Individual Large Shareholders, Earnings Management, and Capital-Market Consequences

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (7-8) ◽  
pp. 872-902 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yiwei Dou ◽  
Ole-Kristian Hope ◽  
Wayne B. Thomas ◽  
Youli Zou
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Market Consequences

How Does Intentional Earnings Smoothing Vary With Managerial Ability?

2017 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 406-437 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Demerjian ◽  
Melissa Lewis-Western ◽  
Sarah McVay
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Informed Trading ◽  
Executive Turnover ◽  
High Ability ◽  
Managerial Ability ◽  
Earnings Smoothing ◽  
Market Consequences ◽  
Do So

We investigate if high-ability managers are more likely to intentionally smooth earnings, a form of earnings management, and when they are more likely to do so. Although prior studies provide evidence that high-ability managers report higher quality earnings, the literature does not indicate whether this behavior is common because of (or happens in spite of) high-ability managers’ intentional smoothing activities. We find that (a) high-ability managers are significantly more likely to engage in intentional smoothing, (b) their intentional smoothing is associated with improved future operating performance, and (c) their intentional smoothing is more prevalent when the smoothing either benefits shareholders, the manager, or both. We do not, however, find evidence that high-ability managers who smooth are more likely to have engaged in informed trading or are more likely to consume perquisites. High-ability managers’ intentional smoothing is also associated with increased voluntary (but not forced) executive turnover, consistent with high-ability managers being motivated, at least in part, by how the capital market consequences of smoothing are expected to benefit shareholders, thereby bolstering their reputation.

Capital Market Consequences of Audit Office Size: Evidence from Stock Price Crash Risk

2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Jeffrey L. Callen ◽  
Xiaohua Fang ◽  
Baohua Xin ◽  
Wenjun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Capital Market ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Crash Risk ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Empirical Tests ◽  
Office Size ◽  
Market Consequences ◽  
Robust Evidence

SUMMARY This study examines the association between the office size of engagement auditors and their clients' future stock price crash risk, a consequence of managerial bad news hoarding. Using a sample of U.S. public firms with Big 4 auditors, we find robust evidence that local audit office size is significantly and negatively related to future stock price crash risk. The evidence is consistent with the view that large audit offices effectively detect and deter bad news hoarding activities in comparison with their smaller counterparts. We further explore two possible explanations for these findings, the Auditor Incentive Channel and the Auditor Competency Channel. Our empirical tests offer support for both channels. JEL Classifications: G12; G34; M49.

scholarly journals Reaksi Pasar atas Manajemen Laba

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fery Friyo Handoko ◽  
Mu'minatus Sholichah
Keyword(s):  
Data Analysis ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Abnormal Return ◽  
Accounting Information ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
Manufacturing Company ◽  
Simple Regression

Abstract This research examine the capital market reaction on earnings management.  Agency conflict represented by information asymetry caused earnings management.  Managers have incentive to play accounting method and estimate to gain certain amount of earnings.  Hereafter, investor have interest regarding their invesment decision.  They rely on accounting information that represented in financial statement.Based on premise in Signalling Theory, we then hypothesized that investor would response any information addressed to them.Sample and population that used to test hypothesis taken from listed manufacturing company during 2015-2017.  We documenting data from financial statement items.  We obtain 40 manufacturing company that comply to purposive sampling requirement.  We use simple regression to do data analysis.  We found the empirical evidence that market reac the earnings management indication.  There is empirical fact that cummulative abnormal return decreas when determinate by discretionarry accruals.  This research conclude that market reacting the earnings management indication generally.

The role of state ownership on earnings quality: evidence across public and private European firms

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (2) ◽  
pp. 312-332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina Gaio ◽  
Inês Pinto
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Capital Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
State Ownership ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Large Sample

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of state ownership on financial reporting quality regarding the characteristics of conservatism and earnings management. Design/methodology/approach Using a large sample of public and private European firms during the period 2003-2010, the authors test the hypotheses following Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) model for conservatism and the modified Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow and Sloan (1995) for earnings management. To ensure that the results are robust, the authors conduct sensitivity analysis with regard to potential endogeneity and selection bias. Findings The authors find that state-owned firms are less conservative than non-state-owned firms, which is consistent with the idea that there is less need for accounting conservatism due to government protection. The authors also show that capital markets play an important role in shaping the relation between state ownership and earnings management. Among public firms, the authors find that state-owned firms have higher abnormal accruals and worse accruals quality than non-state-owned firms, which suggests that state-owned firms are not immune to capital market pressures. Research limitations/implications The study has two limitations. First, as state-owned and non-state-owned firms face quite different incentive structures, management behavior might be determined by factors that have yet to be identified. Second, prior research results suggest an inverted U-shape relation between ownership concentration and earnings management (Ding et al., 2007). It would be interesting to investigate the impact of different levels of state ownership on earnings quality. Practical implications As the paper investigates the role of state ownership on earnings quality using a sample of European firms, it brings new insights regarding the role of state ownership in accounting quality and firm performance. In addition, it considers the role of capital markets in the relation between the quality of financial reporting and ownership by considering a sample with both public and private firms. Originality/value The study contributes to the debate about state intervention in the corporate sector, by extending the knowledge of the effects of government ownership on earnings quality by using a large sample of European firms. Furthermore, the authors also introduce the effect of capital market forces on managers’ behavior in state-owned and non-state-owned companies by analyzing private and publicly listed firms.

Client Relationships, Analyst Coverage, and Earnings Management

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhi Jin ◽  
Bingxuan Lin ◽  
Chen-Miao Lin
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Markets ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Mutual Fund ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Analyst Coverage ◽  
Client Relationships ◽  
Client Pressure ◽  
The Impact ◽  
A Company

Financial analysts have two important roles in the capital market. In addition to their informational role, which has been widely studied, they play an important monitoring role. Similar to their informational role, their monitoring role might be negatively affected when they face conflicts of interest. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we show that if analysts are under pressure (i.e., housed in a brokerage firm where specific mutual funds hold large positions in a company covered by the analyst), their role in lowering the firm earnings management activities is significantly compromised. We find that the closer the business relationship between the mutual fund and the brokerage firm, the greater the firm earnings management. Our findings caution investors and regulators to heed the impact of client pressure on analysts' roles in financial markets.

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