scholarly journals RANK‐ORDER COMPETITION IN THE VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 2163-2183
Author(s):  
Andrej Angelovski ◽  
Tibor Neugebauer ◽  
Maroš Servátka
2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (01) ◽  
pp. 61-73
Author(s):  
ILTAE KIM

This paper examines the effects of uncertainty on an individual's own contribution to the provision of the collective good using an impure public good model. Two types of uncertainty analyzing free-riding behavior are evaluated: (i) uncertainty surrounding the contributions of others to the public characteristic and (ii) uncertainty surrounding the response of others to an individual's own contribution. We extend previous studies by examining both the compensated and uncompensated effects of increases in such risks on the provision of the collective good. We also establish the conditions that are sufficient to determine both compensated and the total, uncompensated effects of an increase in risk on the voluntary provision of the collective good.


1980 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 397-426 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard D. Raymond ◽  
Michael Sesnowitz

Aspects of the method developed by Aaron and McGuire and Maital (AMM) for estimating the benefit distributions associated with the provision of pure public goods are clarified and the method is extended to cover the case of public projects designed to improve the quality of impure public goods. The extended method is used to estimate the distributional impact of a proposed public project in the Cleveland-Akron metropolitan region, and the results are compared with estimates obtained from three naive models and from the AMM model for pure public goods. It is found that the native models overestimate substantially the net benefits received by low-income families and underestimate the net benefits received by high-income families. Using the AMM method for a pure public good similarly distorts the results, though by a much smaller magnitude.


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