Nash equilibria in risk-sensitive dynamic games

2000 ◽  
Vol 45 (7) ◽  
pp. 1397-1401 ◽  
Author(s):  
M.B. Klompstra
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Risk Sensitive

scholarly journals Dinamicke igre ulaska na trziste

2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (165) ◽  
pp. 121-144
Author(s):  
Bozo Stojanovic
Keyword(s):  
Nash Equilibrium ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Perfect Equilibrium ◽  
Equilibrium Concept ◽  
Reasonable Solution ◽  
Multiple Nash Equilibria ◽  
Entry Games

Market processes can be analyzed by means of dynamic games. In a number of dynamic games multiple Nash equilibria appear. These equilibria often involve no credible threats the implementation of which is not in the interests of the players making them. The concept of sub game perfect equilibrium rules out these situations by stating that a reasonable solution to a game cannot involve players believing and acting upon noncredible threats or promises. A simple way of finding the sub game perfect Nash equilibrium of a dynamic game is by using the principle of backward induction. To explain how this equilibrium concept is applied, we analyze the dynamic entry games.

scholarly journals Capuchin monkeys ( Sapajus [ Cebus ] apella ) play Nash equilibria in dynamic games, but their decisions are likely not influenced by oxytocin

2019 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. e22973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mackenzie F. Smith ◽  
Kelly L. Leverett ◽  
Bart J. Wilson ◽  
Sarah F. Brosnan
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Nash Equilibria ◽  
Cebus Apella ◽  
Capuchin Monkeys
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