Optimal Pricing Decisions of Competing Air-Cargo-Carrier Systems—Impacts of Risk Aversion, Demand, and Cost Uncertainties

2020 ◽  
Vol 50 (12) ◽  
pp. 4933-4947 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xin Wen ◽  
Xiaoyan Xu ◽  
Tsan-Ming Choi ◽  
Sai-Ho Chung
2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 46-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haoxiong Yang ◽  
Wen Wang

This paper studies the subject of pricing decisions of online dual-channel based on hybrid decisions wherein a manufacturer introduces direct online marketing channels beyond the traditional online retail channels. The purpose is to study how to balance the interests of different online channels and maximize the overall efficiency of the channel. Having considered both online channels' satisfaction and the hidden costs of channel selection, by means of the demand function of both channels derived from a consumer utility and selection model, the author investigates the impacts of these two factors on the online dual-channel pricing decisions. This article also further analyzes the impact of changes in these two factors for manufacturers, retailers and channel' total revenue, with the purpose to provide decision-making reference for the enterprises' managers in the supply chain to develop optimal pricing strategies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (03) ◽  
pp. 1950011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng Yang ◽  
Junjun Kong ◽  
Minyue Jin

This paper investigates the implications of selling effort upon a monopolistic seller’s optimal pricing decisions and its performance in the presence of strategic customers. In our model, strategic customers can anticipate future price discounts and decide on when to purchase products from the seller over two periods. The direct impact of selling effort is to induce more customers to purchase in the first period. Two pricing policies are under consideration: (i) preannounced pricing under which the seller commits to a price path over two periods in advance; (ii) contingent pricing under which the seller can dynamically set a price in each period. The analytical results demonstrate that preannounced pricing always dominates contingent pricing from the seller’s perspective. Moreover, compared with the results under contingent pricing, selling effort is enhanced but market demand is shrunk under preannounced pricing. Through sensitivity analysis, we further find that when customers become more willing to postpone their purchases to the second period, the seller should reduce its selling effort in the first period if the demand-enhancement effect of selling effort is sufficiently low.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-8 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Wang ◽  
Jing Zhao ◽  
Jie Wei

Pricing decisions of two complementary products in a fuzzy environment are considered in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the changes of the optimal retail pricing of two complementary products under two different decentralized decision scenarios (e.g., Nash game case and Stackelberg game case). As a reference model, the centralized pricing model is also established. The closed-form optimal pricing decisions of the two complementary products are obtained in the above three decision scenarios. Some interesting management insights into how pricing decisions vary with decision scenarios are given.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Lingzhi Shao

Many dual-channel suppliers need to make appropriate strategies for their upgraded products in the presence of strategic consumers. This paper develops a two-period dynamic game framework to explore the optimal pricing and upgrade the channel choice when the supplier introduces new upgraded products to a market populated by strategic consumers. The results show that, under any upgrade channel choice, the strategic consumers’ behavior has impacts on supplier and retailer’s pricing decisions and reduces their profit. The supplier could choose appropriate upgrade channel to improve his performance according to the consumers’ patience and innovation level of upgrade products. The supplier should choose pure offline channel to upgrade products when the innovation level of upgraded product B is relatively small. With the sufficiently high innovation level, the supplier should adopt pure offline channel to upgrade products when consumers’ patience is low and uses dual-channel upgrade strategy when the patience is high enough.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 1655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xinmin Liu ◽  
Kangkang Lin ◽  
Lei Wang ◽  
Lili Ding

In service to sustainable development, consumers have begun to prefer green products for their special environmental characteristics, and many enterprises are introducing new products to improve their competitiveness, but this tactic may not work if customers are strategic, as they might choose to defer purchasing decisions while prices are high and wait for lower prices in the future. Considering the differences in purchase behavior, we divided customers into two groups—strategic customers and myopic customers. Furthermore, we distinguished three types of strategic customers according to their different preferences to analyze the optimal pricing and greenness strategies in sustainable supply chain in strategic customer scenarios. Our results led to the following conclusions. (1) Strategic customers’ individual preferences can affect optimum equilibrium and that a higher purchase price threshold can stimulate the manufacturer to improve greenness and set a higher price, while a higher greenness purchase threshold and purchase value threshold will force manufacturer to set a lower price. (2) We observed that strategic customers can increase demand and vender profit. As the number of strategic customers increases, selling price and greenness will experience downward trends in a price threshold scenario but upward trends in greenness threshold and value threshold scenarios. (3) A firm can take measures to mitigate the effects of strategic customers by adjusting price and greenness dynamically according to price and greenness sensitivity, which can play a leading role in actively influencing strategic customer behavior.


2012 ◽  
Vol 452-453 ◽  
pp. 663-668 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang

With awareness of environmental protection strengthens and constraints of regulations and laws to environmental protection increasing, more and more enterprises focus on the closed-loop supply chain management. Considering difference between new product and remanufactured product, this paper constructs closed-loop supply chain system with manufacturers recycling used products directly from the consumers based on game theory. The optimal pricing decisions and the optimal profit of centralized and decentralized closed-loop supply chain are obtained. It is found that the efficiency of decentralized closed-loop supply chain decreases by 25%. At last, the coordination mechanism is designed to solve the profit conflict in the decentralized closed-loop supply chain by the two-part tariff contract.


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