scholarly journals Optimal Contract Design for Cooperative Relay Incentive Mechanism under Moral Hazard

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Wei Xiong ◽  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Optimization Problems ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Spatial Diversity ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Cooperative Relay ◽  
Relay Nodes ◽  
Relay Incentive

Cooperative relay can effectively improve spectrum efficiency by exploiting the spatial diversity in the wireless networks. However, wireless nodes may acquire different network information with various users’ location and mobility, channels’ conditions, and other factors, which results in asymmetric information between the source and the relay nodes (RNs). In this paper, the relay incentive mechanism between relay nodes and the source is investigated under the asymmetric information. By modelling multiuser cooperative relay as a labour market, a contract model with moral hazard for relay incentive is proposed. To effectively incentivize the potential RNs to participate in cooperative relay, the optimization problems are formulated to maximize the source’s utility while meeting the feasible conditions under both symmetric and asymmetric information scenarios. Numerical simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed contract design scheme for cooperative relay.

Contract design for relay incentive mechanism under dual asymmetric information in cooperative networks

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (8) ◽  
pp. 3029-3044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Rui Liu ◽  
Yang Chen ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Yunhao Jiang ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Incentive Mechanism ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Cooperative Networks ◽  
Relay Incentive

scholarly journals Cooperative Communication in Cognitive Radio Networks under Asymmetric Information: A Contract-Theory Based Approach

2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-11 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nan Zhao ◽  
Minghu Wu ◽  
Wei Xiong ◽  
Cong Liu
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Radio ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Cognitive Radio Networks ◽  
Cooperative Communication ◽  
Relay Selection ◽  
Contract Theory ◽  
Contract Design ◽  
Radio Networks ◽  
Spectrum Efficiency ◽  
Optimal Contract

By exploiting the spatial diversity of multiple wireless nodes, cooperative communication technique is a promising technique for spectrum sharing to improve spectrum efficiency. In this paper, the incentive issue between relay nodes’ (RNs’) service and source’s relay selection is investigated in the presence of the asymmetric information scenario. Multiuser cooperative communication is modelled as a labour market, where the source designs a contract and each relay node decides to select a contract item according to hidden information in order to obtain the best profit. The optimal contract design under both symmetric information and asymmetric information is presented based on contract theory. The contract-theoretic model for ability discrimination relay selection is formulated as an optimization problem to maximize the source’s utility. A sequential optimization algorithm is proposed to obtain the optimalrelay-rewardstrategy. Simulation results show that the optimal contract design scheme is effective in improving system performance for cooperative communication. This paper establishes a valuable cooperative communication mechanism in cognitive radio networks.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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