scholarly journals Unemployment Insurance, Wage Dynamics and Inequality Over the Life Cycle

2013 ◽  
Vol 123 (568) ◽  
pp. 341-372 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bingley ◽  
Lorenzo Cappellari ◽  
Niels Westergård‐Nielsen
2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Bingley ◽  
Lorenzo Cappellari ◽  
Niels Westergaard-Nielsen

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emin Dinlersoz ◽  
Henry R. Hyatt ◽  
Sang V. Nguyen

2015 ◽  
Vol 105 (2) ◽  
pp. 816-859 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claudio Michelacci ◽  
Hernán Ruffo

We argue that US welfare would rise if unemployment insurance were increased for younger and decreased for older workers. This is because the young tend to lack the means to smooth consumption during unemployment and want jobs to accumulate high-return human capital. So unemployment insurance is most valuable to them, while moral hazard is mild. By calibrating a life cycle model with unemployment risk and endogenous search effort, we find that allowing unemployment replacement rates to decline with age yields sizeable welfare gains to US workers. (JEL D91, E24, J13, J64, J65)


2010 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 1432-1467 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hamish Low ◽  
Costas Meghir ◽  
Luigi Pistaferri

We specify a life-cycle model of consumption, labor supply and job mobility in an economy with search frictions. We distinguish different sources of risk, including shocks to productivity, job arrival, and job destruction. Allowing for job mobility has a large effect on the estimate of productivity risk. Increases in the latter impose a considerable welfare loss. Increases in employment risk have large effects on output and, primarily through this channel, affect welfare. The welfare value of programs such as Food Stamps, partially insuring productivity risk, is greater than the value of unemployment insurance which provides (partial) insurance against employment risk. (JEL D91, J22, J31, J61, J64, J65)


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