Erdogan may find events in Turkey escaping his control

Subject Erdogan's vision for Turkey. Significance Since the July attempted coup, the government has purged 81,000 real or imagined opponents. Yet it has not been in turmoil, as is frequently claimed, even though President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's refusal to compromise on any front has locked Turkey into simultaneous expensive military conflicts, including participation in the civil war in Syria, just after 3,000 serving officers have been purged and just under 40% of generals and admirals either sacked or arrested. Impacts Erdogan's supremacy faces no foreseeable internal challengers or pressures to make policy changes. Turkey's international isolation will worsen, especially the US rift; the EU will keep its soft line while Russia will be friendly. The defeat of Islamic State group and recapture of Mosul will exacerbate US-Turkish tensions. Reliance on Russian energy imports may grow and new areas of cooperation be announced. Turkey's ambitious new health system may be an early economic area to run into financing problems.

Significance The bill's declared purpose is to prevent the import of foreign ideologies and to give law enforcement wider authority, in particular for 'special' security operations, arrests and searches. Its origins lie not in recent events in Nardaran but the destabilisation of the Middle East after the 'Arab spring', the chair of the parliamentary committee on religious organisations and public associations, Siyavush Novruzov, said. The secular regime sees a rising threat in radical Islam, represented by both Islamic State group (ISG) and a multitude of smaller groups. Impacts The government will strive for socioeconomic stability at all costs, expanding benefits and using the State Oil Fund's substantial reserves. The deteriorating regional security situation may undercut Azerbaijan's strategy of becoming a prime supplier of gas to Turkey and the EU. Baku will become more tempted to use anti-terrorism and anti-extremism as a political weapon against the domestic non-religious opposition. Azerbaijan's Shia form 75% of its Muslims, who form 97% of the population.


Significance The process looks in danger. Serious local conflicts in south-eastern Turkey are straining tensions between Kurds and the government, even though guerrilla warfare has not resumed. Kurdish self-confidence is rising because of its fighters' success in expelling Islamic State group (ISG) from Kobani. However, dialogue between the government and imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan continues, and Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu seems more sensitive to Kurdish aspirations than his predecessors. Impacts Ocalan's leadership of the PKK is unshakable, but his ability to persuade his followers to avoid clashes on the streets is weakening. The conflict between the Kurds and Islamists inside Turkey will grow. Public opinion, including conservative religious elements, will block significant concessions to the Kurds, limiting the government's scope. The Kurds are emerging as a key regional opponent of Islamist politics.


Subject US Iraqi Train and Equip Fund. Significance The US Department of Defense has requested an additional 630 million dollars for the Iraqi Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) in the 2016-17 fiscal year. This fund, hurriedly brought into existence in the summer of 2014, was developed to provide assistance and training to the Iraqi army in the wake of its disastrous performance against Islamic State group (ISG) forces. Forces trained under the ITEF will be a key component of the planned offensive to retake the ISG stronghold of Mosul later this year. Impacts The programme is unlikely to continue once Mosul has been retaken -- although other funding streams will continue. Its success would strengthen the Iraqi army, thereby empowering central government against pro-Iran, hardline militias. Its failure would strengthen these militias and increase the prospects of a semi-permanent fragmentation of the Iraqi state.


Significance The June 26 suicide attack inside the Imam al-Sadiq Mosque killed 27 people and was Kuwait's worst terrorist attack in over three decades. The attack, claimed by Islamic State group (ISG) and carried out by a Saudi citizen, was intended to inflame sectarian tensions that have spiralled in recent years. US officials have long identified Kuwait as an epicentre of funding and other forms of materiel assistance for participants in the Syrian civil war. However, unlike Qatar and Saudi Arabia, where support largely has flowed in one direction toward Sunni rebel groups, Kuwaitis have provided high-profile support to both the opposition and the Assad regime. Impacts The government will use the attack to reinforce its narrative that the bidun constitute a security threat rather than a human rights issue. Initial solidarity among Kuwait Sunni and Shia could dissipate quickly into political wrangling over the government's response. Kuwaiti salafi aid will boost hardline Islamist rebel groups in Syria. Key commercial and business interests, and oil installations are unlikely to be affected seriously by the rising terrorist threat. Reinforced security measures will further restrict political freedoms in the GCC's most open state.


Subject ISG infiltration of refugee flows. Significance Refugee arrivals in Europe in 2016, large if not at 2015 levels, will put yet more pressure on the EU, which is already struggling to address economic crises, political polarisation and inter-state divisions on how to address security crises in Ukraine and the Middle East. Suspicions have grown that among the refugees are operatives of the Islamic State group (ISG). Impacts ISG's foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria will seek to expand their relationships with existing extremist networks in Europe. Speculation over ISG's presence within refugee flows will continue, especially as far-right parties continue to perform well in elections. The EU-Turkey deal may slow refugee flows, but the existing numbers of refugees will continue to attract suspicion from authorities.


Significance This is the first visit to Washington by a Thai prime minister since 2005. Thai-US relations have been much cooler since the mid-2014 military coup that Prayuth, as an army general, led to depose Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra. The visit, therefore, had high symbolism. It was also controversial because Trump is warming ties with a coup leader who has instituted a new constitution that will weaken elected government in Thailand after the next election, which Prayuth told Trump would take place in 2018. Impacts Thailand’s election could be delayed to 2019: two of the required pre-poll ‘organic laws’ will not be passed until end-2018. Thai intellectual property protections will likely be strengthened to avoid sanctions under the US Trade Act’s Section 301. Thai-US anti-Islamic State cooperation will likely be slow to build, partly given southern Thailand’s Muslim-Buddhist conflict. Thailand will push for enhanced trade ties with the EU and post-Brexit United Kingdom.


Significance Iran's armed forces have suffered a number of high-profile casualties in Syria and Iraq in recent weeks. General Mohammad Ali Allah-Dadi was killed in an Israeli airstrike inside Syria in January, while General Hamid Taqavi was killed by the Islamic State group (ISG) in Iraq in late December. Taqavi was the highest-ranking officer to be killed since the Iran-Iraq war ended in 1988. Both men were members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), Iran's elite military force that conducts all of Tehran's military operations outside the country's borders. As rising instability threatens Iran's interests, the IRGC has stepped up its deployment across the region, raising the risk of military overstretch. Meanwhile, on the domestic front, the IRGC is at loggerheads with the government of President Hassan Rouhani as nuclear negotiations approach their next deadline. Impacts IRGC dominance in Tehran policy-making will prevent any wider rapprochement with Washington. Resolution to the Syrian civil war will require regional political agreement involving Iran. Tensions with Saudi Arabia are at risk of further escalation. Demands on the defence budget will increase, raising fiscal strain on government.


Subject Assessment of the 'Khorasan Group' Significance The US-led coalition's airstrikes in Syria since 2014 have focused on the Islamic State group (ISG). However, they have also struck the 'Khorasan Group' -- a collection of veteran al-Qaida operatives that allegedly plots terrorist attacks abroad, and that operates on the edges of Syria's al-Qaida affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra (JaN). Beginning in late 2014, Washington warned repeatedly that the Khorasan Group was plotting attacks in Europe and the United States, and that it was recruiting holders of Western passports who would be able to enter and transit Western countries more easily. Impacts Al-Qaida outside Syria will likely pursue terrorist attacks that punish the West for its policies in the Muslim world. ISG will also carry out terrorist attacks in an effort to assert its leadership over the global jihadist movement. Without an imminent threat from the Khorasan Group, the West will have difficulty making a case for targeting JaN. JaN will retain a base of Syrian opposition support so long as it does not invite international retaliation by supporting an attack abroad.


Significance The meeting follows Turkey's launch of military strikes on July 24 against Islamic State group (ISG) in northern Syria and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in northern Iraq. Although Ankara says it is pursuing a broader strategy against terrorism, it has two asymmetrical goals. Against ISG, its measures remain largely defensive in nature, including driving ISG from the border and reducing the threat of blowback inside Turkey. Against the PKK, they appear more ambitious and appear designed to crush the organisation and use force rather than dialogue to resolve the demands of Turkey's Kurds for greater cultural and political rights. Impacts The US-led coalition may move the main platform for its air campaign in Syria and Iraq to Turkey, reducing flying times to targets. Ankara is likely to stop short of deploying ground troops in Syria. ISG may retaliate inside Turkey, particularly against its tourism sector. AKP may abandon coalition negotiations and go for the nationalist vote to recover its majority in early elections, possibly in November. Crackdown on ISG activities inside Turkey could weaken the group in Syria.


Significance These operations follow the recapture of Tikrit, Sinjar, Ramadi and Fallujah from Islamic State group (ISG) in the past 18 months. Western countries backing the government and supporting its military campaign have pledged to increase their support for initiatives to stabilise recaptured areas. However, these initiatives have significant drawbacks that limit their prospects of success. Impacts Western criticism of Baghdad's military campaigns and anti-ISG strategy will remain muted. International aid organisations will be at risk of attack. Absent meaningful reconciliation, ISG will drive new terrorist attacks in Iraq, other Middle East conflict zones and the West.


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