Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A reply

Public Choice ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 609-609
Author(s):  
Gene E. Mumy
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Rights Sharing

Long-run efficiency and property rights sharing for pollution control: A comment

Public Choice ◽  
1981 ◽  
Vol 37 (3) ◽  
pp. 607-608
Author(s):  
Brian Beavis ◽  
Martin Walker
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Rights Sharing

scholarly journals Effects of patents on the transition from stagnation to growth

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 395-411 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Zonglai Kou ◽  
Xilin Wang
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Population Size ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Growth Model ◽  
Patent Protection ◽  
Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Schumpeterian Growth ◽  
Long Run

Abstract This study provides a growth-theoretic analysis of the effects of intellectual property rights on the take-off of an economy from an era of stagnation to a state of sustained economic growth. We incorporate patent protection into a Schumpeterian growth model in which take-off occurs when the population size crosses an endogenous threshold. We find that strengthening patent protection has contrasting effects on economic growth at different stages of development. Specifically, it leads to an earlier take-off but also reduces economic growth in the long run.

scholarly journals Will Intellectual Property Rights Policy Increase Foreign Direct Investment and Promote Technological Innovation?

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Debao Hu ◽  
Zhengkai Liu ◽  
Jing Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Business Environment ◽  
Theory Model ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Resource Endowment ◽  
Indigenous Innovation ◽  
Good For

In this paper, we discuss the effects of intellectual property rights (IPRs) on FDI and indigenous innovation and the overall effects of IPR on the Southern and Northern countries. Our model predicts that tighter IPR is good for FDI and indigenous innovation; however, the effects vary according to the initial resource endowment such as skill level and absorptive capacity. By a game theory model, we also find that tighter IPR benefits both sides if the innovation is the common knowledge to both players, and it improves indigenous innovation and welfare in a short term, but they will emerge in the long run. We also discuss the further direction to an empirical study. Finally, we make the following conclusion: IPR is part of business environment, and tighter IPR in progress is good for boosting welfare of both sides. It is time to build a better environment for IPR, but the cost of patent enforcement policy and the trade barrier must be taken into account.

Property rights and domestication

2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dean Lueck ◽  
Gustavo Torrens
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
Evolutionary Economics ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Renewable Resource ◽  
Wild Animals ◽  
Hunting Strategies ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Archeological Evidence

AbstractThis paper combines the property rights approach of Barzel with models from renewable resource and evolutionary economics to examine the domestication of wild animals. Wild animals are governed by weak property rights to stocks and individuals while domesticated animals are governed by private ownership of stocks and individuals. The complex evolutionary process of domestication can be viewed as a conversion of wild populations into private property, as well as a transition from natural selection to economic selection controlled by owners of populations and individuals. In our framework domestication is not the explicit goal of any economic agent, but it emerges as a long-run outcome of an innovation in hunting strategies in a hunter–gatherer society. Our formal model also suggests that the domestication process moves slowly at first but then proceeds rapidly, and is aligned with the archeological evidence on domestication events.

AN ITERATIVE PROCEDURE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION CONTROL UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (03) ◽  
pp. 279-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
NICOLAS QUEROU
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Pollution Control ◽  
Iterative Procedure ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Full Information ◽  
Nash Implementation ◽  
Tax Rate ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Regulation Model ◽  
Number Of Firms

We consider a repeated regulation model in an oligopoly under asymmetric information with pollution. An iterative procedure is proposed where the regulator designs stationary taxes, and firms are not required to be perfectly rational. They can form and update simple beliefs about their competitors' aggregate output at each period. Two versions of the mechanism are provided depending on whether firms behave adaptively or with perfect foresight. Conditions under which the procedure converges to a unique steady state are provided. It is proved that there exists a suitable stationary tax policy that enables the firms to adjust to socially optimal choices in the long run. The tax rates of both versions are typically strictly less than the ones that result from a full information, Nash implementation. Moreover, in the myopic case, the tax rate decreases as the number of firms increases. We discuss problems relating to the potential implementation of the procedure.

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