Winning Coalition Size, State Capacity, and Time Horizons: An Application of Modified Selectorate Theory to Environmental Public Goods Provision

2014 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 264-279 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xun Cao ◽  
Hugh Ward
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
State Capacity ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Time Horizons ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Environmental Public Goods ◽  
Coalition Size

scholarly journals Selectorate theory, the democratic peace, and public goods provision

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 391-416 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Arena ◽  
Nicholas P. Nicoletti
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Democratic Politics ◽  
Democratic Peace ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
The Core ◽  
Realistic Picture ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Simple Models

We show that without a few peculiar modeling choices that are not justified by the core assumptions of the theory, selectorate theory neither unambiguously predicts the democratic peace nor that leaders of more inclusive regimes will rely upon the provision of public goods to remain in office, though they may be more likely to provide club goods. We illustrate these claims using relatively simple models that incorporate the core assumptions of their theory, while avoiding modeling choices we believe to be less appropriate. We argue for a revised version of selectorate theory, one that continues to emphasize the importance of the size of the winning coalition, yet we believe it provides a more realistic picture of democratic politics.

Retesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects ofWfrom Other Elements of Democracy

2008 ◽  
Vol 102 (3) ◽  
pp. 393-400 ◽  
Author(s):  
JAMES D. MORROW ◽  
BRUCE BUENO DE MESQUITA ◽  
RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON ◽  
ALASTAIR SMITH
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Political Survival ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Control Variables ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Coalition Size

Kevin Clarke and Randall Stone (2008) offer a methodological critique of some of our tests of the selectorate theory inThe Logic of Political Survival(Bueno de Mesquita et al.2003). We accept their critique of residualization for control variables in those tests, but reject the contention that the size of the winning coalition does not predict the provision of public goods and private benefits. We present new tests that control for elements of democracy other than W and that do not use residualization. These new tests show that selectorate theory is strongly and robustly supported. Our measure of the size of the winning coalition is in the theoretically predicted direction and is statistically significant for 28 out of 31 different public goods and private benefits. Aspects of democracy not contained in the selectorate theory explain less of the variance than does the theory's core factor, namely, winning coalition size, for 25 of the 31 public goods and private benefits.

Coalition Formation and Selectorate Theory: An Experiment

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 261-275
Author(s):  
Andrew W. Bausch
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Laboratory Experiment ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Target Individual ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Over Time

This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine how different rules for re-selecting the leader of a group affects how that leader builds a winning coalition. Leaders play an inter-group game and then distribute winnings from that game within their group before standing for re-selection. The results of the experiment show that leaders of groups with large winning coalition systems rely heavily on distributing winnings through public goods, while leaders of groups with small winning coalition systems are more likely to target specific citizens with private goods. Furthermore, the experiment shows that supporters of small coalition leaders benefit from that support in future rounds by receiving more private goods than citizens that did not support the leader. Meanwhile, citizens that support a large coalition leader do not benefit from this support in future rounds. Therefore, small coalition leaders target individual citizens to maintain a coalition over time in a way not possible in a group with a large winning coalition. Finally, in the experiment, small coalition leaders increased their payoffs over time, suggesting that once power has been consolidated, small coalition leaders narrow their coalition.

scholarly journals All or nothing: State capacity and optimal public goods provision

2020 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 104955 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Bierbrauer ◽  
Justus Winkelmann
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
State Capacity ◽  
Public Goods Provision

Chickens, Whales, and Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision

1982 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Taylor ◽  
Hugh Ward
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Simple Games ◽  
Public Goods Provision ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Alternative Models ◽  
Environmental Public Goods ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game

The game-theoretic literature on the problem of the provision of public goods has concentrated almost exclusively on one model—the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Several other simple games may be more applicable in certain situations. In particular, the game structure known as Chicken seems to provide a better description of an important sub-class of games where the good is lumpy rather than continuously divisible. Many environmental public goods belong to this category. A distinct paradox of public-goods provision occurs within games of Chicken.

scholarly journals Selectorate Theory in Hybrid Regimes: Comparing Hong Kong and Singapore

2017 ◽  
Vol 53 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-734
Author(s):  
Mathew Y. H. Wong
Keyword(s):  
Hong Kong ◽  
Winning Coalition ◽  
Control Case ◽  
Hybrid Regimes ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Selectorate Theory ◽  
Set Up ◽  
Coalition Size ◽  
Two Hybrid

This article investigates public and private goods provision in two hybrid regimes: Hong Kong and Singapore. We build on the selectorate theory, which analyses all regimes in terms of the size of their leaders’ support coalitions. This research follows a differences-in-differences design, with the exogenous political change in Hong Kong in 1997 as a treatment and Singapore as a control case. This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, as the aim of the selectorate theory is to transcend traditional regime typologies, a focus on hybrid regimes provides another test of the theory beyond the democratic–authoritarian divide. Second, the distinctive comparative set-up allows us to disentangle the effects of the size of the winning coalition from those of supporter loyalty. The empirical results demonstrate that whilst public goods increase with the winning coalition size, private goods provision is not affected unless accompanied by a change in supporter loyalty.

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