Agency Problems in Corporate Structure

The role of accounting in contracting process of corporations

Economic Analysis ◽

10.35774/econa2019.04.089 ◽

2019 ◽

pp. 89-95

Author(s):

Vasyl Tsaruk

Keyword(s):

Accounting Information ◽

Historical Analysis ◽

Agency Problems ◽

Corporate Structure ◽

Structure Activity ◽

Contract Performance ◽

Contractual Relationships ◽

Contract Costs ◽

Contracting Process

The expediency of conducting researches in the direction of determining the role of accounting in the contracting process of corporate structures has been grounded. A historical analysis of the approaches of researchers to understanding the role of accounting in the contracting process of the corporate structure has been conducted. The value of accounting information in reducing contract costs has been determined. It has been substantiated that accounting allows to measure contractual requirements of agents and remuneration, to provide information on contract performance to principals and information on corporate structure activity to potential agents. It has been found that accounting is a part of a set of corporate structure contracts and is the object of negotiation among agents and other parties of contractual relationships. There are two main areas of use of accounting information in the contractual process of the corporate structure in the context of agency problems (concerning managers and borrowers) have been allocated.

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AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽

10.32678/alqalam.v33i1.384 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 33 (1) ◽

pp. 46

Author(s):

Aswadi Lubis

Keyword(s):

High Risk ◽

Asymmetric Information ◽

Human Resources ◽

Moral Hazard ◽

Adverse Selection ◽

Agency Problem ◽

Agency Problems ◽

Islamic Banking ◽

The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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