scholarly journals Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints

2014 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 427-442 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin ◽  
Nicolas Drouhin
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
Tacit Collusion

scholarly journals Scanner Data: New Opportunities for Demand and Competitive Strategy Analysis

1994 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 125-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald W. Cotterill
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Scanner Data ◽  
Strategy Analysis ◽  
Price Response ◽  
Oligopoly Model ◽  
Sufficient Detail ◽  
Bertrand Price Competition ◽  
Reaction Equations

This paper reviews prior research by agricultural economists on the demand for food products using scanner data. Thereafter, a differentiated product's oligopoly model with Bertrand price competition is developed and used to specify brand level demand and oligopoly price reaction equations. The model has sufficient detail to estimate brand level price elasticities and price response elasticities which in turn can be used to estimate three indices of market power. The first index estimated is the familiar Rothschild Index. The paper develops estimates two new indexes, the observed index and the Chamberlin quotient for tacit collusion. It concludes with comments on how the proposed method for the measurement of market power in a differentiated oligopoly can be improved.

The Hawaiian Airline Industry, 2001–2008

2017 ◽  
pp. 1-6
Author(s):  
Brett Saraniti
Keyword(s):  
Risk Factors ◽  
Airline Industry ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
First Year ◽  
The Third ◽  
Price War ◽  
The Government ◽  
One Year ◽  
Industry Risk

Two Hawaiian airlines' cooperative environment is disrupted by the entry of a third competitor, Mesa Airways. The price war leads to fares as low as $0 and causes more than $100 million in losses in the first year with no end in sight. Industry risk factors for price competition were reduced in 2001 when the government granted a one-year reprieve from anti-trust laws, but increased dramatically after Mesa's announced entry.To demonstrate how industry risk factors drive price competition. The initial circumstances are supportive of a tacit collusion between two firms; following the entry of the third airline, conditions were more conducive to a devastating price war.

scholarly journals DYNAMIC PRICE COMPETITION WITH CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS AND A STRATEGIC BUYER

2014 ◽  
Vol 55 (3) ◽  
pp. 943-958 ◽  
Author(s):  
James J. Anton ◽  
Gary Biglaiser ◽  
Nikolaos Vettas
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
Dynamic Price

scholarly journals A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints

2019 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 95-120
Author(s):  
Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin ◽  
Nicolas Drouhin
Keyword(s):  
General Model ◽  
Price Competition ◽  
Capacity Constraints

Environmental Taxes in Duopoly with Soft Capacity Constraints

2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (4) ◽  
pp. 1569-1584
Author(s):  
Henrik Vetter
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Cournot Competition ◽  
Capacity Constraints ◽  
Environmental Taxes ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Environmental Tax ◽  
Unit Tax ◽  
Qualitative Nature

Abstract This paper examines an environmental tax when duopolistic firms engage in capacity-price competition. Under soft capacity constraints, the equilibrium ranges from Bertrand competition to Cournot competition, depending upon parameters. It is shown that a unit tax potentially changes the qualitative nature of equilibrium. That is, the type of tax affects the mode of competition between firms. This effect gives rise to the result that a unit tax is sometimes an inefficient instrument. The explanation is that the tax that leads to the first-best under Cournot competition will in fact sustain Bertrand competition, and vice versa.

New York Flow Control with Deterministic En Route Capacity Constraints

2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-172
Author(s):  
Shon Grabbe ◽  
Banavar Sridhar ◽  
Avijit Mukherjee
Keyword(s):  
New York ◽  
Flow Control ◽  
Capacity Constraints
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