scholarly journals Pricing and Operation Strategy for Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Using Distribution System Usage Charge and Game Theoretic Model

IEEE Access ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 8 ◽  
pp. 137720-137730
Author(s):  
Yunsun Jin ◽  
Jeonghoon Choi ◽  
Dongjun Won
Keyword(s):  
Distribution System ◽  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Operation Strategy ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
System Usage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading in a Prosumer-Based Community Microgrid: A Game-Theoretic Model

2019 ◽  
Vol 66 (8) ◽  
pp. 6087-6097 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amrit Paudel ◽  
Kalpesh Chaudhari ◽  
Chao Long ◽  
Hoay Beng Gooi
Keyword(s):  
Peer To Peer ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Energy Trading ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

scholarly journals Making the Public Distribution System Work

2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 3
Author(s):  
Debarshi Das
Keyword(s):  
Distribution System ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
High Food ◽  
Fair Price ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Distribution System ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Delivery Mechanism ◽  
Food Inflation

Drawing on empirical observations of operation of public distribution system in different states of India, the paper constructs a preliminary game theoretic model. It argues that an effective public distribution must be as universal as possible, delivery mechanism of fair price shops should be re-formed, they should be make them commercially viable and that special attention should be paid to PDS at times of high food inflation.

Stability in the informal value transfer systems: norms of trust or institutions of control?

2017 ◽  
pp. 120-130
Author(s):  
A. Lyasko
Keyword(s):  
Social Control ◽  
Institutional Economics ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Transfer System ◽  
Value Transfer ◽  
Partner Interaction ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
Informal Value Transfer System

Informal financial operations exist in the shadow of official regulation and cannot be protected by the formal legal instruments, therefore raising concerns about the enforcement of obligations taken by their participants. This paper analyzes two alternative types of auxiliary institutions, which can coordinate expectations of the members of informal value transfer systems, namely attitudes of trust and norms of social control. It offers some preliminary approaches to creating a game-theoretic model of partner interaction in the informal value transfer system. It also sheds light on the perspectives of further studies in this area of institutional economics.

Hollywood’s Movie Production Companies in Game Theoretic Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nargiz Mammadova ◽  
Aygun Malikova ◽  
Arzu Heydarova
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model

Augmenting Employees’ Efforts in Innovation

2021 ◽  
pp. 097674792198917
Author(s):  
Nikita Jain
Keyword(s):  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Wrongful Discharge ◽  
Equilibrium Level ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact

Strong labour laws play a major role in motivating innovation among employees. It has been found in the literature that stringency of labour laws is positively linked with employees’ efforts in innovation, in particular, wrongful discharge laws (WDL). However, employees may also bring nuisance suits against employers. Usually, the result of these suits is that both parties settle with each other. Thus, even if employees are justly dismissed, they may be able to bring nuisance suits against employers and gain a settlement amount. This article investigates how the possibility of nuisance suits affects the impact of WDL on employees’ efforts in innovation. In this respect, a game-theoretic model is developed in the article to find the equilibrium level of employees’ efforts in the presence of nuisance suits, where there is a possibility of employees getting discharged from the firm. I find that if nuisance suits are a possibility, the stringency of WDL has no impact on employees’ efforts if defence cost of the firm is low; but for higher defence costs, WDL affects employees’ efforts. The efforts exerted by an employee are found to be weakly increasing in the defence costs of the firm.

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