Can CEO equity‐based compensation limit investment‐related agency problems?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Qu ◽  
Majella Percy ◽  
Fang Hu ◽  
Jenny Stewart
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Randall K. Morck ◽  
Bernard Yin Yeung
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems

Misallocation of Investment in Europe

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesca Barbiero ◽  
Philipp-Bastian Brutscher ◽  
Atanas Kolev ◽  
Alexander Popov ◽  
Marcin Wolski
Keyword(s):  
Agency Problems ◽  
Growth Opportunities ◽  
Data Set ◽  
European Firm ◽  
Weak Evidence ◽  
Zombie Lending ◽  
Matched Data ◽  
Global Growth

Using a pan-European, firm-bank matched data set, we find weak evidence of investment misallocation in Europe. Firms with higher debt overhangs invest significantly less, in particular in sectors that are facing good global growth opportunities. We also find that firms with higher debt overhangs are more likely to invest if they borrow from undercapitalized banks, and this effect is particularly strong in industries facing good global growth opportunities, suggesting a misallocation of investment associated with ‘zombie lending’. Our results are consistent with theories of investment misallocation due to agency problems at firms and at banks.

scholarly journals Endogenous Agency Problems and the Dynamics of Rents

2020 ◽  
Vol 87 (6) ◽  
pp. 2542-2567
Author(s):  
B Biais ◽  
A Landier
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Overlapping Generations Model ◽  
Complex Tasks ◽  
Complex Skills ◽  
Do So

Abstract While potentially more productive, more complex tasks generate larger agency rents. Agents therefore prefer to acquire complex skills, to earn large rents. In our overlapping generations model, their ability to do so is kept in check by competition with predecessors. Old agents, however, are imperfect substitutes for young ones, because the latter are easier to incentivize, thanks to longer horizons. This reduces competition between generations, enabling young managers to go for larger complexity than their predecessors. Consequently, equilibrium complexity and rents gradually increase beyond what is optimal for the principal and for society.

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