Contract choice for upstream innovation in a finance‐constrained supply chain

Author(s):  
Guangyuan Xing ◽  
Bing Xia ◽  
Jue Guo
Keyword(s):  
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
pp. 0
Author(s):  
Yafei Zu

<p style='text-indent:20px;'>Advertising has a crucial impact on a product's goodwill. To further improve a product's goodwill and make more profit, member firms in the supply chain use various contracts to coordinate the channel. Considering the dynamic effect of advertising, this paper studies a two-level supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The two members focus on maximizing their profits through advertising and pricing strategies under two types of contracts: the wholesale price contract and the consignment contract. The Stackelberg differential game is introduced, and the optimal advertising effort, wholesale and retail pricing strategies in the two situations are studied. Numerical examples and sensitivity analyses are conducted to explore the models further. The results show that the retailer's revenue proportion and the product's goodwill according to consumers significantly affect the strategies and the contract choice of the partner firms in the supply chain. A proportion of too high or too low revenue may lead to a contract selection conflict between the two partner firms. However, when consumers care more about the product's goodwill, this contract selection conflict can be weakened.</p>


2013 ◽  
Vol 143 (1) ◽  
pp. 188-197 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bai-Xun Li ◽  
Yong-Wu Zhou ◽  
Ji-zi Li ◽  
Shi-ping Zhou

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yonglong Wang ◽  
Xinyu Zheng ◽  
Jirong Cai ◽  
Yuelong Zheng

Retailer may exhibit irrationality when facing the risk of demand uncertainty; therefore, we consider four retailer behavioral preferences: risk neutral (RN), waste aversion (WA), stockout aversion (SA), and stockout-waste aversion (SW). The decision-making and contract choice of upstream and downstream enterprises in cases where demand depends on supplier’s effort are studied. The results show that if the retailer has only SA or RN preferences, then the supplier prefers to choose a wholesale price contract, while the retailer does the opposite, if the retailer has only WA, then the supplier prefers to choose a revenue sharing contract, but the retailer’s contract choice depends on the degree of waste aversion, and if the retailer has SW, then the contract choice of upstream and downstream enterprises is related to the degree of waste aversion and stockout aversion.


2020 ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
Keyword(s):  

Durant la période de confinement, la chaîne d’approvisionnement de la filière nucléaire a pleinement joué son rôle. Mais en sort-elle renforcée ? Si l’expérience acquise par les différents acteurs de la supply chain va lui offrir plus de robustesse, les difficultés économiques rencontrées par les autres filières industrielles, comme l’automobile ou l’aéronautique, risquent de fragiliser des acteurs essentiels à la filière nucléaire.


2020 ◽  
pp. 28-33
Author(s):  
Witold Strzelecki

Le changement climatique est le défi mondial majeur le plus urgent. Afin d’atténuer la tendance actuelle, l’Union européenne (UE) a fixé des objectifs ambitieux qui nécessitent un effort de tous et de tous les secteurs, énergétique en particulier. Une chaîne d’approvisionnement nucléaire solide et diversifiée peut aider l’UE à atteindre ses objectifs climatiques. Harmoniser la chaîne d’approvisionnement nucléaire européenne et assurer aux États membres de l’UE la possibilité d’utiliser des composants modernes de haute qualité fabriqués pour d’autres industries permettra d’amplifier le processus. FORATOM1 a précisément analysé la supply chain nécessaire à cette ambition.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document