scholarly journals Property rights and long‐run capital

Author(s):  
Julio Dávila
Keyword(s):  
2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Zonglai Kou ◽  
Xilin Wang

Abstract This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis of the effects of intellectual property rights on the take-off of an economy from an era of stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. We incorporate patent protection into a Schumpeterian growth model in which take-off occurs when the population size crosses an endogenous threshold. We find that strengthening patent protection has contrasting effects on economic growth at different stages of development. Specifically, it leads to an earlier take-off but also reduces economic growth in the long run.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Debao Hu ◽  
Zhengkai Liu ◽  
Jing Zhao

In this paper, we discuss the effects of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on FDI and indigenous innovation and the overall effects of IPR on the Southern and Northern countries. Our model predicts that tighter IPR is good for FDI and indigenous innovation; however, the effects vary according to the initial resource endowment such as skill level and absorptive capacity. By a game theory model, we also find that tighter IPR benefits both sides if the innovation is the common knowledge to both players, and it improves indigenous innovation and welfare in a short term, but they will emerge in the long run. We also discuss the further direction to an empirical study. Finally, we make the following conclusion: IPR is part of business environment, and tighter IPR in progress is good for boosting welfare of both sides. It is time to build a better environment for IPR, but the cost of patent enforcement policy and the trade barrier must be taken into account.


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Lueck ◽  
Gustavo Torrens

AbstractThis paper combines the property rights approach of Barzel with models from renewable resource and evolutionary economics to examine the domestication of wild animals. Wild animals are governed by weak property rights to stocks and individuals while domesticated animals are governed by private ownership of stocks and individuals. The complex evolutionary process of domestication can be viewed as a conversion of wild populations into private property, as well as a transition from natural selection to economic selection controlled by owners of populations and individuals. In our framework domestication is not the explicit goal of any economic agent, but it emerges as a long-run outcome of an innovation in hunting strategies in a hunter–gatherer society. Our formal model also suggests that the domestication process moves slowly at first but then proceeds rapidly, and is aligned with the archeological evidence on domestication events.


2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 792-829 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ian Keay ◽  
Cherie Metcalf

2017 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wubiao Zhou

ABSTRACTThis article investigates the relative roles of formal property rights institutions versus deregulated markets in entrepreneurial development, based on China's market transition. Empirically, it is not yet known which set of institutions matters more for entrepreneurship, particularly in the long run, despite the existence of well-established theoretical arguments for each. Using provincial-level panel data from China's transition economy, this study has the following findings: On average, both formal protection of property rights and deregulated markets have positive effects on entrepreneurial development; yet, as market transition progresses, the effect of formal protection of property rights increases, while that of deregulated markets decreases. These results are robust to both multiple model specifications and an endogeneity test using an instrumental variable approach. Overall, therefore, while both sets of institutions indeed play positive roles in entrepreneurial development, property rights institutions may be more fundamental in the long run.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document