Indecent Disclosures: Anticorruption Reforms and Political Selection

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Szakonyi
Keyword(s):  
Political Selection

Election by Community Consensus: Effects on Political Selection and Governance

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-45
Author(s):  
Ashna Arora
Keyword(s):  
Secret Ballot ◽  
Village Level ◽  
Local Elite ◽  
Qualitative Evidence ◽  
Level Data ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Political Selection ◽  
Selection Of

This paper evaluates the effects of encouraging the selection of local politicians in India via community consensus, as opposed to a secret ballot election. Using village-level data on candidates, elected politicians, government budgets, and workfare employment, I show that incentives for consensus elections lead to politicians that are more educated but less likely to be drawn from historically marginalized castes, and increase how regressively workfare employment is targeted. These results are supported by qualitative evidence that shows that consensus elections are prone to capture by the local elite, which may reduce the need for clientelistic transfers to the non-elite.

Does Performance Matter? Evaluating Political Selection Along the Chinese Administrative Ladder

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 (8) ◽  
pp. 1074-1105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre F. Landry ◽  
Xiaobo Lü ◽  
Haiyan Duan
Keyword(s):  
Economic Performance ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Political Connections ◽  
Political Connection ◽  
Relative Importance ◽  
Heterogeneous Effects ◽  
Local Politicians ◽  
Political Selection ◽  
Ruling Elites ◽  
Government Executives

Political selection is central to the survival of all regimes. This article evaluates the relative importance of performance and political connection for the advancement of local politicians under authoritarianism. We hypothesize that in a large-scale multilevel polity, economic performance plays a greater role in promotion at lower administrative levels of government than at higher ones, even after controlling for political connections. This dualist strategy allows the ruling elites to achieve economic performance while minimizing the advancement of potentially disloyal challengers. Thus, balancing between loyalty and competence among subordinates enhances regime survival. Our empirical evidence draws on a comprehensive panel dataset of provincial, prefectural, and county-level Communist party secretaries and government executives appointed between 1999 and 2007. We find consistent evidence for our argument under various model specifications. We also explore the heterogeneous effects of performance on promotion given the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) age ineligibility rule for cadre promotion and jurisdiction characteristics.

scholarly journals Political Selection and Persistence of Bad Governments

2010 ◽  
Vol 125 (4) ◽  
pp. 1511-1575 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Acemoglu ◽  
G. Egorov ◽  
K. Sonin
Keyword(s):  
Political Selection
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