scholarly journals Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibria in constrained linear–quadratic dynamic games played over event trees

Automatica ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 107 ◽  
pp. 162-174
Author(s):  
Puduru Viswanadha Reddy ◽  
Georges Zaccour
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter focuses on one-player continuous time dynamic games, that is, the optimal control of a continuous time dynamical system. It begins by considering a one-player continuous time differential game in which the (only) player wants to minimize either using an open-loop policy or a state-feedback policy. It then discusses continuous time cost-to-go, with the following conclusion: regardless of the information structure considered (open loop, state feedback, or other), it is not possible to obtain a cost lower than cost-to-go. It also explores continuous time dynamic programming, linear quadratic dynamic games, and differential games with variable termination time before concluding with a practice exercise and the corresponding solution.


2018 ◽  
Vol 238 (6) ◽  
pp. 541-569
Author(s):  
Ivan Savin ◽  
Dmitri Blueschke ◽  
Viktoria Blueschke-Nikolaeva

Abstract We propose a new method for solving nonlinear dynamic tracking games using a meta-heuristic approach. In contrast to ‘traditional’ methods based on linear-quadratic (LQ) techniques, this derivative-free method is very flexible with regard to the objective function specification. The proposed method is applied to a three-player dynamic game and tested versus a derivative-dependent method in approximating solutions of different game specifications. In particular, we consider a dynamic game between fiscal (played by national governments) and monetary policy (played by a central bank) in a monetary union. Apart from replicating results of the LQ-based techniques in a standard setting, we solve two ‘non-standard’ extensions of this game (dealing with an inequality constraint in a control variable and introducing asymmetry in penalties of the objective function), identifying both a cooperative Pareto and a non-cooperative open-loop Nash equilibria, where the traditional methods are not applicable. We, thus, demonstrate that the proposed method allows one to study more realistic problems and gain better insights for economic policy.


Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha

This chapter focuses on one-player discrete time dynamic games, that is, the optimal control of a discrete time dynamical system. It first considers solution methods for one-player dynamic games, which are simple optimizations, before discussing discrete time cost-to-go. It shows that, regardless of the information structure (open loop, state feedback or other), it is not possible to obtain a cost lower than the cost-to-go. A computationally efficient recursive technique that can be used to compute the cost-to-go is dynamic programming. After providing an overview of discrete time dynamic programming, the chapter explores the complexity of computing the cost-to-go at all stages, the use of MATLAB to solve finite one-player games, and linear quadratic dynamic games. It concludes with a practice exercise and the corresponding solution, along with an additional exercise.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-224
Author(s):  
Ezhari Asfa’ani

We discuss about Nash equilibria for the linear quadratic differential game for an infinite planning horizon. We consider an open-loop information structure. In the standard literature this problem is solved under the assumption and provide both necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of Nash equilibria for this game under the assumption that the system as a whole is stabilizable.      Keywords: linear quadratic differential games, open-loop information structure


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