Research on the retail price competition strategy under B2C E-commerce

Author(s):  
Liqiang Zhao ◽  
Lidong Zhao
2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paddy V. Padmanabhan ◽  
Ivan P. L. Png

2005 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 228-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajeev K. Tyagi

Models of distribution channels have defined retailer and manufacturer pricing decision variables in different ways, such as absolute retail price or absolute retail margin and absolute manufacturer price or absolute manufacturer margin. This article examines whether this choice of definition affects the equilibrium outcomes from such models. It shows that the equilibrium outcomes do not change with these definitions if manufacturers are modeled as Stackelberg pricing leaders to their retailer. However, if manufacturers are modeled as Bertrand-Nash competitors to their retailer or as Stackelberg pricing followers to their retailer, the equilibrium outcomes change depending on how the retailer's pricing decision variables are defined. Moreover, if in these two cases manufacturers and retailer are allowed to define their own pricing decision variables, then (1) manufacturers are indifferent about choosing among absolute prices, absolute margins, and percentage margins, but (2) the retailer chooses percentage margins. These results have implications for both theoretical and empirical models of price competition in distribution channels.


1962 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 13-30
Author(s):  
Lee E. Preston ◽  
Reed Hertford

Complexity ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 2018 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianbo Zhu ◽  
Qianqian Shi ◽  
Peng Wu ◽  
Zhaohan Sheng ◽  
Xiangyu Wang

This paper considers a repeated duopoly game of prefabrication contractors in mega infrastructure projects and assumes the contractors exhibit bounded rationality. Based on the theory of bifurcation of dynamical systems, a dynamic price competition model is constructed considering different competition strategies. Accordingly, the stability of the equilibrium point of the system is discussed considering different initial market capacities, and numerical simulation is performed. The results show the system has a unique equilibrium solution when initial capacity is high and the parameters meet certain conditions. The contractors’ price adjustment strategy has an important influence on system stability. However, an overly aggressive competition strategy is not conducive to system stability. Moreover, the system is sensitive to initial parameter values.


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