Do companies try to conceal financial misstatements through auditor shopping?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zvi Singer ◽  
Jing Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Financial Misstatements

The Effect of Misstatements on Decisions of Financial Statement Users: An Experimental Investigation of Auditor Materiality Thresholds

2002 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Tuttle ◽  
Maribeth Coller ◽  
R. David Plumlee
Keyword(s):  
Economic Condition ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Critical Factor ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Asset Markets ◽  
Market Prices ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Experimental Asset Markets ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Materiality Thresholds

Auditors are faced with the dilemma of inferring materiality based, in part, on whether a given level of financial misstatement will affect the decisions of statement users. Misstatements in accounting information that are below the materiality threshold are not expected to change users' assessments of a company's economic condition. While the auditing profession accepts materiality in concept, its application in practice is more controversial. In certain settings, the nature of a misstatement, such as changing a small profit into a loss, may affect an auditor's materiality judgment. However, in many cases the magnitude of the misstatement is a critical factor in judging materiality. We focus solely on the issue of magnitude and examine whether financial misstatements that are at or below commonly applied materiality thresholds result in market prices that differ from those resulting from correctly stated information. We conduct a series of 12 experimental asset markets each consisting of 12 independent three-minute trading periods with six traders in each market. We then compare prices for companies generated by markets that are provided either correctly stated information, information containing misstatements that would typically be considered immaterial, or information containing material misstatements. Results indicate that undisclosed misstatements within materiality thresholds that are consistent with current audit practice do not affect market prices, while misstatements well above these thresholds do.

Determinants of Hedge Fund Internal Controls and Fees

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (6) ◽  
pp. 1887-1919 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gavin Cassar ◽  
Joseph Gerakos
Keyword(s):  
Hedge Funds ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Hedge Fund ◽  
Short Selling ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Fund Managers ◽  
Asset Value ◽  
Net Asset Value ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement

ABSTRACT: We investigate the determinants of hedge fund internal controls and their association with the fees that funds charge investors. Hedge funds are subject to minimal regulation. Hence, hedge fund managers voluntarily implement internal controls, and managers and investors freely contract on fees. We find that internal controls are stronger in funds with higher potential agency costs. Further, internal controls are stronger in funds domiciled in jurisdictions that provide investors with limited legal redress for fraud and financial misstatements. Short selling funds, however, are more likely to protect information about their investment positions by implementing weaker internal controls. With respect to fees, we find that the percentage of positive profits that the manager receives increases in the strength of the fund’s internal controls. Finally, removing the manager from setting and reporting the fund’s official net asset value, along with reputational incentives and monitoring by leverage providers, are all associated with lower likelihoods of future regulatory investigations of fraud and/or financial misstatement.

Auditors' Responses to Classification Shifting: Evidence from U.S. Firms

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mai Dao ◽  
Hongkang Xu ◽  
Trung Pham
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Real Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Report ◽  
Audit Opinion ◽  
Income Statement ◽  
Financial Restatements ◽  
Classification Shifting ◽  
Financial Misstatements

This study examines how auditors react to clients' engagement in classification shifting which refers to the intentional misallocation of line items within the income statement. We find that classification shifting is positively associated with audit fees, audit report lags, the issuance of a modified audit opinion, and auditor resignations. Additional analyses show that auditors' responses to multiple-year classification shifting are similar to our main findings. We further find that classification shifting is associated with a higher likelihood of financial misstatements in the classification shifting year, and future announcements of financial restatements. We also find that the probability of future restatements is even higher when audit clients engage in both classification shifting and real earnings management. Overall, our results imply that auditors become more cautious in response to audit clients' classification shifting behavior.

CFO Outside Directorship and Financial Misstatements

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 59-75
Author(s):  
Sarfraz Khan
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Learning Opportunities ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Firm Characteristics ◽  
Board Membership ◽  
Lower Likelihood ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Organizational Embeddedness ◽  
Jel Classifications

SYNOPSIS I study an important accounting consequence—financial misstatements—of CFO outside board membership. I find that firms with CFOs holding outside directorships have a lower likelihood of misstatements. These results likely reflect the benefits accruing to CFOs' home firms in terms of improved financial reporting quality. These findings are based on several methods that control for unobserved factors that may affect both incidence of CFO outside directorships and a firm's financial misstatements. I also provide some preliminary insights into CFO and home firm characteristics that determine CFO outside board directorships. My findings are consistent with the inter-organizational embeddedness perspective, suggesting that inter-firm networks provide sources for counseling and learning opportunities, which executives can use to improve their home firms' performance. JEL Classifications: M41.

Industry-Specific Knowledge Transfer in Audit Firms: Evidence from Audit Firm Mergers in China

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xianjie He ◽  
S.P. Kothari ◽  
Tusheng Xiao ◽  
Luo Zuo
Keyword(s):  
Treatment Group ◽  
Knowledge Transfer ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Difference In Differences ◽  
Audit Firm ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Different Levels

Using a difference-in-differences approach, we examine the effect of industry-specific knowledge transfer on audit performance after a merger of two Chinese audit firms with different levels of expertise in an industry. For clients in an industry audited by both merging audit firms, those audited by the audit firm less specialized in that industry belong to the treatment group, while all other clients belong to the control group. We find an economically-significant improvement in audit quality (as reflected in a reduction in financial misstatements) for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same merged audit firm. We show that the treatment effect is not driven by changes in auditor incentives or personnel movement and is more pronounced when we expect stronger communication between the less and more specialized auditors after the merger. We caution that our findings are specific to China and may not generalize to other countries.

Does the use of honorific appellations in audit reports connote higher financial misstatement risk? Evidence from China

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (2) ◽  
pp. 154-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Chen ◽  
Xingqiang Du ◽  
Shaojuan Lai ◽  
Mary Ma
Keyword(s):  
Audit Quality ◽  
Positive Association ◽  
Auditor Independence ◽  
Accounting Firms ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Financial Misstatements ◽  
Financial Misstatement ◽  
Chinese Auditors ◽  
Audit Reports

Purpose From the sociolinguistic perspective, the purpose of this paper is to examine whether the honorific and actual-name appellations that Chinese auditors use to address clients in audit reports connote differential financial misstatement risk. Specifically, the authors hypothesize that auditors’ use of honorifics signals their inferior social status relative to their clients, thereby leading to compromised auditor independence, lower audit quality, and higher financial misstatement risk. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of manually coded appellation data from audit reports of Chinese public firms between 2003 and 2012 to conduct the research. Findings The authors find significantly greater financial misstatements, both in terms of likelihoods and magnitudes, for companies addressed by honorifics than for those addressed by actual names. Moreover, compared to auditors’ consistent honorific usage, discretionary honorific usage has a stronger positive association with misstatements. The authors further show that the positive association between honorific usage and client misstatement risk weakens when the audit firm is a Top 10 accounting firms in China, is an industry specialist, is formed as a partnership, or resides in a more concentrated audit market. Originality/value This study contributes to the sociolinguistics literature in accounting and provides evidence supporting the reform proposed by the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board to enhance the usefulness of audit reporting.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document