Equilibrium Selection under Limited Control - An Experiment on Network Hawk Dove Games

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephan Schosser ◽  
Siegfried Berninghaus ◽  
Bodo Vogt
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection

Equilibrium Selection in Bargaining Models

2003 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth Binmore ◽  
Larry Samuelson ◽  
H. Peyton Peyton Young
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Bargaining Models

Equilibrium selection for multi-portfolio optimization

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Lampariello ◽  
Christoph Neumann ◽  
Jacopo M. Ricci ◽  
Simone Sagratella ◽  
Oliver Stein
Keyword(s):  
Portfolio Optimization ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Selection For

scholarly journals Competing Conventions with Costly Information Acquisition

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 53
Author(s):  
Roberto Rozzi
Keyword(s):  
Information Acquisition ◽  
Evolutionary Model ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
The Other ◽  
Group Interactions ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Stochastic Stability Analysis ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

We consider an evolutionary model of social coordination in a 2 × 2 game where two groups of players prefer to coordinate on different actions. Players can pay a cost to learn their opponent’s group: if they pay it, they can condition their actions concerning the groups. We assess the stability of outcomes in the long run using stochastic stability analysis. We find that three elements matter for the equilibrium selection: the group size, the strength of preferences, and the information’s cost. If the cost is too high, players never learn the group of their opponents in the long run. If one group is stronger in preferences for its favorite action than the other, or its size is sufficiently large compared to the other group, every player plays that group’s favorite action. If both groups are strong enough in preferences, or if none of the groups’ sizes is large enough, players play their favorite actions and miscoordinate in inter-group interactions. Lower levels of the cost favor coordination. Indeed, when the cost is low, in inside-group interactions, players always coordinate on their favorite action, while in inter-group interactions, they coordinate on the favorite action of the group that is stronger in preferences or large enough.

Equilibrium selection and altruistic behavior in noncooperative social networks

Top ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 454-470 ◽  
Author(s):  
Giuseppe De Marco ◽  
Jacqueline Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Social Networks ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Altruistic Behavior

EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS

2005 ◽  
Vol 07 (02) ◽  
pp. 229-240 ◽  
Author(s):  
IVAR KOLSTAD
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Basin Of Attraction ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Mutation Rates ◽  
And Control

Bergin and Lipman (1996) prove that equilibrium selection in the evolutionary dynamics of Kandori et al. (1993) and Young (1993), is not robust to variations in mutation rates across states. Specifically, a risk dominant equilibrium can be selected against if mutation rates are higher in its basin of attraction than elsewhere. Van Damme and Weibull (1998) model mutations as a compromise between payoff losses and control costs, which implies lower mutation rates in the risk dominant equilibrium. This paper argues that this result is not driven by control costs, but by players focusing on payoff losses when choosing mutation rates.

A Note on Payoff Equivalence of the Volunteer's Dilemma and the Stag Hunt Game and Inferiority of Intermediate Thresholds

2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (03) ◽  
pp. 1550004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Friedel Bolle
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Equilibrium Selection ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Project ◽  
Binary Decision ◽  
Stag Hunt ◽  
Volunteer’S Dilemma ◽  
Stag Hunt Game ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

The launch of a public project requires "enough" support from a group of 'n' players, i.e., a certain threshold has to be passed. The players may be differently important for passing the threshold; they may have different costs of support and different benefits if the project is launched. If players have only binary decision sets (participate or not, vote approvingly or not) this game is called a Binary Threshold Public Goods game (BTPG). We compare the expected equilibrium payoffs in BTPGs with the same costs and benefits but different thresholds. Applying two principles of equilibrium selection, the least and the most demanding threshold, namely "one supporting player is sufficient" (Volunteer's Dilemma) and "support by all players is necessary" (Stag Hunt game) are payoff equivalent for all players. Compared with the Stag Hunt game, all intermediate thresholds are connected with Pareto-inferior payoffs.

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