scholarly journals Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’

Abacus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-771 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stacey Beaumont ◽  
Raluca Ratiu ◽  
David Reeb ◽  
Glenn Boyle ◽  
Philip Brown ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Design Principles ◽  
Compensation Contracts

scholarly journals Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts

Abacus ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 52 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-684 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yaowen Shan ◽  
Terry Walter
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Design Principles ◽  
Compensation Contracts

The role of accounting conservatism in executive compensation contracts

2018 ◽  
Vol 45 (9-10) ◽  
pp. 1139-1163 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takuya Iwasaki ◽  
Shota Otomasa ◽  
Atsushi Shiiba ◽  
Akinobu Shuto
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Accounting Conservatism ◽  
Compensation Contracts

CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts

2019 ◽  
pp. 105655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Atif Ikram ◽  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li ◽  
Dylan Minor
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Compensation Contracts

scholarly journals CSR-Contingent Executive Compensation Incentive and Earnings Management

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3421 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhichuan (Frank) Li ◽  
Caleb Thibodeau
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Corporate Social Performance ◽  
Social Performance ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Corporate Executives ◽  
Incentive Effects ◽  
Public Pressure ◽  
Contingent Compensation ◽  
Corporate Social

This paper empirically studies the connection between earnings management and corporate social performance, conditional on the existence of CSR-contingent executive compensation contracts, an emerging practice to link executive compensation to corporate social performance. We find that executives are more likely to manipulate earnings to achieve their personal compensation goals when CSR rating is low, as well as their CSR-contingent compensation. Because of public pressure on their excessive total compensation, corporate executives see no need to manipulate earnings to increase compensation when their CSR-contingent compensation is already high. Our results suggest that earnings management and CSR-contingent compensation are substitute tools to serve the interests of executives, which is an agency problem that was never previously studied. Additionally, we explore how managerial characteristics affect earnings management, driven by the incentive effects of CSR-linked compensation.

Determinants of CEO Pay: A Comparison of ExecuComp and Non-ExecuComp Firms

2010 ◽  
Vol 85 (5) ◽  
pp. 1511-1543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian Cadman ◽  
Sandy Klasa ◽  
Steve Matsunaga
Keyword(s):  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Positive Relation ◽  
Stock Liquidity ◽  
Compensation Contracts ◽  
Cash Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay

ABSTRACT: We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support for three predictions. First, ExecuComp firms rely more heavily on earnings and stock returns in determining CEO cash compensation. Second, the weight on earnings is more sensitive to differences in the extent of growth opportunities for ExecuComp firms. Third, the positive relation between institutional ownership concentration and the value of stock option grants is stronger for ExecuComp firms. Overall, our results suggest that ExecuComp and non-ExecuComp firms operate in different contracting environments that lead to differences in the design of their executive compensation contracts. As a result, care should be taken in extending results based on ExecuComp samples to non-ExecuComp firms.

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