scholarly journals Visual body form and orientation cues do not modulate visuo-tactile temporal integration

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Smit ◽  
Anina N. Rich ◽  
Regine Zopf

AbstractBody ownership relies on spatiotemporal correlations between multisensory signals and visual cues specifying oneself such as body form and orientation. The mechanism for the integration of bodily signals remains unclear. One approach to model multisensory integration that has been influential in the multisensory literature is Bayesian causal inference. This specifies that the brain integrates spatial and temporal signals coming from different modalities when it infers a common cause for inputs. As an example, the rubber hand illusion shows that visual form and orientation cues can promote the inference of a common cause (one’s body) leading to spatial integration shown by a proprioceptive drift of the perceived location of the real hand towards the rubber hand. Recent studies investigating the effect of visual cues on temporal integration, however, have led to conflicting findings. These could be due to task differences, variation in ecological validity of stimuli and/or small samples. In this pre-registered study, we investigated the influence of visual information on temporal integration using a visuo-tactile temporal order judgement task with realistic stimuli and a sufficiently large sample determined by Bayesian analysis. Participants viewed videos of a touch being applied to plausible or implausible visual stimuli for one’s hand (hand oriented plausibly, hand rotated 180 degrees, or a sponge) while also being touched at varying stimulus onset asynchronies. Participants judged which stimulus came first: viewed or felt touch. Results show that visual cues do not modulate visuo-tactile temporal order judgements. This is not in line with the idea that bodily signals indicating oneself influence the integration of multisensory signals in the temporal domain. The current study emphasises the importance of rigour in our methodologies and analyses to advance the understanding of how properties of multisensory events affect the encoding of temporal information in the brain.

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hikaru Hasegawa ◽  
Shogo Okamoto ◽  
Ken Ito ◽  
Masayuki Hara ◽  
Noriaki Kanayama ◽  
...  

AbstractTypical experiments to induce the rubber hand illusion (RHI) require experimental participants to gaze at a fake hand while tactile stimuli are provided to both the fake and hidden actual hands in a synchronous manner. However, under such conditions, postural and apparent disagreement between a seen fake hand and hidden actual hand prevents illusory body ownership. Provided that humans recognize mirror images as copies of the real world in spite of their spatial uncertainties or incongruence, the sensory disagreement may be accepted in RHI settings if using a mirror to show a fake hand. The present study performed two experiments to reveal how self-body recognition of a fake hand feature via mirror affects the RHI. These experiments were conducted in an RHI environment involving voluntary hand movements to investigate not only body ownership but also agency. The first experiment (Experiment 1) examined whether illusory ownership of a fake hand seen in a mirror could be induced. Then, we examined whether the RHI using a mirror image allows disagreement in orientation between the rubber and actual hands (Experiment 2). Subjective evaluations using a RHI questionnaire demonstrated that evoked embodiment of the rubber hand was stronger in the presence of a mirror than in the absence of it (Experiment 1) and that participants experienced the RHI even if the actual and rubber hands were incongruent in terms of orientation (45 °; Experiment 2). No significant difference was found in the change of perceived finger location (proprioceptive drift) between these experiments. These findings suggest that the use of a mirror masks subtle spatial incongruency or degrades the contribution of visual cues for spatial recognition and facilitates multisensory integration for bodily illusions.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marie Chancel ◽  
H. Henrik Ehrsson ◽  
Wei Ji Ma

How do we perceive the fundamental distinction between the physical self and the external world, and how do we come to sense that an object in view, for example, a hand, is part of our own body or not? Over the past two decades, many studies have investigated the contributions of vision, touch, and proprioception to the sense of body ownership, i.e., the multisensory perception of limbs and body parts as our own. However, the processes involved in subjectively experienced body ownership have only been qualitatively described, and the computational principles that determine such sensations remain unclear. To address this issue, we developed a detection-like psychophysics task based on the classic rubber hand illusion paradigm where participants were asked to report whether the rubber hand felt like their own (the illusion) or not. We manipulated illusion strength by varying the asynchrony of visual and tactile stimuli delivered to the rubber hand and the hidden real hand under different levels of visual noise. We found that (1) the probability of the emergence of the rubber hand illusion increased with the addition of visual noise and was well predicted by a causal inference model involving the observer computing the probability of the visual and tactile signals coming from a common source; (2) the causal inference model outperformed a non-Bayesian model involving the observer not taking into account sensory uncertainty; and (3) by comparing the casual inference of ownership and visuotactile synchrony detection, we found that the prior probability of inferring a common cause for the two types of multisensory precepts was correlated but greater for ownership, which suggests that individual differences in rubber hand illusion can be explained at the computational level as differences in how priors are used in the multisensory integration process. Collectively, these results demonstrate that the sense of body ownership is determined by Bayesian causal inference, which implies that the same statistical principles determine the perception of the bodily self and the external world.


Autism ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 406-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carissa J. Cascio ◽  
Jennifer H. Foss-Feig ◽  
Courtney P. Burnette ◽  
Jessica L. Heacock ◽  
Akua A. Cosby

In the rubber hand illusion, perceived hand ownership can be transferred to a rubber hand after synchronous visual and tactile stimulation. Perceived body ownership and self–other relation are foundational for development of self-awareness, imitation, and empathy, which are all affected in autism spectrum disorders (ASD). We examined the rubber hand illusion in children with and without ASD. Children with ASD were initially less susceptible to the illusion than the comparison group, yet showed the effects of the illusion after 6 minutes. Delayed susceptibility to the illusion may result from atypical multisensory temporal integration and/or an unusually strong reliance on proprioception. Children with ASD who displayed less empathy were significantly less likely to experience the illusion than those with more intact ability to express empathy. A better understanding of body representation in ASD may elucidate neural underpinnings of social deficits, thus informing future intervention approaches.


Psihologija ◽  
2022 ◽  
pp. 2-2
Author(s):  
Aitao Lu ◽  
Xuebin Wang ◽  
Xiuxiu Hong ◽  
Tianhua Song ◽  
Meifang Zhang ◽  
...  

Many studies have reported that bottom-up multisensory integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information can distort our sense of body-ownership, producing rubber hand illusion (RHI). There is less evidence about when and how the body-ownership is distorted in the brain during RHI. To examine whether this illusion effect occurs preattentively at an early stage of processing, we monitored the visual mismatch negativity (vMMN) component (the index of automatic deviant detection) and N2 (the index for conflict monitoring). Participants first performed an RHI elicitation task in a synchronous or asynchronous setting and then finished a passive visual oddball task in which the deviant stimuli were unrelated to the explicit task. A significant interaction between Deviancy (deviant hand vs. standard hand) and Group (synchronous vs. asynchronous) was found. The asynchronous group showed clear mismatch effects in both vMMN and N2, while the synchronous group had such effect only in N2. The results indicate that after the elicitation of RHI bottom-up integration could be retrieved at the early stage of sensory processing before top-down processing, providing evidence for the priority of the bottom-up processes after the generation of RHI and revealing the mechanism of how the body-ownership is unconsciously distorted in the brain.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (12) ◽  
pp. e0224174 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sophie Smit ◽  
Anina N. Rich ◽  
Regine Zopf

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Caleb Liang ◽  
Wen-Hsiang Lin ◽  
Tai-Yuan Chang ◽  
Chi-Hong Chen ◽  
Chen-Wei Wu ◽  
...  

AbstractBody ownership concerns what it is like to feel a body part or a full body as mine, and has become a prominent area of study. We propose that there is a closely related type of bodily self-consciousness largely neglected by researchers—experiential ownership. It refers to the sense that I am the one who is having a conscious experience. Are body ownership and experiential ownership actually the same phenomenon or are they genuinely different? In our experiments, the participant watched a rubber hand or someone else’s body from the first-person perspective and was touched either synchronously or asynchronously. The main findings: (1) The sense of body ownership was hindered in the asynchronous conditions of both the body-part and the full-body experiments. However, a strong sense of experiential ownership was observed in those conditions. (2) We found the opposite when the participants’ responses were measured after tactile stimulations had ceased for 5 s. In the synchronous conditions of another set of body-part and full-body experiments, only experiential ownership was blocked but not body ownership. These results demonstrate for the first time the double dissociation between body ownership and experiential ownership. Experiential ownership is indeed a distinct type of bodily self-consciousness.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. e0207528 ◽  
Author(s):  
Angela Marotta ◽  
Massimiliano Zampini ◽  
Michele Tinazzi ◽  
Mirta Fiorio

2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (3) ◽  
pp. 177-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merel Prikken ◽  
Anouk van der Weiden ◽  
Heleen Baalbergen ◽  
Manon H.J. Hillegers ◽  
René S. Kahn ◽  
...  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Regine Zopf

Body perception can be dramatically altered in individuals with schizophrenia resulting in experiences of undefined bodily boundaries, loss of body ownership, and size changes for parts of the body. These individuals may also be more susceptible to the rubber hand illusion (RHI: an illusion of body perception that can also be induced in neurotypical populations), but the findings are mixed. Furthermore, the perception of timing information about multisensory stimuli, which is thought to be fundamental for body perception, has been reported to be altered in schizophrenia. We tested here whether altered perception of the temporal relationship between visual and tactile signals in schizophrenia can predict self-reported perceptual aberrations and RHI susceptibility (indexed by both illusion self-ratings and a more objective proprioceptive-drift measure). We found that the sensitivity to detect temporal asynchronies is reduced in schizophrenia and this predicts bodily perceptual symptoms. In contrast, we found no evidence for a direct relationship between asynchrony detection sensitivity and RHI susceptibility. Instead, our findings suggest that experiencing more bodily perceptual symptoms increases the likelihood of endorsing unusual bodily experiences, resulting in higher RHI self-ratings but not higher proprioceptive-drift scores. Overall, our findings provide evidence for both direct and indirect links between temporal and body perception and thus new insight into the mechanisms that may underlie unusual body perceptions in schizophrenia.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document