scholarly journals Does Competition Resolve the Free-Rider Problem in the Voluntary Provision of Impure Public Goods? Experimental Evidence

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tibor Neugebauer ◽  
Maroš Servátka
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Experimental Evidence ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Voluntary Provision ◽  
Impure Public Goods

scholarly journals The Effect of Trusting and Trustworthy Environments on the Provision of Public Goods

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sergio Lo Iacono ◽  
Burak Sonmez
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Learning Effect ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Trust Game ◽  
Similar Distribution ◽  
Incentive Structure ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Relevant Effect ◽  
Distribution Of Resources

Abstract Trusting and trustworthy environments are argued to promote collective action, as people learn to rely on their fellow citizens and believe that only few individuals will free ride. To test the causal validity of this mechanism, we propose an experimental design that allows us to create different trusting and trustworthy conditions simply by (i) manipulating the incentive structure of an iterated binary trust game and (ii) allowing information to flow among participants. Findings indicate that, given a similar distribution of resources among subjects, trusting and trustworthy environments strongly foster the provision of public goods. This outcome is largely driven by a learning effect: subjects transfer what they assimilate during a sequence of dyadic exchanges to their decision to act for the collectivity. In particular, results showed that what we learn from the community has a relevant effect on our ability to overcome the free-rider problem: we are more likely to act for the collectivity when we learn from the community to be trustful or reliable in our one-to-one interactions. The same applies in the opposite direction: we are more prone to free ride when we learn from the environment to be distrustful or unreliable in our dyadic exchanges.

Soliciting Accurate Evaluations of Public Goods

1981 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. H. Barnett
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Public Funds ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Bidding Mechanism ◽  
The Many

Among the many problems faced by policy makers in attempts to use public funds efficiently, none is more troublesome than that of inducing users of public goods to reveal their demand prices. The difficulty in attempts to solicit demand prices falls under the general rubric of the free-rider problem, and is manifest in the propensity of users to behave strategically when asked to reveal evaluations. Several preference revelation devices have been proposed to surmount this problem, but all of these schemes are seriously flawed. This article presents a device which overcomes some of the flaws contained in previous work. The preference revealing mechanism proposed here is a bidding mechanism which takes advantage of the commonly found trait of risk-aversion to discourage strategic revelations.

Political Centralization and Labour Coercion: Latin America and Russia in Comparative Perspective

Itinerario ◽  
1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 137-156 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mario Pastore ◽  
Herman Freudenberger
Keyword(s):  
Latin America ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Basic Principle ◽  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
The Other ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Transactions Costs ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
The Government

Government requires coercion, if only to arrest free riding. Physical coercion alone may not suffice for this purpose, however, and ideological means may be needed as well. This basic principle underlies all government. In market economies the coercive capabilities of government may be expected to be financed out of taxes ultimately levied on factor owners' money incomes, that is, on wages, profits, and rent. On the other hand, in economies where markets have not developed due to high transactions costs individuals' contributions to the provision of public goods will take the form of payments in kind and labour services. In this case, the free rider problem suggests labourers will attempt to shirk; the government, therefore, will have to compel labourers to work and, therefore, will appear to be coercing labour even though it may only be seeking to curtail shirking.

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