A game-theoretic model for energy trading of privacy-preserving Microgrid Social Networks

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Youbiao He ◽  
Jin Wei
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Privacy Preserving ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Competition for Attention in Online Social Networks: Implications for Seeding Strategies

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Gelper ◽  
Ralf van der Lans ◽  
Gerrit van Bruggen
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Online Social Networks ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Information Propagation ◽  
Media Campaigns ◽  
Exchange Networks ◽  
Seeding Strategy ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Connectivity Parameter

Many firms try to leverage consumers’ interactions on social platforms as part of their communication strategies. However, information on online social networks only propagates if it receives consumers’ attention. This paper proposes a seeding strategy to maximize information propagation while accounting for competition for attention. The theory of exchange networks serves as the framework for identifying the optimal seeding strategy and recommends seeding people that have many friends, who, in turn, have only a few friends. There is little competition for the attention of those seeds’ friends, and these friends are therefore responsive to the messages they receive. Using a game-theoretic model, we show that it is optimal to seed people with the highest Bonacich centrality. Importantly, in contrast to previous seeding literature that assumed a fixed and nonnegative connectivity parameter of the Bonacich measure, we demonstrate that this connectivity parameter is negative and needs to be estimated. Two independent empirical validations using a total of 34 social media campaigns on two different large online social networks show that the proposed seeding strategy can substantially increase a campaign’s reach. The second study uses the activity network of messages exchanged to confirm that the effects are driven by competition for attention. This paper was accepted by Anandhi Bharadwaj, information systems.

scholarly journals Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading in a Prosumer-Based Community Microgrid: A Game-Theoretic Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (8) ◽  
pp. 6087-6097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amrit Paudel ◽  
Kalpesh Chaudhari ◽  
Chao Long ◽  
Hoay Beng Gooi
Keyword(s):  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Why the West Became Wild

2017 ◽  
Vol 69 (4) ◽  
pp. 713-749 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer M. Larson
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Rapid Growth ◽  
Population Change ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Weak States ◽  
High Turnover ◽  
The West ◽  
The Social ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Settlers flocking to boomtowns on the American western frontier were faced with the same task that communities in weak states across the globe face in contemporary times: self-governance. Peer sanctions can enforce cooperation in these environments, but their efficacy depends on the social networks that transmit information from peer to peer. The author uses a game-theoretic model to show that peripheral network positions can generate such strong incentives to misbehave that persistent cheating occurs in equilibrium. The model reveals that groups maintaining high levels of cooperation that face shocks to their strategic environment or to their network can ratchet down into less cooperative equilibria in which the most peripheral become ostracized. Furthermore, population change that features rapid growth, high turnover, and enclave settlements can undermine cooperation. The insights from this article help to explain the trajectory of cooperation in the mining towns of the Wild West in which high levels of cooperation deteriorated as the population surged, and help to make sense of why only certain nonwhite settlers were targets of hostility and racism.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

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