Multi‐tier pricing in uniform and non‐uniform tax/subsidy systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Winston W. Chang ◽  
Tai‐Liang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Tax Subsidy

Implicit Taxes Amid Race to the Bottom in a Global Tax Game

2020 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 42
Author(s):  
Igor Semenenko ◽  
Junwook Yoo ◽  
Parporn Akathaporn
Keyword(s):  
Capital Mobility ◽  
Tax Rates ◽  
Corporate Tax ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Race To The Bottom ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Tax Subsidies ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Tax Returns ◽  
Tax Hypothesis

Growing tax competition among national governments in the presence of capital mobility distorts equilibrium in the international corporate tax market. This paper is related to the literature that examines impact of international tax policies on corporate accounting statements. Employing international firm-level data, this study revisits the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and documents that tax exemptions lowering effective tax rates relative to statutory rates increase pre-tax returns. This finding directly contradicts the implicit tax hypothesis documented by Wilkie (1992), who provided empirical evidence on inverse relationship between pre-tax return and tax subsidy. We also find evidences that relative importance of permanent versus timing component depends on the geography and that decline in corporate tax rates reduces impact of tax subsidies on profitability. Our findings suggest that tax subsidies play a different role than in 1968-1985, which was examined by Wilkie (1992). These results are consistent with the race-to-the-bottom hypothesis and income shifting explanation

Who Consumes the Credit Union Tax Subsidy?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert DeYoung ◽  
John Goddard ◽  
Donal G. McKillop ◽  
John O. S. Wilson
Keyword(s):  
Credit Union ◽  
Tax Subsidy

scholarly journals Mechanism Design for Demand Management in Energy Communities

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Xupeng Wei ◽  
Achilleas Anastasopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Optimal Allocation ◽  
Demand Management ◽  
Management Problem ◽  
Energy Company ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Allocation Function ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Energy Community ◽  
Message Space

We consider a demand management problem in an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of energy as well as a separate price for peak demand. Since users’ utilities are their private information, which they may not be willing to share, a mediator, known as the planner, is introduced to help optimize the overall satisfaction of the community (total utility minus total payments) by mechanism design. A mechanism consists of a message space, a tax/subsidy, and an allocation function for each user. Each user reports a message chosen from her own message space, then receives some amount of energy determined by the allocation function, and pays the tax specified by the tax function. A desirable mechanism induces a game, the Nash equilibria (NE), of which results in an allocation that coincides with the optimal allocation for the community. As a starting point, we design a mechanism for the energy community with desirable properties such as full implementation, strong budget balance and individual rationality for both users and the planner. We then modify this baseline mechanism for communities where message exchanges are allowed only within neighborhoods, and consequently, the tax/subsidy and allocation functions of each user are only determined by the messages from their neighbors. All of the desirable properties of the baseline mechanism are preserved in the distributed mechanism. Finally, we present a learning algorithm for the baseline mechanism, based on projected gradient descent, that is guaranteed to converge to the NE of the induced game.

The Income Tax Subsidy to "Reorganizations"

1938 ◽  
Vol 38 (1) ◽  
pp. 98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Milton Sandberg
Keyword(s):  
Income Tax ◽  
Tax Subsidy

scholarly journals Strategic trade policy with interlocking cross-ownership

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella
Keyword(s):  
Trade Policy ◽  
Free Trade ◽  
Strategic Trade Policy ◽  
Cournot Duopoly ◽  
Public Intervention ◽  
Tax Subsidy ◽  
Strategic Trade ◽  
Duopoly Model ◽  
Product Competition ◽  
Cross Ownership

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).

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