scholarly journals Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

2013 ◽  
Vol 45 (6) ◽  
pp. 1147-1164 ◽  
Author(s):  
ASLI DEMIRGUC-KUNT ◽  
ENRICA DETRAGIACHE ◽  
OUARDA MERROUCHE
Author(s):  
V. Kovalenko ◽  
S. Sheludko ◽  
N. Radova ◽  
F. Murshudli ◽  
K. Gonchar

The paper analyzes the evolution of the introduction of international standards for bank capital regulation. The aim of the research is to study international standards for bank capital regulation and their impact on financial stability and sustainability of domestic banking systems. The 2007—2009 Global Financial Crisis was perhaps the greatest banking and financial crisis since bank failures and the financial panic of the Great Depression in early 1930s. According to academics and professionals, there has been much debate over the last decade as to whether the 2007—2009 banking crisis was primarily a solvency crisis or a liquidity crisis. Capital adequacy of banks today is the main indicator of increasing society’s confidence in banking systems. The flexible and balanced implementation of Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) recommendations on the assessment of bank capital adequacy is of particular importance in the context of the deepening economic crisis caused by COVID-19 quarantine restrictions. Regulation of bank capital is primarily settles by the ability to execute basic functions inherent in it. A number of shocks in connection with the crisis require the renewal and search for a new paradigm of regulation, which today is focused on achieving financial stability, overcoming pro-cyclicality, especially in the banking sector. One of the latest developments in the field of bank capital regulation has been the implementation of international banking supervision standards recommended by BCBS, which have been transformed from Basel I, Basel II, Basel III, Basel 3.5 to Basel IV. The new ideology suggests that in times of financial and economic crisis or in anticipation of growing uncertainty in the economy, it is necessary to abandon the idea of bank capital management and the creation of financial reserves to maintain liquidity and stability of financial institutions. These measures will not be able to protect the bank from default and bankruptcy. This ideology has become a new paradigm of effective banking regulation, which can be formulated as an accepted set of three vectors: risk; risk management; risk-oriented supervision.


Author(s):  
Mark E. Van Der Weide ◽  
Jeffrey Y. Zhang

Regulators responded with an array of strategies to shore up weaknesses exposed by the 2008 financial crisis. This chapter focuses on reforms to bank capital regulation. We first discuss the ways in which the post-crisis Basel III reforms recalibrated the existing framework by improving the quality of capital, increasing the quantity of capital, and improving the calculation of risk weights. We then shift to the major structural changes in the regulatory capital framework—capital buffers on top of the minimum requirements; a leverage ratio that explicitly accounts for off-balance-sheet exposures; risk-based and leverage capital surcharges on the largest banks; bail-in debt to facilitate orderly resolution; and forward-looking stress tests. We conclude with a quantitative assessment of the evolution of capital in the global banking system and in the US banking sector.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 15
Author(s):  
Nidya Rahmanita ◽  
Renny Miryanti

Global Financial Crisis has revealed major weakness in the design and implementation of the existing economic governance framework of the European Union. In addition, the first temporary fiscal backstop is EFSF (The European Financial Stability Facility) as a temporary crisis resolution mechanism by the Euro area Member States. In this case, The EFSF does not provide any further financial assistance, so the task of EFSF being replace by the new mechanism that includes the establishment of a permanent crisis management mechanism as the safeguard against imbalances in individual countries that is ESM (European Stability Mechanism). Spain as one of the Eurozone Member States that fall on financial crisis caused by disproportionate growth in the real estate sector, along with the expansion of credit, on 25 June 2012 made an official request for financial assistance through ESM for its banking system. In accordance with MoU, Spain must conduct a structural adjustment program through identifying individual bank capital needs, recapitalising and restructuring.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peiyi Yu ◽  
Jessica Hong Yang ◽  
Nada Kakabadse

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 73 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harald Benink

In this paper we analyze the effectiveness of more than 30 years of efforts by international banking supervisors, working together in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, to harmonize capital and liquidity standards for internationally active banks. Notwithstanding the great efforts and progress made by international banking supervisors since the financial crisis of 2007–2009, two important issues require further attention. First, although bank capital ratios have been raised significantly since the recent financial crisis, they are still at historically low levels. In a world in which global debt ratios have risen even further during the past decade, this is a worrying signal of fragility in the global financial system. Second, bank liquidity requirements may have become too complex and could also have unintented and unpredictable interaction effects with bank capital requirements.


2012 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 377-392 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aigbe Akhigbe ◽  
Jeff Madura ◽  
Marek Marciniak

2021 ◽  
pp. 100891
Author(s):  
Deniz Anginer ◽  
Ata Can Bertay ◽  
Robert Cull ◽  
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt ◽  
Davide S. Mare

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