scholarly journals Die Durchsetzung der Haushaltspolitik und der Haushaltsführung

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Markus Huber
Keyword(s):  
Financial Management ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Budget Management ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
Fiscal Rule ◽  
Federal Debt

Adopting the debt break as the highest fiscal rule for the Swiss federal budget has ended the long legalization process surrounding the federal budget management. The debt break guarantees a passive-anticyclic budget policy by allowing discretionary measures during extraordinary circumstances. Through its standards in law and regulation, it binds the financial management to a supervisory fiscal rule. Furthermore, the Swiss federal debt break served as a model for the German federal debt break. It also functions as an addition to the various cantonal fiscal rules. While the German Federal Constitutional Court is able or even obliged to check whether each and every proposal is compliant with the debt break, the Swiss equivalent lacks any possibility for legal review. The cantonal budget laws, too, lack any judicial protection. To ensure that supervisory fiscal rules are enforced, financial policy actors can choose to follow the implementation laws. Also, the implementation of such is supervised by financial control authorities and independent control mechanisms within the budget laws. These enforcement mechanisms are supported by the principles of budget management that are valid throughout the entire budget and accounting process. Comparing the enforceability of the Swiss federal budget with its cantonal equivalents as well as the German federal debt break leads to the question whether the Swiss rules are sufficiently actionable. For the Swiss federal budget, the possibilities for legal enforcement or even individual legal protection are indeed only indirect and very limited. Still, expanding legal measures for enforcing standards under the current financial legislation would be alien to the system and cannot be accomplished without additional friction between their enforcement and other financial laws and policies. In addition to simply expanding enforcement capabilities, it is worth considering and evaluating alternatives. It is especially recommended to continuously examine whether current budget laws are compatible with and suitable for achieving a medium- to long-term budget balance.

Fiscal rules as an instrument of balanced budget policy

2017 ◽  
pp. 5-32 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Kudrin ◽  
I. Sokolov
Keyword(s):  
Structural Changes ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
Current Version ◽  
Economic Cycle ◽  
Fiscal Rule ◽  
Budget Policy

In the article the authors attempt to understand the extent to which fiscal rules that were applied earlier in Russia and are in force at the present time are systemic and balanced, which requirements must be met by an effective fiscal rule in current conditions. So, according to the authors, fiscal rules should allow to adapt the budget to the requirements of financing structural changes in the economy and to maintain control over long-term budgetary sustainability. However, the new fiscal rules, introduced in July 2017, imposing excessively tight restrictions on the volume of federal budget expenditures, will not allow to provide the necessary amount of expenditures for economic development and financing of structural reforms. In this regard, a consistent transformation of the current version of fiscal rules to the framework on the basis of a zero structural balance is justified. The preparation of federal budget, balanced on a cyclical basis, can provide a relatively stable level of expenditure, regardless of the volatility of oil prices and the economic cycle, thereby realizing the countercyclical nature of fiscal policy and reducing the budget vulnerability to internal and external shocks. The effectiveness of the proposed fiscal rule is verified through modeling on data for 2007-2016. In particular, if we had used the proposed rule starting from the second half of the 2000s, it would have been possible to curb the growth of federal budget expenditures that began with the anti-crisis measures of 2009, halve the level of public debt and accumulate sovereign reserves in the amount of up to 25% of GDP. At the same time, the proposed rule requires high quality of macroeconomic and budgetary forecasting.

scholarly journals The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution

1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 13-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A Niskanen
Keyword(s):  
Price Level ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
The Public ◽  
General Price Level ◽  
Federal Debt ◽  
Fiscal Constitution ◽  
The Government

For the first 140 years of U.S. history, the federal budget was effectively constrained by two fiscal rules: the formal limits within the Constitution on the enumerated spending powers and an informal rule that the government could borrow only during recessions and wars. At the end of the 1920s, federal expenditures were 2.6 percent of GNP. The federal debt was constrained to about equal to 16 percent of GNP. The general price level was roughly stable over this long period. Over the past six decades, however, federal expenditures have increased to nearly 25 percent of GNP. Larger and more frequent budget deficits have increased the federal debt held by the public to an amount equal to about 50 percent of GNP. And the general price level is now about nine times the level at the beginning of this period. This dramatic change in fiscal and monetary conditions occurred without one amendment to the Constitution to authorize a change in the fiscal rules. Our effective fiscal constitution has been transformed into one in which Congress and the President may authorize any type or amount of expenditures and taxes, subject only to the voting rules for routine legislation. How did this happen? Should economists be concerned about this change in the fiscal constitution? What, if anything, should be done about it?

scholarly journals Sustainability and Control Issues of the Financial Management of Local Governments – Through Hungary’s Example

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 53-57
Author(s):  
Csaba Lentner
Keyword(s):  
Control System ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Operational Risk ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Major Reform ◽  
And Control

Abstract The rules and control mechanisms pertaining to the financial management of local governments enhance the sustainability of their budgets, that is, they have an operational risk mitigating effect. This paper presents the Hungarian system of self-government, and its fiscal rules, which have undergone a major reform since 2011, and the system of duties and financing have been aligned. The paper evaluates the reform process that commenced in 2011, and the effectiveness of budgetary regulations. The second half of the paper presents the control system of Hungarian local governments, the strengthening of which also has promoted the sustainability of financial management.

Fiscal Rules and the Behavior of Public Investment in Costa Rica and Panama: Towards Growth-Friendly Fiscal Policy?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliécer Arce ◽  
Edgar A. Robles
Keyword(s):  
Costa Rica ◽  
Financial Management ◽  
Capital Expenditure ◽  
Public Investment ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Public Financial Management ◽  
Rule Compliance ◽  
Pile Up ◽  
Fiscal Rule

This paper aims to provide evidence on the effects of fiscal rules on public investment, fiscal results and growth in Costa Rica and Panama. First, we find that the budget formulation process and the political economy behind the adoption and compliance of fiscal rules explain that Panama has a bias to create and sequentially pile up rules, while Costa Rica has a tendency not to comply with them. Second, a retrospective analysis of the 2018 fiscal rules in both nations finds asymmetric effects on the fiscal results. In Panama it is difficult to separate the effect of fiscal rule designs on public investment; and, in Costa Rica, the application of the fiscal rule will decrease public investment, if the debt to GDP ratio exceeds 60 percent and current expenditure crowds out capital expenditure. Two lessons emerge. First, an effective fiscal rule compliance requires time consistent institutions, solid monitoring, enforcement schemes and improving the quality of public financial management systems. Second, it is necessary to review the design of fiscal rules in both countries to ensure they are investment and growth friendly.

Analysis of tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-29
Author(s):  
Evsey T. Gurvich ◽  
Natalia A. Krasnopeeva
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Causal Relationship ◽  
National Economy ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
Fiscal Discipline ◽  
Federal Level ◽  
Regional Budgets ◽  
Econometric Technique

We study the tax-spend nexus for Russian regional budgets. Causal relationship running from taxing to spending is found, thus supporting the concept “tax and spend” suggested by M. Friedman. Next, elasticity of expenditure by revenue is estimated for a panel of 80 regional budgets basing on data for 2000—2017. Estimates are in the range of 0.72 to 0.78 (depending on the econometric technique), which exceeds elasticity for the federal budget more than twice. This evidences that fiscal policy at the sub-federal (as distinct from the federal) level has clear pro-cyclical nature. Besides, the largest sensitivity of expenditure to revenue shocks is found for the item “national economy”, implying marked adverse implications for economic growth. We suggest to mitigate this effect by modifying fiscal rules for sub-federal budgets. They are currently aimed primarily at enhancing fiscal discipline, with less emphasis on countercyclical policy, insulating economy from fiscal shocks.

Fiscal rules: Excessive limitation or indispensable instrument of fiscal sustainability?

2016 ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Gurvich ◽  
I. Sokolov
Keyword(s):  
Historical Data ◽  
Federal Budget ◽  
Fiscal Sustainability ◽  
Fiscal Rules ◽  
External Shocks ◽  
Base Price ◽  
Depth Analysis ◽  
Fiscal Balance ◽  
Lower Size ◽  
Budget Expenditure

In-depth analysis of international and Russia’s experiences with implementing fiscal rules is presented. Theoretical and empirical evidences are suggested in favor of retaining the present fiscal rules with some modifications aimed at ensuring: a) a relatively stable level of federal budget expenditure with guaranteed full execution of all commitments; b) countercyclical fiscal policy, based on flexibleand proper reaction to revenue changes; and c) robustness of fiscal rules to internal and external shocks. The main new features suggested include modified calculation of the oil base price, different measurement of cyclical fiscal revenues, lower size of structural fiscal balance, and thorough specification of sources for each item of the balance. The modified rules envisage increased flexibility by relaxing to a pre-set extent and for a pre-set time spending limits in response to extreme shocks. The suggested version of fiscal rules has been tested by application to historical data for 2005-2015, and macro projections for 2015-2025.

scholarly journals A Populist Monster and the future of Constitutional Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 83-100
Author(s):  
Andraž Teršek
Keyword(s):  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Court Decisions ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Council Of Europe ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
The Rule Of Law ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Eu

Abstract The central objective of the post-socialist European countries which are also Member States of the EU and Council of Europe, as proclaimed and enshrined in their constitutions before their official independence, is the establishment of a democracy based on the rule of law and effective legal protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms. In this article the author explains what, in his opinion, is the main problem and why these goals are still not sufficiently achieved: the ruthless simplification of the understanding of the social function and functioning of constitutional courts, which is narrow, rigid and holistically focused primarily or exclusively on the question of whether the judges of these courts are “left or right” in purely daily-political sense, and consequently, whether constitutional court decisions are taken (described, understood) as either “left or right” in purely and shallow daily-party-political sense/manner. With nothing else between and no other foundation. The author describes such rhetoric, this kind of superficial labeling/marking, such an approach towards constitutional law-making as a matter of unbearable and unthinking simplicity, and introduces the term A Populist Monster. The reasons that have led to the problem of this kind of populism and its devastating effects on the quality and development of constitutional democracy and the rule of law are analyzed clearly and critically.

Implication Juridical Decision of The Constitutional Court No. 18/PUU-XVII/2019 Concerning Wanprestasi In the Fiducia Agreement

2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 12-21
Author(s):  
Soleh Hasan Wahid ◽  
Harum Mudrikah Mahsun
Keyword(s):  
Legal Protection ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Literature Study ◽  
Breach Of Contract ◽  
Library Research ◽  
Security Holder ◽  
Approach Method ◽  
Data Collection Technique ◽  
Research Type

The purpose of this paper is to criticize the Constitutional Court Decision Number 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019, which determines that the phrases "executorial power" and "are the same as court decisions having permanent legal force" in Article 15 paragraph (2) of Law Number 42 of 1999 concerning The Fiduciary Guarantee contradicts the 1945 Constitution. From the norms contained in this article, there is a power of execution that the fiduciary security holder can carry out (creditors), which then causes many problems, both related to the constitutionality of norms and implementation. Thus, the authors question two things, first how is the juridical analysis of the Constitutional Court decision No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 regarding breach of contract in the fiduciary agreement? Second, what is the juridical implication of MK Decision No. fiduciary? The writer's research type is library research, a literature study (library research) with a descriptive qualitative research type. The data collection technique used was documentation techniques, and the approach method used in this study was juridical normative. The results of this study conclude that 1) The Constitutional Court's decision has not provided a sense of justice as in Article 27 paragraph (1) and Article 28D paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution, because in this Constitutional Court decision gives more exclusive rights to the debtor because in this case, the creditor does not get legal protection rights in the event of undesirable things (2) This decision has implications for various parties, namely the Court, which now often receives requests for execution and the process will be lengthy, for notaries must add and clarify default clauses in detail. For business people whose creditors (fiduciary recipients) cannot carry out unilateral execution of the object of fiduciary security but must submit a request for performance to the Court. There is a concern that lousy faith will occur from the community's debtor when the creditor is submitting a request for execution to the Court.

scholarly journals Implikasi Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 69/PUU/XIII/2015 Tentang Perjanjian Perkawinan Terhadap Tujuan Perkawinan

2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Moh. Faizur Rohman
Keyword(s):  
Domestic Violence ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Married Couples ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Marriage Law ◽  
Marriage Contract ◽  
Property Loss ◽  
Happy Family ◽  
Islamic Marriage

Abstract: this article discusses changes brought by the ruling of Constitutional Court No. 69/PUU/XIII/2015 which reviewed Marriage Law No. 1/1974, article 29 on pre nuptial agreement.  The article previously stated that such an agreement must be done prior or at the eve of marriage contract was signed. The Constitutional Court  decided upon a petition that nuptial agreement may be done prior the marriage or during the marriage. The implication of this reuling by Constitutional Court is the additional legal protection regime that women can have in marriage against misfortunes such as domestic violence and property loss. In doing so, married couples will be focused on the realization of islamic marriage of everlasting, peaceful and happy family.  Abstrak: Salah satu tujuan utama pernikahan adalah terbentuknya keluarga yang bahagia, kekal, penuh kasih sayang di antara suami istri. Namun di luar itu berkemungkinan terjadi permasalahan dalam perkawinan, sehingga butuh diadakan sebuah perjanjian perkawinan. Dalam Undang-Undang Perkawinan Nomor 1 Tahun 1974 pasal 29 ayat (1) disebutkan bahwa perjanjian perkawinan harus diadakan saat atau sebelum perkawinan dilaksanakan. Hal ini dapat mengganggu konsentrasi pasangan terhadap tujuan utama perkawinan. Ditetapkannya putusan MK Nomor 69/PUU/XIII/2015, menjadikan frasa “pada waktu atau sebelum perkawinan dilangsungkan” dalam pasal 29 ayat (1) dimaknai dengan “pada waktu, sebelum dilangsungkan atau selama dalam ikatan perkawinan”. Jadi, perjanjian perkawinan yang semula harus diadakan sebelum atau saat perkawinan dilangsungkan, sekarang boleh diadakan setelah perkawinan dilangsungkan selama dalam ikatan perkawinan. Implikasi dari hal ini adalah adanya perlindungan hukum lebih, terutama bagi perempuan agar tidak menjadi korban kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, menjamin perlindungan terhadap hak milik atau hak guna bangunan suatu harta, pasangan juga lebih fokus terhadap tujuan utama perkawinan yakni membentuk keluarga yang bahagia, kekal, penuh kasih sayang bersama pasangan.

scholarly journals SITA JAMINAN DALAM KEPAILITAN

Yuridika ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sriti Hesti Astiti
Keyword(s):  
Legal Protection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Court Decision ◽  
Bankruptcy Law ◽  
Legal Enforcement ◽  
The Law ◽  
Erroneous Interpretation

The law of bankruptcy basically has to pay more attention and give a proportionate legal protection between the interests of debtors to creditors, even also the interests of other credi-tors, who do not have a file in the bankruptcy process. Unfortunately, the legal protection for the other creditors which is regulated in Article 10 Law No. 37/2004 contains many weak-nesses and give many erroneous interpretation in the field of its structure, culture and the substance. Therefore, the legal enforcement and the conservatoir measures in bankruptcy law which has been intended to protect the legal interests of what we called “the other credi-tors” in the commercial court decision becomes unpredictable.Keyword : bankruptcy, other creditors, debtors.

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