Border disputes will keep Balkan region unstable

Subject Intensifying disputes over several borders in the Western Balkans. Significance Croatia and Slovenia are at odds over their maritime border in the Adriatic. Kosovo rejects Montenegro’s claim to a parcel of land which Kosovo currently controls, while Serbia is mounting a challenge to the very existence of its border with Kosovo. Bosnian Serbs are threatening to create a new international border with the rest of Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH). Impacts Border disputes will have an adverse impact on economic development and business continuity in the affected areas. Border disputes will frustrate the integration of the Balkans with the EU and NATO. Disputes over borders will provide a flashpoint for potential conflict, especially in Kosovo and BiH.

Subject Russia's contacts with Balkans political parties. Significance For Moscow, connections with Balkan parties are an instrument to exert influence in a region falling within the West's sphere. The declaration the ruling United Russia party signed with parties from Serbia, Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH), Macedonia and Bulgaria on June 27 called for military neutrality in a Balkan zone of neutral sovereign states within a new pan-European continental security architecture that would exclude NATO membership and hark back to the Yugoslav policy of non-alignment. Impacts Russia will balance NATO expansion into the Western Balkans with initiatives to increase its influence in the region's domestic politics. Moscow will tacitly accept the Balkans' integration into the EU. Russia will seek to diversify alliances, cooperating with both mainstream pragmatists and radicals calling for a turn away from the West.


Subject Prospects for EU enlargement to the Western Balkans after the UK vote to leave. Significance EU officials and diplomats in the region are publicly trying to send messages that, when it comes to the accession prospects of the Western Balkan countries, everything remains 'business as usual', despite the UK vote to leave ('Brexit'). The familiar refrain is that as long as the countries of the region deliver on the reforms demanded by the EU, the process will continue to move forward. Impacts UK-Balkans trade, investment and remittances flows are too low to inflict any appreciable Brexit 'shock'. Serbia will remain on course for the EU despite Brexit, which will have no major financial or economic impact, the Serbian premier has said. However, the National Bank of Serbia cut its key policy rate yesterday, expecting Brexit to affect emerging economies, including Serbia. Pro-Russian elements in the Balkans will welcome UK withdrawal as removing a perceived obstacle to rapprochement between the EU and Russia.


Significance Part of the preparations for the summit was the ‘reflection forum’ in Trieste on June 26-27, which gathered representatives of international organisations, media and NGOs from Europe and the Balkans. They underlined the risks of further destabilisation in the Balkans, with Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH) in particular entering deeper into a political crisis characterised by personal animosities and mistrust among all key politicians. Impacts Whether the Balkans destabilises further or stabilises depends on EU and US ability and desire to engage more concretely and resolutely. The gradual fading of EU enlargement has fuelled regional tensions and enabled other influences to grow. Russia could play spoiler by using its influence among Serbs in BiH, Serbia and Montenegro to destabilise the Balkans. Turkey's worsening relations with the EU, United States and NATO and its rapprochement with Russia could create regional tensions.


Significance Disturbances in the newest NATO member state stems from religious and political affiliation rather than any doctrinal split, pitting pro-Western Montenegrin nationalists and minorities against self-identified Serbs loyal to Belgrade and Moscow. It is part of a broader Balkan split between pro-Western and pro-Russia orientations. Impacts The Western Balkans could become another contentious issue dividing Russia and Turkey, alongside Idlib and Libya. Unlike the EU, NATO is still interested in expanding in the Balkans. The West will push back against Beijing’s Balkan influence although its political profile is much lower than Moscow’s.


2019 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 91
Author(s):  
Tamara Latkovska ◽  
Lyubov Bila-Tiunova

The presented work is an attempt to compare the quality of governance in non-EU states in the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe with which the EU Association Agreements have been concluded, and Ukraine, including aspects of the impact of the DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas). The most important issues are the interpretation of the results, the equality of countries, and the political consequences that may arise after the progression and the rapid pace of the member countries of the DCFTA towards the countries of the Balkan region. The identified countries seek full membership in the EU. Although the EU distinguishes between these countries, it recognizes “European prospects”, that is, membership in the EU, the commitments to adopt or approach EU laws and policies, made by both groups of countries, have much in common. This makes the comparison between the countries of the Balkan region and the member states of the DCFTA a sound and politically significant one. Such comparison is facilitated by numerous sources, qualitative assessments, and official ratings. Figuratively by analytical indicators, the countries can be divided into the first group of leading countries (Serbia and Montenegro) for which in February 2018 the European Commission proposed to consider 2025 as the possible date of accession to the EU. The second group (Albania and Macedonia), for which the date of accession negotiations is conditionally open in 2019. The third group includes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, for which there are no dates, and Turkey, the negotiations with which are suspended. For comparison, if we take both political and economic indicators of Ukraine, it is approximately equal to the Balkan states of the second group and outstrips the states of the third group. The prospect of EU membership was recognized as the strongest external factor of internal political changes in the countries surrounding the EU. One of the most striking trends is the steady decline in the standards of political governance in all countries, for which the EU expands its membership perspective. One of the main manifestations of poor governance in the broader neighbourhood is the widespread corruption and impunity of officials. Weak rule of law and ineffective law enforcement bodies have become common practice in all different states and have allowed current officials to act impunity during their term of office. The identified results challenge the assumption dominating in political and scientific circles that a credible prospect of EU membership is steadily generating an internal environment conducive to democratic changes. The effectiveness of economic governance was assessed by the indicators of competitiveness of the national economy (Global Competitiveness Index, Corruption Perceptions Index, Human Development Index, Ease of Doing Business Index, Index of Economic Freedom, Index of Globalization, SEDA (Sustainable Economic Development Assessment)); GDP dynamics; the volume of foreign direct investment; economic activity of the population. In practice, the EU applies an increasing number of common economic policy instruments for the Balkans and member countries of the DCFTA, in spite of the political (or rhetorical) differentiation between countries, given the categorization of membership prospects. The convergence of the actual EU policy has taken place. The Association Agreements and the DCFTA have raised the level of political and economic governance in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine at the level of the Balkan countries while the expansion process for the Balkan countries has not advanced.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Teoman Ertuğrul Tulun

Among the current EU leaders, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has held office the longest. She was instrumental in steering the EU through the refugee crisis, the eurozone crisis, Covid-19, and, to some extent, Brexit. This article is a tale of many Merkel's with many faces. German presence in the Balkans has been strong, yet, on par with German foreign policy not very visible. Albania, North Macedonia, and Montenegro's entrance to NATO - the only significant move forward in a long time – is the achievement of the United States of America (USA) and Turkey.During Merkel's period, Western countries have tried to redefine the Balkan region. In renaming, carving, dividing up the region, the EU had several goals. One is to separate EU Balkan member states from their regional and cultural roots. Another is to create a second category called a divisive and discriminatory term "Western Balkans". Overall, Merkel's foreign policy has been successful as an economic plan, while the political approach has not.


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 427-447 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marijke Welisch ◽  
Gustav Resch ◽  
André Ortner

Purpose The purpose of the paper is to provide estimation results for feasibility of renewable energy source (RES) deployment in Turkey, the Western Balkans and North Africa. From these results, the potential for cooperation in renewables production between the countries and the European Union (EU) is assessed and evaluated, in a mid- (2030) and long-term (up to 2040) perspective. Design/methodology/approach The authors focus on the quantitative assessments undertaken on the extent to which RES cooperation can create mutual benefits, identifying costs and benefits for both sides, but in particular with respect to RES target achievement (2020 and 2030) at EU level. The potentials for RES generation in Turkey, North Africa and the Western Balkans are calculated under different policy pathways, taking into account different levels of economic and non-economic barriers that could occur. Findings Overall, the authors found that increasing RES deployment in the three analysed regions and initiating or intensifying cooperation with EU28 Member States leads to mutual benefits. Concretely, these benefits become apparent in terms of the EU Member States importing renewable energy sources for electricity with a good resource quality and adding on to their targets for RES deployment. At the same time, substantial savings occur for the EU, in turn leading to income and investments in the cooperating regions. Originality/value The assessment underlying this paper is the first of its kind to the authors’ knowledge that opens up the geographical spread in comparison to merely assessing cooperation between Europe and the Middle East and North Africa. Furthermore, the multitude of policy parameters analysed provides detailed and robust insights concerning a broad variety of different possible scenarios.


Author(s):  
F. Basov

This article is dedicated to the German policy towards the EU enlargement. Its history as well as the current German policy towards prospective enlargements are analyzed in this paper. The article offers party-political and sociological analysis of Germany`s attitude towards the EU enlargement, also the reasons for it are determined. FRG supported all of the European Community and European Union enlargements. This line is being continued, but nowadays only step to step approach is being supported. Germany‘s motives to the EU enlargement are based on the liberal concept of the common security. The main goals of this policy are the including of European countries into the Western community of developed countries (the EU), the extension of the stability and security area. The economic integration is also very important for Germany. The key priority of the EU enlargement is the Western Balkan region (the so called “Europeanisation” of Western Balkans). This process is being supported by political elites of the region and by the European Union itself. It is recognized, that the Europeanisation of Western Balkans was used as a sample for the Eastern Partnership Program. Without consideration of the Russian factor, though, this strategy towards the post-Soviet countries has many weaknesses. But the EU-membership for the Eastern Partnership members is not excluded.


2021 ◽  
pp. 233-252
Author(s):  
Tatiana Bitkova ◽  

The article analyzes some aspects of Romania’s foreign policy in the Balkan region. It is noted that the same fact that country belongs to the Balkans causes ambiguous interpretations on the part of Romanian politicians and experts, many of whom believe that Romania cannot be attributed to this region either geographically or politically. At the same time, culturally and historically, according to a certain part of historians and sociologists, Romania nevertheless carries the features of the so-called «Balkanism», due to the common Ottoman past with the Balkan Peninsula. These features are also relevant for the current socio-political situation, which is shown in the article with specific examples. In addition, criticism of the very term «Balkanism» from the side of Romanian analysts is presented. The author also examines Romania’s relations with the countries of the Western Balkans, primarily with Serbia. The points of contact of the positions of these countries are noted, which are largely due to the desire of Serbia to resolve the Kosovo problem in its favor, relying on the support of Romania - one of the five EU countries that did not recognize the independence of Kosovo. Romania, using this situation, is trying to strengthen its position, seeking regional leadership. The author comes to the conclusion that, although the Western Balkan countries directly or indirectly aspire to Euro-Atlantic structures, some of them (primarily Serbia) maintain and develop friendly relations with Russia, which complicates their interaction with Romania, orthodoxly adhering to the NATO and European Union policies and having a very difficult relationship with Russia.


Author(s):  
Goran Ilik

This chapter explores the key features of the concept of postnationalism, its modes, and theoretical implications regarding the European Union. The main research intention is to explore the EU as a model and an agent for reconciliation of the Balkan region. For that purpose, the main operative elements of both the South East European Cooperation Process and “Yugosphere” are examined. At the end, it is concluded that the emulation of EU postnational model by the Balkan countries enables the process of reconciliation. Hence, the Balkan states seems to be “forced” to cooperate with each other, in order to achieve their common objective – their full integration into the EU, which strongly confirms the role of the EU as an agent for reconciliation of the Balkans.


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