The Electoral Sweet Spot in the Lab

2016 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Labbé St-Vincent ◽  
André Blais ◽  
Jean-Benoit Pilet
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Sweet Spot ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Accurate Representation ◽  
Moderate Number ◽  
Good Outcome ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Lab Experiments ◽  
Number Of Parties

AbstractCarey and Hix (2011) propose that a proportional electoral system with a moderate number of seats per district offers the best compromise between (1) accurate representation and (2) strong accountability. The argument is that there is a district magnitude (DM) level where the trade-off between proportionality and fragmentation of parties is optimal. This DM is called the sweet spot. We explore this proposition through lab experiments conducted in Brussels and Montreal. We find that the probability of achieving a “good” outcome on both proportionality and the number of parties is slightly higher at moderate DMs. We note, however, that this probability remains low.

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, 1945–85

1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 481-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arend Lijphart
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Electoral Laws ◽  
System Variables ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Western Democracies

A systematic analysis of the relationships between the main electoral system variables (electoral formula, district magnitude, and ballot structure) and electoral outcomes (the degrees of disproportionality and multipartism) in the 20 Western democracies from 1945 to 1985—representing 32 distinct electoral systems (an electoral system being defined as a set of elections held under basically the same rules)—shows that the effects of both formula and magnitude on proportionality are very strong, much stronger than Douglas W. Rae and subsequent researchers have suggested; that on the other hand, their effects on the number of parties participating in elections is surprisingly weak; and that ballot structure affects the degree of multipartism only in single-member district systems. These findings suggest that strategic behavior by politicians and voters plays a less important role in reducing multipartism than is usually assumed.

Regionalism, Cabinet Stability and Canada's Electoral System: The Effect of District Magnitude

1996 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 497-520 ◽  
Author(s):  
Neil Sutherland
Keyword(s):  
Electoral System ◽  
Previous Literature ◽  
Trade Off ◽  
Regional Conflict ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Minority Government ◽  
The Government ◽  
Quasi Experiment

AbstractPrevious literature has assumed that there is a trade-off between cabinet stability, by means of a majority manufactured by a single-seat plurality system, and the alleviation of regional conflict, by means of a more proportional electoral system. This study demonstrates that no such tradeoff exists. The objective of this study is to find an alternative electoral system which satisfies both the criteria of majority government and multiregional representation. In a quasi-experiment, an electoral system with a district magnitude of two (M2) satisfies both of the above criteria. The results of the study show that a district magnitude of two can provide a large diffuse party with a majority of seats for the same amount of voter support as the present plurality system. In addition, M2 rewards this large diffuse party with seats necessary to form a minority government at a much lower level of voter support than does the existing system. Thus, M2 solves the problem of underrepresentation of regions in the government party, and is at the same time even more advantageous to a large diffuse party than is the present electoral system. If the argument of this study is correct, beneficiaries of the existing system should not be averse to implementing it.

Wahlsystemreform in Deutschland

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peggy Matauschek
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Parallel Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Electoral Reform ◽  
Suitable Alternative ◽  
Representation Systems ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Alternative Vote

Is plurality or majority electoral reform a sensible option in Germany’s muddled electoral system debate? Yes, it is. Since Germany’s mixed-member proportional system fails to concentrate the party system in a sufficient way, Peggy Matauschek searches for a suitable alternative to the principle of proportional representation. She discusses the following options according to their contextual conditions: single-member plurality and majority electoral systems—like the alternative vote system—, parallel systems, proportional representation systems with a low district magnitude and majority bonus systems. In light of its balanced performance, the study advocates the introduction of a system with a majority bonus for a coalition.

scholarly journals The impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in Algeria. Applied to the elections of the National People’s Assembly (1997–2017)

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Mahmoud Mahgoub
Keyword(s):  
Political System ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Proportional Representation ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Legislative Elections ◽  
Representation System ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Impact

Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of using proportional representation system on the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system within the period from 1997 to 2017, in which Algeria has experienced five legislative elections regularly every five years by testing a hypothesis about adopting the proportional representation system on the basis of the closed list during the foregoing legislative elections has obviously influenced the exacerbation of the Algerian party system’s fragmentation, compared to other factors. Design/methodology/approach The essence of the theoretical framework of this study is to address the effect of the electoral system as an independent variable on the party system as a dependent variable. The starting point for that framework is to reassess the “Duverger’s law,” which appeared since the early 1950s and has influenced the foregoing relationship, and then to review the literature on a new phase that tried to provide a more accurate mechanism for determining the number of parties and their relative weight, whether in terms of electoral votes or parliamentary seats. This means that researchers began to use a measure called the effective number of parties (ENP) for Laakso and Taagepera since 1979. The study elaborates the general concepts of the electoral system and the party system. It used Laakso, Taagepera index of the “ENP” to measure the phenomenon of fragmentation party during the five legislative elections from 1997 to 2017 in Algeria. Findings The results of the study reveal that the proportional representation electoral system – beside other factors – had clear impacts on the fragmentation of the Algerian party system by all standards, whether on the level of the apparent rise in the number of the parties represented in the Algerian parliament from 10 parties in 1997 election to 36 parties in 2017 election or according to the index of Laakso and Taagepera (ENP). The average number of effective number of electoral parties in the five elections was around 7.66, and the average number of effective number of parliamentary parties in the five elections was around 4.39, which puts Algeria in an advanced degree of the fragmentation of the party system. Originality/value This study about the phenomenon of the fragmentation of the party system, which is one of the new subjects in the field of comparative politics – globally and in the Arab world. Hence, the value of this study aims to shed light on this mysterious area of science, the fragmentation of the party system in the Algerian political system during the period from 1997 to 2017.

scholarly journals Political finance regimes and party system size: evidence from new and established European democracies

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48
Author(s):  
Ekaterina R. Rashkova ◽  
Yen-Pin Su
Keyword(s):  
Party System ◽  
System Size ◽  
New Democracies ◽  
Sociological Factors ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Political Finance ◽  
Campaign Expenditure ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Established Democracies

AbstractStudies of party system size have looked at institutional and sociological factors in their attempt to explain what determines the number of parties. While some recent studies contend that party laws, beyond the district magnitude, have a significant impact on, among others, new party entry, we know very little about whether certain rules matter more in some societies than they do in others. In this paper, we study the extent to which various party finance rules affect party system size and differentiate the effect between new and established democracies. Specifically, we focus on direct and indirect public subsidization and limits on private donation and campaign expenditure. We hypothesize that compared to established countries, new democracies tend to have a larger party system size when the political finance rules create more equal conditions for electoral competition. Using data from 43 Europe democracies, the empirical analyses support our hypothesis.

Assimilation, contrast and voter projections of parties in left-right space

2010 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 711-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew J. Drummond
Keyword(s):  
Institutional Design ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Institutional Setting ◽  
Contrast Effects ◽  
Hierarchical Modelling ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Simple Question ◽  
Using Data ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
The Comparative Study

When voters place parties in their system along the left-right dimension, they often pull their preferred party closer towards them (assimilation) and push the opposition further away (contrast). This article asks a simple question: are such assimilation and contrast effects similarly powerful across different types of electoral system? I hypothesize that systems employing single-member districts will tend to strengthen assimilation and contrast because they mechanically reduce the number of parties, while shifting the focus of electoral competition away from the party and towards the candidate. Using data from 18 advanced democracies compiled by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and hierarchical modelling I find that contrast effects are indeed stronger in majoritarian systems, while assimilation effects appear similarly strong regardless of the institutional setting. These findings suggest that institutional design holds lasting consequences for how we perceive politics and, perhaps also, for our ability to effectuate democracy.

Dimensions of Variation in Electoral Systems

2017 ◽  
pp. 22-40
Author(s):  
Michael Gallagher ◽  
Paul Mitchell
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Electoral System ◽  
Political Actors ◽  
Political Consequences ◽  
Policy Choices ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Essential Components ◽  
Seat Allocation ◽  
Dimensions Of Variation

Electoral systems matter. They are a crucial link in the chain connecting the preferences of citizens to the policy choices made by governments. They are chosen by political actors and, once in existence, have political consequences for those actors. This chapter argues that electoral system choice is a highly consequential matter for democratic states and offers a comparative overview of the principal means by which electoral systems vary. What are the essential components of real-world electoral systems? The chapter emphasizes the importance of district magnitude, ballot structure (with three main types: categorical, dividual, and ordinal), “levels” of seat allocation, methods of selecting candidates within parties, and devices for limiting proportionality.

Predicting Party Systems from Electoral Systems

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rein Taagepera ◽  
Matthew Shugart
Keyword(s):  
Political Science ◽  
Party System ◽  
Electoral Systems ◽  
Party Systems ◽  
Product Model ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Upper Limits ◽  
Predictive Relationships ◽  
Number Of Parties ◽  
Quantities Of Interest

The Seat Product Model matters to electoral and party systems specialists in what it is able to predict, and to all political scientists as one example of how to predict. The seat product (MS) is the product of assembly size (S) and electoral district magnitude (M, number of seats allocated). Without any data input, thinking about conceptual lower and upper limits leads to a sequence of logically grounded models that apply to simple electoral systems. The resulting formulas allow for precise predictions about likely party system outputs, such as the number of parties, the size of the largest party, and other quantities of interest. The predictions are based entirely on institutional inputs. And when tested on real-world electoral data, these predictions are found to explain over 60% of the variance. This means that they provide a baseline expectation, against which actual countries and specific elections can be compared. To the broader political science audience, this research sends the following message: Interconnected quantitatively predictive relationships are a hallmark of developed science, but they are still rare in social sciences. These relationships can exist with regard to political phenomena if one is on the lookout for them. Logically founded predictions are stronger than merely empirical relationships or predictions of the direction of effects. Finally, isolated equations that connect various factors are nice, but equations that interconnect pack even more predictive punch. Political scientists should strive for connections among connections. This would lead to a more scientific political science.

The Effect of District Magnitude on Electoral Outcomes: Evidence from Two Natural Experiments in Argentina

2017 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 557-577 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adrián Lucardi
Keyword(s):  
Psychological Effect ◽  
Effective Number ◽  
Natural Experiments ◽  
Electoral Rules ◽  
Electoral Outcomes ◽  
District Magnitude ◽  
Electoral Support ◽  
Effective Number Of Parties ◽  
Number Of Parties

How does district magnitude affect electoral outcomes? This article addresses this question by exploiting a combination of two natural experiments in Argentina between 1985 and 2015. Argentine provinces elect half of their congressional delegation every two years, and thus districts with an odd number of representatives have varying magnitudes in different election years. Furthermore, whether a province elects more representatives in midterm or concurrent years was decided by lottery in 1983. I find that district magnitude (a) increases electoral support for small parties, (b) increases the (effective) number of parties that gain seats and (c) reduces electoral disproportionality. The last two results are driven by the mechanical rather than the psychological effect of electoral rules.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document