Debt covenants and asset versus equity acquisitions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Surendranath Rakesh Jory ◽  
Thanh Ngo ◽  
Ca Nguyen
Keyword(s):  
Debt Covenants

Does Utility Regulation Substitute for Debt Covenants?

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ervin L. Black ◽  
Thomas A. Carnes ◽  
Joshua Mallett ◽  
Michael Mosebach
Keyword(s):  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Utility Regulation

The Relation between Accounting Information in Debt Covenants and Operating Leases

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 969-996 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Gyung H. Paik ◽  
Joyce A. van der Laan Smith ◽  
Brandon Byunghwan Lee ◽  
Sung Wook Yoon
Keyword(s):  
Balance Sheet ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Debt Contracts ◽  
Debt Contracting ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Operating Leases ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Accounting Ratios ◽  
Lease Accounting

SYNOPSIS Proposed changes by the FASB and the IASB to lease accounting standards will substantially change the accounting for operating leases by requiring the capitalization of future lease payments. We consider the impact of these changes on firms' debt covenants by examining the frequency of income-statement- versus balance-sheet-based accounting ratios in debt covenants of firms in high and low Off Balance Sheet (OBS) lease industries. Based on debt contracts from the 1996–2009 period, our results provide evidence that lenders focus on balance sheet (income statement) ratios in designing debt covenants for borrowers in low (high) OBS lease industries. Further, the use of balance-sheet- (income-statement-) based covenants falls (rises) faster in high OBS lease industries than in low OBS lease industries as the use of OBS leasing increases. This evidence indicates that OBS operating leases influence lenders' use of accounting information in covenants, suggesting that creditors consider the impact of OBS leases when structuring debt agreements. These results also suggest that the proposed capitalization of OBS leases may not result in firms violating loan covenants but will make the balance sheet a more complete source of information for debt contracting by removing the need for constructive capitalization of OBS leases.

Debt Covenants and Accounting Manipulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Volker Laux
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Control Rights ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Per Se

This paper studies the effects of allocating control rights to lenders via debt covenants when managers can sometimes misreport the accounting information on which the covenants are based. When contract renegotiation is exogenously prohibited, including a covenant in the contract is ex ante optimal because it increases both the probability that poor projects are liquidated and the manager's effort incentive. When the parties can renegotiate the contract, the results can flip: Granting the lender more control can lead to less frequent liquidations of low-quality projects and lower managerial effort incentives and thereby reduce the manager's ex ante payoff. The key behind these results is not the manager's incentive to misreport per se but her desire to take subsequent actions that conceal the misreporting. The model generates predictions regarding the determinants of accounting-based covenants, and the effects of covenants on misreporting, managerial effort, the frequency of liquidations, and firm value.

Debt Covenants and Risk-Taking

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chris Armstrong ◽  
Carlo Maria Gallimberti ◽  
David Tsui
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Debt Covenants

scholarly journals The Role of Debt Covenant in Moderating the Effects of Poilitical Cost on Accounting Conservatism

2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (9) ◽  
pp. 505-510
Author(s):  
Nur Fatwa Basar ◽  
Andi Hendro
Keyword(s):  
Financial Services ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Debt Covenants ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Political Costs ◽  
Political Cost ◽  
Debt Covenant

The purpose of this study was to analyze the direct effect of political cost and debt covenant on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study also analyzes the role of debt covenants as a moderator between the effect of political cost on accounting conservatism. The companies that are the samples are companies indexed on the IDX30 other than financial services companies and companies with non-rupiah financial reports. the data used is secondary data from the financial statements of 20 companies listed on the Indonesian stock exchange. data analysis using multiple linear regression and analysis of variance. The results showed that political cost directly affects accounting conservatism positively and significantly. whereas debt covenant does not have a direct significant effect on accounting conservatism. Besides, this study shows the role of debt covenants in strengthening the effect of political costs on accounting conservatism.

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