scholarly journals Dissociable neural circuits underlie the resolution of three discrete sources of competition during task-switching

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kelly M. Burke ◽  
Sophie Molholm ◽  
John S. Butler ◽  
Lars A. Ross ◽  
John J. Foxe

AbstractHumans perform sub-optimally when juggling more than one task, but are nonetheless required to multitask during many daily activities. Rapidly and effectively switching attentional focus between tasks is fundamental to navigating complex environments. Task-switching paradigms in conjunction with neuroimaging have identified brain networks underpinning flexible reallocation of cognitive resources and a core network of neural regions is repeatedly implicated (i.e., posterior parietal, inferior frontal, anterior cingulate, and middle frontal cortex). Performance costs such as reduced accuracy and slowed responses accompany the first execution of a task following a task-switch. These costs stem from three main sources of competition: 1) the need to reconfigure task-rules, 2) the immediate history of motor responding, and 3) whether inputs to be acted upon provide congruent or incongruent information regarding the appropriate motor response, relative to the recently “switched-away-from” task. Here, we asked whether both common (domain-general) and non-overlapping (dissociable) neural circuits were involved in resolving these three distinct sources of competition under high-demand task-switching conditions. Dissociable neural circuits were active in resolving each of the three sources of competition. No domain-general regions were implicated in all three. Rather, two regions were common across rule-switching and stimulus incongruence, and five regions to incongruence and response-switching. Each source of conflict elicited activation from many regions including the posterior cingulate, thalamus, and cerebellum, regions not commonly implicated in the task-switching literature. These results suggest that dissociable neural networks are principally responsible for resolving different sources of competition, but with partial interaction of some overlapping domain-general circuitry.

2003 ◽  
Vol 15 (6) ◽  
pp. 785-799 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. Swainson ◽  
R. Cunnington ◽  
G. M. Jackson ◽  
C. Rorden ◽  
A. M. Peters ◽  
...  

We investigated the extent to which a common neural mechanism is involved in task set-switching and response withholding, factors that are frequently confounded in taskswitching and go/no-go paradigms. Subjects' brain activity was measured using event-related electrical potentials (ERPs) and event-related functional MRI (fMRI) neuroimaging in separate studies using the same cognitive paradigm. Subjects made compatible left/right keypress responses to left/right arrow stimuli of 1000 msec duration; they switched every two trials between responding at stimulus onset (GO task—green arrows) and stimulus offset (WAIT task—red arrows). Withholding an immediate response (WAIT vs. GO) elicited an enhancement of the frontal N2 ERP and lateral PFC activation of the right hemisphere, both previously associated with the “nogo” response, but only on switch trials. Task-switching (switch vs. nonswitch) was associated with frontal N2 amplification and right hemisphere ventrolateral PFC activation, but only for the WAIT task. The anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was the only brain region to be activated for both types of task switch, but this activation was located more rostrally for the WAIT than for the GO switch trials. We conclude that the frontal N2 ERP and lateral PFC activation are not markers for withholding an immediate response or switching tasks per se, but are associated with switching into a response-suppression mode. Different regions within the ACC may be involved in two processes integral to task-switching: processing response conflict (rostral ACC) and overcoming prior response suppression (caudal ACC).


2013 ◽  
Vol 221 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Jost ◽  
Wouter De Baene ◽  
Iring Koch ◽  
Marcel Brass

The role of cue processing has become a controversial topic in research on cognitive control using task-switching procedures. Some authors suggested a priming account to explain switch costs as a form of encoding benefit when the cue from the previous trial is repeated and hence challenged theories that attribute task-switch costs to task-set (re)configuration. A rich body of empirical evidence has evolved that indeed shows that cue-encoding repetition priming is an important component in task switching. However, these studies also demonstrate that there are usually substantial “true” task-switch costs. Here, we review this behavioral, electrophysiological, and brain imaging evidence. Moreover, we describe alternative approaches to the explicit task-cuing procedure, such as the usage of transition cues or the task-span procedure. In addition, we address issues related to the type of cue, such as cue transparency. We also discuss methodological and theoretical implications and argue that the explicit task-cuing procedure is suitable to address issues of cognitive control and task-set switching.


Author(s):  
Edita Poljac ◽  
Ab de Haan ◽  
Gerard P. van Galen

Two experiments investigated the way that beforehand preparation influences general task execution in reaction-time matching tasks. Response times (RTs) and error rates were measured for switching and nonswitching conditions in a color- and shape-matching task. The task blocks could repeat (task repetition) or alternate (task switch), and the preparation interval (PI) was manipulated within-subjects (Experiment 1) and between-subjects (Experiment 2). The study illustrated a comparable general task performance after a long PI for both experiments, within and between PI manipulations. After a short PI, however, the general task performance increased significantly for the between-subjects manipulation of the PI. Furthermore, both experiments demonstrated an analogous preparation effect for both task switching and task repetitions. Next, a consistent switch cost throughout the whole run of trials and a within-run slowing effect were observed in both experiments. Altogether, the present study implies that the effects of the advance preparation go beyond the first trials and confirms different points of the activation approach ( Altmann, 2002) to task switching.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzanne Oosterwijk ◽  
Lukas Snoek ◽  
Jurriaan Tekoppele ◽  
Lara H. Engelbert ◽  
H. Steven Scholte

Abstract People often seek out stories, videos or images that detail death, violence or harm. Considering the ubiquity of this behavior, it is surprising that we know very little about the neural circuits involved in choosing negative information. Using fMRI, the present study shows that choosing intensely negative stimuli engages similar brain regions as those that support extrinsic incentives and “regular” curiosity. Participants made choices to view negative and positive images, based on negative (e.g., a soldier kicks a civilian against his head) and positive (e.g., children throw flower petals at a wedding) verbal cues. We hypothesized that the conflicting, but relatively informative act of choosing to view a negative image, resulted in stronger activation of reward circuitry as opposed to the relatively uncomplicated act of choosing to view a positive stimulus. Indeed, as preregistered, we found that choosing negative cues was associated with activation of the striatum, inferior frontal gyrus, anterior insula, and anterior cingulate cortex, both when contrasting against a passive viewing condition, and when contrasting against positive cues. These findings nuance models of decision-making, valuation and curiosity, and are an important starting point when considering the value of seeking out negative content.


Author(s):  
Jiaying Zhao ◽  
Brandon M. Tomm

Scarcity is the condition of having insufficient resources to cope with demands. This condition presents significant challenges to the human cognitive system. For example, having limited financial resources requires the meticulous calculation of expenses with respect to a budget. Likewise, having limited time requires the stringent management of schedules with respect to a deadline. As such, scarcity consumes cognitive resources such as attention, working memory, and executive control and elicits a range of systematic and even counter-productive cognitive and behavioral responses as a result. Specifically, scarcity induces an attentional focus on the problem at hand, which facilitates performance by enhancing cognitive processing of information relevant to the problem, increasing the efficiency of resource use, and stabilizing the perception of value. Such prioritization of the problem at hand may seem advantageous, but it can produce undesirable consequences. For example, scarcity causes myopic and impulsive behavior, prioritizing short-term gains over long-term gains. Ironically, scarcity can also result in a failure to notice beneficial information in the environment that alleviates the condition of scarcity. More detrimentally, scarcity directly impairs cognitive function, which can lead to suboptimal decisions and choices that exacerbate the condition of scarcity. Thus, scarcity means not only a shortage of physical resources (e.g., money or time) but also a deficit of cognitive resources (e.g., attention, executive control). The cognitive deficits under scarcity are particularly problematic because they impair performance and lead to counter-productive behaviors that deepen the cycle of scarcity. In addition, people under financial scarcity suffer from stigmas and stereotypes associated with poverty. These social perceptions of poverty further burden the mind by consuming cognitive resources, weakening performance in the poor. Understanding the cognitive and behavioral responses to scarcity provides new insights into why the poor remain poor, identifying the psychological causes of scarcity, and illuminating potential interventions to stop the cycle of scarcity. These insights have important implications for the design and the implementation of policies and services targeting the populations under scarcity.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 789-813 ◽  
Author(s):  
Josiane Jauniaux ◽  
Ali Khatibi ◽  
Pierre Rainville ◽  
Philip L Jackson

Abstract Empathy relies on brain systems that support the interaction between an observer’s mental state and cues about the others’ experience. Beyond the core brain areas typically activated in pain empathy studies (insular and anterior cingulate cortices), the diversity of paradigms used may reveal secondary networks that subserve other more specific processes. A coordinate-based meta-analysis of fMRI experiments on pain empathy was conducted to obtain activation likelihood estimates along three factors and seven conditions: visual cues (body parts, facial expressions), visuospatial (first-person, thirdperson), and cognitive (self-, stimuli-, other-oriented tasks) perspectives. The core network was found across cues and perspectives, and common activation was observed in higher-order visual areas. Body-parts distinctly activated areas related with sensorimotor processing (superior and inferior parietal lobules, anterior insula) while facial expression distinctly involved the inferior frontal gyrus. Self- compared to other-perspective produced distinct activations in the left insula while stimulus- versus other-perspective produced distinctive responses in the inferior frontal and parietal lobules, precentral gyrus, and cerebellum. Pain empathy relies on a core network which is modulated by several secondary networks. The involvement of the latter seems to depend on the visual cues available and the observer's mental state that can be influenced by specific instructions.


Science ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 364 (6441) ◽  
pp. eaav8911 ◽  
Author(s):  
Morteza Sarafyazd ◽  
Mehrdad Jazayeri

Humans process information hierarchically. In the presence of hierarchies, sources of failures are ambiguous. Humans resolve this ambiguity by assessing their confidence after one or more attempts. To understand the neural basis of this reasoning strategy, we recorded from dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) of monkeys in a task in which negative outcomes were caused either by misjudging the stimulus or by a covert switch between two stimulus-response contingency rules. We found that both areas harbored a representation of evidence supporting a rule switch. Additional perturbation experiments revealed that ACC functioned downstream of DMFC and was directly and specifically involved in inferring covert rule switches. These results‏ reveal the computational principles of hierarchical reasoning, as implemented by cortical circuits.


2006 ◽  
Vol 18 (9) ◽  
pp. 1586-1594 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. M. Moran ◽  
C. N. Macrae ◽  
T. F. Heatherton ◽  
C. L. Wyland ◽  
W. M. Kelley

This study examines whether the cognitive and affective components of self-reflection can be dissociated using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Using a simple paradigm in which subjects judged the personal relevance of personality characteristics that were either favorable (e.g., “honest”) or unfavorable (e.g., “lazy”, we found that distinct neural circuits in adjacent regions of the prefrontal cortex subserve cognitive and emotional aspects of self-reflection. The medial prefrontal cortex responded only to material that was self-descriptive, and this did not differ as a function of the valence of the trait. When material was judged to be self-relevant, the valence of the material was resolved in an adjacent region of ventral anterior cingulate. The nature of self is one of the most enduring questions in science, and researchers are now beginning to be able to decompose the neural operations that give rise to a unitary sense of self.


2005 ◽  
Vol 58 (7) ◽  
pp. 1325-1338 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea M. Philipp ◽  
Iring Koch

When participants perform a sequence of different tasks, it is assumed that the engagement in one task leads to the inhibition of the previous task. This inhibition persists and impairs performance when participants switch back to this (still inhibited) task after only one intermediate trial. Previous task-switching studies on this issue have defined different tasks at the level of stimulus categorization. In our experiments we used different response modalities to define tasks. Participants always used the same stimulus categorization (e.g., categorize a digit as odd vs. even), but had to give a vocal, finger, or foot response (A, B, or C). Our results showed a higher reaction time and error rate in ABA sequences than in CBA sequences, indicating n − 2 repetition cost as a marker for persisting task inhibition. We assume that different response modalities can define a task and are inhibited in a “task switch” in the same way as stimulus categories are inhibited.


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