NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION*

2013 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 525-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Huanxing Yang
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Relational Contracts

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Adverse Selection, Lemon Shocks and Business Cycles

2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 (361) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daisuke Ikeda ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Business Cycles ◽  
Adverse Selection

Governance of supplier-customer relations: An empirical review

2007 ◽  
Vol 158 (12) ◽  
pp. 406-416
Author(s):  
Jon Bingen Sande
Keyword(s):  
Transaction Cost ◽  
Empirical Research ◽  
Customer Relations ◽  
Transaction Cost Economics ◽  
Exchange Theory ◽  
Forest Industry ◽  
Relational Contracts ◽  
Relational Exchange ◽  
Exchange Relationships ◽  
Relational Exchange Theory

The forest industry is riddled with exchange relationships. The parties to exchanges may have diverging goals and interests, but still depend upon each other due to non-redeployable specific assets. Formal and relational contracts may be used to deal with the resulting cooperation problems. This paper proposes a framework based on transaction cost economics and relational exchange theory, and examines to what extent empirical research has found formal and relational contracts to deal with three different governance problems. To that end, I review the results from 32 studies in a range of settings. These studies generally support the view that exchanges characterized by high degrees of specific assets should be supported by formal and relational contracts.

Tick Size and Adverse Selection: Spurious Effects Arising from Serial Correlation

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lynn Doran ◽  
Michael A. Goldstein ◽  
Evgenia V. Golubeva ◽  
Eric N. Hughson
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Serial Correlation ◽  
Tick Size

Perfectly Contestable Monopoly and Adverse Selection

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Bennett Rasmusen ◽  
Luis Fernandez
Keyword(s):  
Adverse Selection
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