Introspection Plays an Early Role in Children's Explicit Theory of Mind Development

2017 ◽  
Vol 89 (5) ◽  
pp. 1545-1552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Gonzales ◽  
William V. Fabricius ◽  
Anne S. Kupfer
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Explicit Theory

Does a Computerized Social Cognitive Intervention Improve Implicit or Explicit Theory of Mind in Individuals With Psychosis?

2021 ◽  
Vol 89 (9) ◽  
pp. S312
Author(s):  
Briana Galindo ◽  
Colin Iwanski ◽  
Kristen M. Haut ◽  
Alexander Demos ◽  
Sarah Pridgen ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Cognitive ◽  
Cognitive Intervention ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Social Cognitive Intervention

The Contribution of Symbolic Skills to the Development of an Explicit Theory of Mind

2014 ◽  
Vol 85 (4) ◽  
pp. 1535-1551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angeline S. Lillard ◽  
Robert D. Kavanaugh
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Explicit Theory

scholarly journals Testing the stability of theory of mind: A longitudinal approach

PLoS ONE ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (11) ◽  
pp. e0241721
Author(s):  
Diane Poulin-Dubois ◽  
Naomi Azar ◽  
Brandon Elkaim ◽  
Kimberly Burnside
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Social Communication ◽  
False Belief ◽  
The Social ◽  
Longitudinal Approach ◽  
Explicit Theory ◽  
Second Year ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Implicit And Explicit ◽  
Violation Of Expectation

An explicit understanding of false belief develops around the age of four years. However, tasks based on spontaneous responses have revealed an implicit understanding of belief and other theory of mind constructs in infants in their second year of life. The few longitudinal studies that have examined conceptual continuity of theory of mind from infancy to early childhood have reported mixed findings. Here we report two longitudinal experiments to investigate the developmental relation between implicit and explicit theory of mind. No link was observed in the first experiment between false belief and intention understanding measured at 14 and 18 months with the violation of expectation paradigm and tasks measuring explicit and implicit false belief at four or five years of age. In the second experiment, infants aged 18 months were tested with a battery of tasks that measured knowledge inference and false belief. They were then tested with the theory of mind scale at five years of age. The parents completed the Children’s Social Understanding Scale (CSUS) and the Social Communication Questionnaire (SCQ). As in the first experiment, there were no associations between early and later forms of theory of mind. We suggest that these findings do not support the view that there is conceptual continuity in theory of mind development.

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