Cuban 'opening' will be gradual and limited

Significance Although the promise of Cuba's 'opening' has brought a rush of high-level US and European visits, change will be slow. Negotiations to restore diplomatic relations with Washington are still mired in rules for embassy personnel, while EU-Cuban talks on a cooperation agreement are advancing, but slowly. Within Cuban society, expectations that US-Cuban rapprochement will lead to domestic detente will exert pressure for gradual political and media liberalisation. Impacts Foreign policy successes have yet to translate into material benefits for the population. Paris Club talks, after a 14-year hiatus, are the strongest signal yet that Cuba is preparing a return to international finance. Long-announced monetary reform remains pending, while multiple exchange rates undermine the economy. Sources close to Cuba's Foreign Ministry suggest that Castro himself will travel to Brussels for the EU-CELAC meeting.

Significance Mitsotakis has chosen Cyprus for his first trip abroad two weeks after the EU announced sanctions against Turkey over prospecting operations in disputed parts of the seabed off Cyprus, divided between Greeks and Turks since 1974. They include suspension of high-level diplomatic contact, some funding cuts and a halt to talks on regional flight regulation. Impacts The risk of a Turkish-Greek naval confrontation is growing. The new Greek government will take a harsher line than its predecessor. Israel and Greece will press for a trans-Mediterranean gas pipeline with US support.


Significance A series of scandals surrounding Prime Minister Andrej Babis, including the newly released Pandora Papers, threaten to undermine ANO’s popularity. A challenge may come from the centre-right SPOLU coalition, campaigning on a strong anti-Babis programme. The key question is which way undecided voters will finally lean. Impacts The Communists, who are currently teetering on the 5% electoral threshold, could eventually disappear from high-level politics. If ANO retains power, the government's European policy will focus on defending Babis’s interests before the EU. Either of the two opposition blocs would pursue a more constructive European policy if they won. Introduction of the euro is unlikely in the foreseeable future, as supporters of the common currency are significantly in the minority.


Author(s):  
Roberto Dominguez ◽  
Marlena Crandall

The EU–Mexico relationship is symbolic of how a determined commitment to cooperation can lead to enduring partnerships between disparate and geographically distant states. The EU and Mexico have gradually institutionalized several frameworks for cooperation through a series of internationally significant agreements. In spite of major asymmetries in their levels of political, social, and economic development, the EU and Mexico have continually formalized their commitment to cooperation: both parties signed the Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement (GA) in 1997 (in force since 2000), the Strategic Partnership (SP) in 2008, and modernization of the GA in 2018. Although the EU and Mexico have had relations since the 1970s, the first two decades of the 21st century have witnessed an intense alignment of policy goals in a variety of economic, political, and social areas, leading to the acceleration of mutual commitments and cooperation between seemingly unlikely partners. The implementation of the 2000 GA has been successful on several fronts: trade expanded, trust grew, and the European investment flow to Mexico increased with few interruptions. Therefore, it was not a lack of success that motivated the GA modernization process, but external global transformations and a relationship that had outgrown its defining framework. External global transformations—such as the rapid technological revolution, the subtly shifting international balance of power, and the degradation of the neoliberal economic model—required a more responsive agreement with updated legal frameworks. Further, the limitations of the original GA with respect to trade and economic imperatives required the inclusion of several new articles to address the expanded digital and service-based economies. With respect to political coordination and cooperation, the revised GA incorporated more disciplines into the formal High-Level Dialogues, and addressed a broadened international agenda increasingly focused on regulation, sustainability, and environmental concerns. While the EU–Mexico relationship is characterized by an entrenched belief in institutionalized, regular, and productive cooperation mechanisms, both parties agreed to modernize the GA in the late 2010s. The decades-long commitment to this ethos, despite their highly disparate starting point, is poised to promote several more decades of cooperation with the conclusion of the modernized Agreement in 2018.


Significance The trip is one of several for Rousseff, who is looking to accelerate ongoing trade talks with the United States and the EU in order to provide a much-needed boost to the struggling Brazilian economy. Although trade will be the main topic of conversation, Rousseff and US President Barack Obama will mark the restart of high-level political dialogue on strategic issues such as climate change and defence ties. Impacts The warm welcome planned by the White House will mark a symbolic break from the cold relations prevailing since the NSA scandal. Despite recent progress on a trade facilitation agreement, Brasilia's reluctance to give up import tax income will present obstacles. Dialogue on technical issues will gain momentum, including exchange of technology, military information and travel visas.


Significance Today marks the first anniversary of US President Barack Obama and Cuban President Raul Castro's announcement of normalisation of US-Cuban relations. One year on, the process has advanced significantly, with Obama suggesting that he may travel to Havana in 2016. However, despite Cuba's rapidly changing international relations and economic growth, domestic reform has failed to accelerate. Impacts Foreign investment in Cuba will increase significantly in 2016. Negotiations with the EU are likely to bring about a Cuba-EU cooperation agreement. Domestic reform is unlikely to advance much before April as Cuban leaders avoid divisive issues prior to the 2016 party congress. The Cuban migration surge will probably worsen over the coming months.


Significance This is the strongest signal yet of President Miguel Diaz-Canel’s commitment to the reform process he inherited from his predecessor Raul Castro. The changes will not end single-party rule but should bring the constitution up to date with the economic reforms of the past decade -- private property ownership will be permitted, and the role of the market recognised. Political institutions will be re-organised, introducing new high-level offices and term limits. Impacts Constitutional reform will only temporarily deflect attention from the need for monetary reform and higher salaries. The reforms will help Diaz-Canel build his visibility and profile as Cuba’s leader. For Diaz-Canel new ministerial appointments will be key to consolidating his standing in the party apparatus.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (6) ◽  
pp. 679-691
Author(s):  
Magdalena Jażdżewska-Gutta ◽  
Monika Grottel ◽  
Dagmara Wach

Purpose This study aims to investigate the motives for and the benefits of authorized economic operator (AEO) certification in the supply chain. Also, whether there are significant differences in the perception of the AEO status as a necessity or privilege among cargo owners and service providers. Design/methodology/approach The research design includes an international survey of 159 AEO-certified companies from four European Union (EU) countries performing various roles in the supply chain. The data are analyzed using quantitative methods, including factor analysis and analysis of variance. Findings Based on factor analysis, the research reveals the motives for and benefits of AEO certification. This reveals significant differences between two distinct groups of supply chain participants, namely, cargo owners and service providers. Service providers are mainly driven by the need to gain or maintain their competitive advantage and treat AEO certification as a standard that is required by customers. Cargo owners are relatively more focused on the improvement of internal processes and treat AEO certification as a privilege that helps them achieve a high level of efficiency. Originality/value The study fills the existing literature gap as it focuses on the differences between two distinct groups (cargo owners and service providers) in terms of their perception of the AEO certification. As empirical research in this area is scarce, especially at the cross-country level, this study also significantly complements knowledge on AEO certification in the EU.


Significance Prime Minister Theresa May's keynote address had been billed in advance as key to whether she would have the personal political authority to conclude any kind of deal with the EU before the end of this year and see it endorsed by the House of Commons. It was also viewed as a showcase for the support that former Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson might have with Conservative activists as his positions himself for the succession to May. Impacts Although a deal is likely, a high level of drama and market turbulence around the United Kingdom can be expected between now and end-2018. Ambiguity of outcome in the overall EU-UK relationship is likely to persist through 2020. External investment is thus likely to be paused in the short term, with an adverse impact on UK growth.


2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. e01948-20
Author(s):  
Dalin Rifat ◽  
Si-Yang Li ◽  
Thomas Ioerger ◽  
Keshav Shah ◽  
Jean-Philippe Lanoix ◽  
...  

ABSTRACTThe nitroimidazole prodrugs delamanid and pretomanid comprise one of only two new antimicrobial classes approved to treat tuberculosis (TB) in 50 years. Prior in vitro studies suggest a relatively low barrier to nitroimidazole resistance in Mycobacterium tuberculosis, but clinical evidence is limited to date. We selected pretomanid-resistant M. tuberculosis mutants in two mouse models of TB using a range of pretomanid doses. The frequency of spontaneous resistance was approximately 10−5 CFU. Whole-genome sequencing of 161 resistant isolates from 47 mice revealed 99 unique mutations, of which 91% occurred in 1 of 5 genes previously associated with nitroimidazole activation and resistance, namely, fbiC (56%), fbiA (15%), ddn (12%), fgd (4%), and fbiB (4%). Nearly all mutations were unique to a single mouse and not previously identified. The remaining 9% of resistant mutants harbored mutations in Rv2983 (fbiD), a gene not previously associated with nitroimidazole resistance but recently shown to be a guanylyltransferase necessary for cofactor F420 synthesis. Most mutants exhibited high-level resistance to pretomanid and delamanid, although Rv2983 and fbiB mutants exhibited high-level pretomanid resistance but relatively small changes in delamanid susceptibility. Complementing an Rv2983 mutant with wild-type Rv2983 restored susceptibility to pretomanid and delamanid. By quantifying intracellular F420 and its precursor Fo in overexpressing and loss-of-function mutants, we provide further evidence that Rv2983 is necessary for F420 biosynthesis. Finally, Rv2983 mutants and other F420H2-deficient mutants displayed hypersusceptibility to some antibiotics and to concentrations of malachite green found in solid media used to isolate and propagate mycobacteria from clinical samples.


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