CONTRACT DESIGN AND SELF-CONTROL WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

2014 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 618-624 ◽  
Author(s):  
SANXI LI ◽  
JIANYE YAN ◽  
BINQING XIAO
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Self Control

Heterogeneous suppliers’ contract design in assembly systems with asymmetric information

2020 ◽  
Vol 286 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yanfei Lan ◽  
Xiaoqiang Cai ◽  
Changjing Shang ◽  
Lianmin Zhang ◽  
Ruiqing Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Assembly Systems

scholarly journals Incentive Contract Design for the Water-Rail-Road Intermodal Transportation with Travel Time Uncertainty: A Stackelberg Game Approach

Entropy ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Wenying Zhang ◽  
Xifu Wang ◽  
Kai Yang
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Travel Time ◽  
Design Problem ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Optimal Time ◽  
Incentive Contract ◽  
Intermodal Transportation ◽  
The Impact

In the management of intermodal transportation, incentive contract design problem has significant impacts on the benefit of a multimodal transport operator (MTO). In this paper, we analyze a typical water-rail-road (WRR) intermodal transportation that is composed of three serial transportation stages: water, rail and road. In particular, the entire transportation process is planned, organized, and funded by an MTO that outsources the transportation task at each stage to independent carriers (subcontracts). Due to the variability of transportation conditions, the travel time of each transportation stage depending on the respective carrier’s effort level is unknown (asymmetric information) and characterized as an uncertain variable via the experts’ estimations. Considering the decentralized decision-making process, we interpret the incentive contract design problem for the WRR intermodal transportation as a Stackelberg game in which the risk-neutral MTO serves as the leader and the risk-averse carriers serve as the followers. Within the framework of uncertainty theory, we formulate an uncertain bi-level programming model for the incentive contract design problem under expectation and entropy decision criteria. Subsequently, we provide the analytical results of the proposed model and analyze the optimal time-based incentive contracts by developing a hybrid solution method which combines a decomposition approach and an iterative algorithm. Finally, we give a simulation example to investigate the impact of asymmetric information on the optimal time-based incentive contracts and to identify the value of information for WRR intermodal transportation.

scholarly journals Supply Contract Design for Competing Heterogeneous Suppliers under Asymmetric Information

2014 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 791-807 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhaolin Li ◽  
Jennifer K. Ryan ◽  
Lusheng Shao ◽  
Daewon Sun
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Supply Contract

scholarly journals Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Wei Xiong ◽  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Spatial Diversity ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Cooperative Relay ◽  
Relay Nodes ◽  
Relay Incentive

Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.

scholarly journals Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence

2004 ◽  
Vol 119 (2) ◽  
pp. 353-402 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. DellaVigna ◽  
U. Malmendier
Keyword(s):  
Control Theory ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Self Control

Contract design for relay incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information in cooperative networks

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 3029-3044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Rui Liu ◽  
Yang Chen ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Yunhao Jiang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Relay Incentive
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