Mixed duopoly, privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

2013 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 526-554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Toshihiro Matsumura ◽  
Yoshihiro Tomaru
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Excess Burden

scholarly journals Complex Dynamical Behaviors of a Mixed Duopoly Game Based on Intellectual Property Rights Protection

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Tong Chu ◽  
Yu Yu ◽  
Xiaoxue Wang
Keyword(s):  
Intellectual Property ◽  
Property Rights ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Fractal Structures ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
Intellectual Property Rights Protection ◽  
Dynamical Behaviors ◽  
Property Rights Protection ◽  
Coexistence Of Attractors

Based on the oligopoly game theory and the intellectual property rights protection policy, we investigate the complex dynamical behaviors of a mixed duopoly game with quadratic cost. In the new system, a few parameters are improved by considering intellectual property rights protection and the stability conditions of the Nash equilibrium point are discussed in detail. A set of the two-dimensional bifurcation diagrams is demonstrated by using numerical modeling, and these diagrams show abundant complex dynamical behaviors, such as coexistence of attractors, different bifurcation, and fractal structures. These dynamical properties can present the long-run effects of strengthening intellectual property protection.

A note on merger in mixed duopoly: Bertrand versus Cournot

2012 ◽  
Vol 108 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-298 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Andree
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly: Price Competition

2007 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 263-272 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Carlos Bárcena-Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Price Competition ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Endogenous Timing

Environmental taxes in a differentiated mixed duopoly

2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 389-396 ◽  
Author(s):  
Leonard F.S. Wang ◽  
Jean Wang
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Environmental Taxes

Governance, privatization and foreign direct investment

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 569-586
Author(s):  
Dongling Cai ◽  
Leonard Fengsheng Wang ◽  
Xiaokai Wu
Keyword(s):  
Social Welfare ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Foreign Firm ◽  
Mode Choice ◽  
Entry Mode ◽  
Mixed Duopoly ◽  
Economic Governance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Entry Mode Choice ◽  
Optimal Degree

Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the interplay between economic governance and privatization, and how these two instruments affect the entry mode choice of the foreign firm and the social welfare of the host country. Design/methodology/approach This study constructs a mixed duopoly model wherein one domestic public firm competes with a foreign firm and investigates the influence of economic governance investment on the domestic government’s optimal degree of privatization choice and the foreign firm’s entry mode choice. Findings This study shows that (1) better economic governance enhances the effect of privatization on output, thus resulting in a lower degree of privatization; (2) the optimal privatization policy of the domestic government is partial privatization irrespective of the foreign firm’s entry mode choice; (3) with optimal investment by the domestic government on economic governance, the optimal degree of privatization is higher under FDI than export, and the host-country welfare is also higher under FDI. In particular, this study demonstrates that better economic governance decreases the threshold of the degree of privatization when the foreign firm switches from export to FDI, implying that better economic governance stimulates the foreign firm to undertake FDI in the host country. Practical implications The findings shed some light on both the mixed ownership reform of the SOEs in China and attracting foreign capital inflow to improve the host country’s social welfare. Originality/value To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study constitutes the first attempt to build a theoretical framework to explore how the interactions between economic governance and privatization influence the entry mode choice of the foreign firm.

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