Free Agency for the Front Office: How Data Analytics and Noncompete Agreements Threaten to Disrupt Competitive Balance in U.S. Professional Sports Leagues

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 121-162
Author(s):  
Nathaniel Grow
Keyword(s):  
Data Analytics ◽  
Professional Sports ◽  
Competitive Balance ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Front Office ◽  
Sports Leagues ◽  
Noncompete Agreements ◽  
Professional Sports Leagues

A Look Back at the Hearings

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David George Surdam
Keyword(s):  
Professional Sports ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Financial Data ◽  
Free Agency ◽  
Congressional Hearings ◽  
Look Back ◽  
Sports Leagues ◽  
Territorial Rights ◽  
Shed Light ◽  
Professional Sports Leagues

This conclusion discusses the aftermath of the Congressional hearings. During the hearings, the owners' general prerogatives survived essentially intact, although free agency of some sort was imminent in all sports by 1976. Legislators did not repudiate the reserve clause, the reverse-order draft, or territorial rights, despite their qualms regarding these institutions. The legislators and their aides missed some opportunities to subject the team financial data from the 1950s to analysis, which could have shed light on such questions as the effects of revenue sharing. Some fans gained when their hometown landed an expansion or existing franchise, while other fans lost when legislators did not prevent franchise relocation. Congress has held several hearings in the intervening decades since 1989. The professional sports leagues have also evolved. Technology has altered the landscape.

Player Mobility and Competitive Balance Regulation in Professional Sports Leagues

2021 ◽  
pp. 152700252110595
Author(s):  
Marco Runkel
Keyword(s):  
North American ◽  
Professional Sports ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Competitive Balance ◽  
Extended Version ◽  
Sports Leagues ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Salary Caps ◽  
Professional Sports Leagues

Competitive balance regulation is more widespread in North American than in Europan sports leagues. The present paper addresses the question whether this observation can be explained with the help of differences in the degree of player mobility. Using an extended version of the workhorse contest model of sports leagues, the paper shows that the answer depends on the kind of competitive balance regulation. While player mobility may help to explain the difference with respect to salary regulation (e.g., salary caps), the choice of revenue sharing schemes turns out to be independent of player mobility.

A Formal Test for Asymmetry in the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 253-270 ◽  
Author(s):  
Liam J. A. Lenten
Keyword(s):  
Professional Sports ◽  
Competitive Balance ◽  
Structural Time Series ◽  
Labor Market Policies ◽  
Australian Football League ◽  
Australian Football ◽  
Sports Leagues ◽  
Uncertainty Of Outcome ◽  
Formal Test ◽  
Professional Sports Leagues

The presence of asymmetry in the relation between attendances and competitive balance in the Australian Football League is tested, over the period 1945-2010. The results from the well-specified structural time-series model validate the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, and the null of no asymmetry is rejected easily in the structural innovations of the series, although it is not rejected in the levels. The latter finding substantiates the reversibility (without net loss of demand) of league revenue-sharing and labor market policies that influence demand in professional sports leagues.

Home advantage and the debate about competitive balance in professional sports leagues

2005 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 439-445 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Forrest ◽  
James Beaumont ◽  
John Goddard ◽  
Robert Simmons
Keyword(s):  
Professional Sports ◽  
Competitive Balance ◽  
Home Advantage ◽  
Sports Leagues ◽  
Professional Sports Leagues

Economics of Antitrust

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
David George Surdam
Keyword(s):  
Team Sports ◽  
Professional Sports ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Antitrust Law ◽  
Competitive Balance ◽  
Sports Teams ◽  
Sherman Act ◽  
Professional Team Sports ◽  
Sports Leagues ◽  
Professional Sports Leagues

This chapter examines the economics of antitrust, with particular emphasis on how antitrust law affects professional team sports. In the late 1800s, Americans worried about the growing concentration of power in the hands of a few producers such as Standard Oil, American Tobacco, and other large firms that consolidated their holds over industries by merging and acquiring other companies. Other industrial leaders sought to fix prices above those obtained under competition. The Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted in 1890, contains provisions addressing “contract,” “conspiracy,” and “trade and commerce.” This chapter first considers how courts applied the Sherman Act to cases involving professional team sports before discussing the characteristics of professional sports leagues, how owners of professional sports teams reported profits and losses, the issue of player salaries and exploitation, and competitive balance and revenue sharing in professional leagues. It also describes franchise relocation and expansion and how television created demand in sports.

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