus supporting the concept “tax and spend” suggested by M. Friedman. Next, elasticity of expenditure by revenue is estimated for a panel of 80 regional budgets basing on data for 2000—2017. Estimates are in the range of 0.72 to 0.78 (depending on the econometric technique), which exceeds elasticity for the federal budget more than twice. This evidences that fiscal policy at the sub-federal (as distinct from the federal) level has clear pro-cyclical nature. Besides, the largest sensitivity of expenditure to revenue shocks is found for the item “national economy”, implying marked adverse implications for economic growth. We suggest to mitigate this effect by modifying fiscal rules for sub-federal budgets. They are currently aimed primarily at enhancing fiscal discipline, with less emphasis on countercyclical policy, insulating economy from fiscal shocks.

Fiscal rules: Excessive limitation or indispensable instrument of fiscal sustainability?

2016 ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich ◽  
I. Sokolov
Keyword(s):  
Historical Data ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Sustainability ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
Base Price ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Fiscal Balance ◽  
Lower Size ◽  
Budget Expenditure

In-depth analysis of international and Russia’s experiences with implementing fiscal rules is presented. Theoretical and empirical evidences are suggested in favor of retaining the present fiscal rules with some modifications aimed at ensuring: a) a relatively stable level of federal budget expenditure with guaranteed full execution of all commitments; b) countercyclical fiscal policy, based on flexibleand proper reaction to revenue changes; and c) robustness of fiscal rules to internal and external shocks. The main new features suggested include modified calculation of the oil base price, different measurement of cyclical fiscal revenues, lower size of structural fiscal balance, and thorough specification of sources for each item of the balance. The modified rules envisage increased flexibility by relaxing to a pre-set extent and for a pre-set time spending limits in response to extreme shocks. The suggested version of fiscal rules has been tested by application to historical data for 2005-2015, and macro projections for 2015-2025.

The Future Ain’t What It Used to Be

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ashoka Mody
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Social Problems ◽  
Financial Integration ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
European Project ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Right

This chapter describes two scenarios, the two possible ways in which the final act of the European project plays out. In the first scenario, European authorities remain confident that they have essentially been on the right track and they continue to make modest course corrections, which they believe will ensure a brighter European future. However, the elusive and frustrating pursuit of deeper economic and financial integration causes more economic and political damage. Setbacks and crises recur to test the euro and its accompanying political vision. In the second scenario, the pro-European vision, European authorities recognize the important truth that “more Europe” will not solve Europe's most pressing economic and social problems. They dismantle the economically counterproductive and politically corrosive system of fiscal rules and rely more on financial markets to enforce fiscal discipline. Paradoxically, the euro survives, not because it adds value but because it becomes largely irrelevant.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document