scholarly journals District magnitude, electoral formula, and the number of parties

2001 ◽  
Vol 39 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
KENNETH BENOIT
Keyword(s):  
District Magnitude ◽  
Number Of Parties

scholarly journals Political finance regimes and party system size: evidence from new and established European democracies

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Ekaterina R. Rashkova ◽  
Yen-Pin Su
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
System Size ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Sociological Factors ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Political Finance ◽  
Campaign Expenditure ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Established Democracies

AbstractStudies of party system size have looked at institutional and sociological factors in their attempt to explain what determines the number of parties. While some recent studies contend that party laws, beyond the district magnitude, have a significant impact on, among others, new party entry, we know very little about whether certain rules matter more in some societies than they do in others. In this paper, we study the extent to which various party finance rules affect party system size and differentiate the effect between new and established democracies. Specifically, we focus on direct and indirect public subsidization and limits on private donation and campaign expenditure. We hypothesize that compared to established countries, new democracies tend to have a larger party system size when the political finance rules create more equal conditions for electoral competition. Using data from 43 Europe democracies, the empirical analyses support our hypothesis.

Predicting Party Systems from Electoral Systems

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rein Taagepera ◽  
Matthew Shugart
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Product Model ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Upper Limits ◽  
Predictive Relationships ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

The Seat Product Model matters to electoral and party systems specialists in what it is able to predict, and to all political scientists as one example of how to predict. The seat product (MS) is the product of assembly size (S) and electoral district magnitude (M, number of seats allocated). Without any data input, thinking about conceptual lower and upper limits leads to a sequence of logically grounded models that apply to simple electoral systems. The resulting formulas allow for precise predictions about likely party system outputs, such as the number of parties, the size of the largest party, and other quantities of interest. The predictions are based entirely on institutional inputs. And when tested on real-world electoral data, these predictions are found to explain over 60% of the variance. This means that they provide a baseline expectation, against which actual countries and specific elections can be compared. To the broader political science audience, this research sends the following message: Interconnected quantitatively predictive relationships are a hallmark of developed science, but they are still rare in social sciences. These relationships can exist with regard to political phenomena if one is on the lookout for them. Logically founded predictions are stronger than merely empirical relationships or predictions of the direction of effects. Finally, isolated equations that connect various factors are nice, but equations that interconnect pack even more predictive punch. Political scientists should strive for connections among connections. This would lead to a more scientific political science.

The Electoral Sweet Spot in the Lab

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Labbé St-Vincent ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Jean-Benoit Pilet
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Sweet Spot ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Accurate Representation ◽  
Moderate Number ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Lab Experiments ◽  
Number Of Parties

AbstractCarey and Hix (2011) propose that a proportional electoral system with a moderate number of seats per district offers the best compromise between (1) accurate representation and (2) strong accountability. The argument is that there is a district magnitude (DM) level where the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation of parties is optimal. This DM is called the sweet spot. We explore this proposition through lab experiments conducted in Brussels and Montreal. We find that the probability of achieving a “good” outcome on both proportionality and the number of parties is slightly higher at moderate DMs. We note, however, that this probability remains low.

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 481-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
System Variables ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Western Democracies

A systematic analysis of the relationships between the main electoral system variables (electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure) and electoral outcomes (the degrees of disproportionality and multipartism) in the 20 Western democracies from 1945 to 1985—representing 32 distinct electoral systems (an electoral system being defined as a set of elections held under basically the same rules)—shows that the effects of both formula and magnitude on proportionality are very strong, much stronger than Douglas W. Rae and subsequent researchers have suggested; that on the other hand, their effects on the number of parties participating in elections is surprisingly weak; and that ballot structure affects the degree of multipartism only in single-member district systems. These findings suggest that strategic behavior by politicians and voters plays a less important role in reducing multipartism than is usually assumed.

The Effect of District Magnitude on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments in Argentina

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 557-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Effect ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Natural Experiments ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Effective Number Of Parties ◽  
Number Of Parties

How does district magnitude affect electoral outcomes? This article addresses this question by exploiting a combination of two natural experiments in Argentina between 1985 and 2015. Argentine provinces elect half of their congressional delegation every two years, and thus districts with an odd number of representatives have varying magnitudes in different election years. Furthermore, whether a province elects more representatives in midterm or concurrent years was decided by lottery in 1983. I find that district magnitude (a) increases electoral support for small parties, (b) increases the (effective) number of parties that gain seats and (c) reduces electoral disproportionality. The last two results are driven by the mechanical rather than the psychological effect of electoral rules.

District Magnitude, Economic Performance, and Party-System Fragmentation in Five Latin American Countries

1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-185 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL COPPEDGE
Keyword(s):  
Latin American ◽  
Party System ◽  
Initial Level ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Simultaneous Equations ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Effective Number Of Parties ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Latin American Countries ◽  
Country Specific

This article makes a fresh start in the attempt to explain the number of parties in party systems. It develops a simultaneous equations model to differentiate between the psychological and mechanical effects of district magnitude on party-system fragmentation. Both effects are statistically significant and approximately equal. However, neither effect is very large in comparison to underlying patterns of politicization, which are argued to be reflections of the number of political cleavages in society. These cleavages predispose each party system to converge toward a country-specific effective number of parties within 5 elections, regardless of the initial level of fragmentation, barring outside disturbances. Major devaluations may act as such disturbances, but the evidence so far is inconclusive. The analysis is based on new data from 62 elections in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela, supplemented by 30+ additional elections in Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay for the exploration of economic impacts.

District Magnitude, Social Diversity, and Indonesia's Parliamentary Party System from 1999 to 2009

Asian Survey ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 50 (4) ◽  
pp. 663-683 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jungug Choi
Keyword(s):  
Presidential Elections ◽  
Party System ◽  
District Level ◽  
Social Diversity ◽  
Parliamentary Elections ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Over Time

This study analyzes the party system in Indonesia's parliamentary elections since 1999. It argues that neither district magnitude nor social diversity accounts for the dramatically increased number of parties in votes at the district level over time; the increase may stem from the introduction of popular presidential elections and the rise of new issues.

Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption

2006 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-137 ◽  
Author(s):  
ERIC C. C. CHANG ◽  
MIRIAM A. GOLDEN
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Objective Measure ◽  
Public Works ◽  
The Political ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Do So

The relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations is analysed in this article. Whereas previous studies have shown that closed-list proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR, it is demonstrated here that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying this study draws on work on ‘the personal vote’ that suggests that the incentives to amass resources – and perhaps even to do so illegally – increase with district magnitude in open-list settings but decrease in closed-list contexts. Extending this insight, it is shown that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open-list PR (closed-list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold – the estimates here are that this is as low as fifteen – corruption is greater under open lists than closed lists. Only at small district magnitudes (below fifteen) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. These results hold for alternative measures of corruption, for different sets of countries analysed, for different measures of district magnitude and regardless of whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary, and of the number of parties.Using an objective measure of corruption in public works contracting, corroborating evidence is also presented from Italian electoral districts. In Italy's open-list environment in the period prior to 1994, larger districts were more susceptible to corruption than smaller ones.

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