scholarly journals The Role of Proactive and Reactive Cognitive Control for Target Selection in Multiple-Target Search

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduard Ort ◽  
Johannes J. Fahrenfort ◽  
Reshanne Reeder ◽  
Stefan Pollmann ◽  
Christian N. L. Olivers

AbstractCognitive control can involve proactive (preparatory) and reactive (corrective) mechanisms. Using a gaze-contingent eye tracking paradigm combined with fMRI, we investigated the involvement of these different modes of control and their underlying neural networks, when switching between different targets in multiple-target search. Participants simultaneously searched for two possible targets presented among distractors, and selected one of them. In one condition, only one of the targets was available in each display, so that the choice was imposed, and reactive control would be required. In the other condition, both targets were present, giving observers free choice over target selection, and allowing for proactive control. Switch costs emerged only when targets were imposed and not when target selection was free. We found differential levels of activity in the frontoparietal control network depending on whether target switches were free or imposed. Furthermore, we observed core regions of the default mode network to be active during target repetitions, indicating reduced control on these trials. Free and imposed switches jointly activated parietal and posterior frontal cortices, while free switches additionally activated anterior frontal cortices. These findings highlight unique contributions of proactive and reactive control during visual search.

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (8) ◽  
pp. 1137-1147 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduard Ort ◽  
Johannes J. Fahrenfort ◽  
Christian N. L. Olivers

It is debated whether people can actively search for more than one object or whether this results in switch costs. Using a gaze-contingent eye-tracking paradigm, we revealed a crucial role for cognitive control in multiple-target search. We instructed participants to simultaneously search for two target objects presented among distractors. In one condition, both targets were available, which gave the observer free choice of what to search for and allowed for proactive control. In the other condition, only one of the two targets was available, so that the choice was imposed, and a reactive mechanism would be required. No switch costs emerged when target choice was free, but switch costs emerged reliably when targets were imposed. Bridging contradictory findings, the results are consistent with models of visual selection in which only one attentional template actively drives selection and in which the efficiency of switching targets depends on the type of cognitive control allowed for by the environment.


2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (12) ◽  
pp. 1287
Author(s):  
Eduard Ort ◽  
Johannes Fahrenfort ◽  
Christian Olivers

2019 ◽  
Vol 84 (8) ◽  
pp. 2090-2110
Author(s):  
Gizem Arabacı ◽  
Benjamin A. Parris

Abstract Inattention is a symptom of many clinical disorders including attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and is thought to be primarily related to limitations in working memory. In two studies, we investigated the implications of inattention for task switching performance. In study one, we measured task switching performance using predictable and unpredictable conditions in adults who self-rated inattention and other ADHD-related tendencies. Tasks required proactive control and reactive control, respectively, under both high and low working memory loads. Results revealed that inattentive, but not hyperactive/impulsive traits, predicted switch costs when switching was predictable and working memory load was high. None of the ADHD traits were related to unpredictable switch costs. Study two was designed to: (1) de-confound the role of proactive control and the need to keep track of task order in the predictable task switching paradigm; (2) investigate whether goal neglect, an impairment related to working memory, could explain the relationship between inattention and predictable task switching. Results revealed that neither predictability nor the need to keep track of the task order led to the association between switch costs and inattention, but instead it was the tendency for those high in inattention to neglect preparatory proactive control, especially when reactive control options were available.


Author(s):  
Matias M Pulopulos ◽  
Jens Allaert ◽  
Marie-Anne Vanderhasselt ◽  
Alvaro Sanchez-Lopez ◽  
Sara De Witte ◽  
...  

Abstract Previous research supports the distinction between proactive and reactive control. Although the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been consistently related to these processes, lateralization of proactive and reactive control is still under debate. We manipulated brain activity to investigate the role of the left and right DLPFC in proactive and reactive cognitive control. Using a single-blind, sham-controlled crossover within-subjects design, 25 young healthy females performed the ‘AX’ Continuous Performance Task after receiving sham vs active high-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (HF-rTMS) to increase left and right DLPFC activity. Reaction times (RTs) and pupillometry were used to assess patterns of proactive and reactive cognitive control and task-related resource allocation, respectively. We observed that, compared to sham, HF-rTMS over the left DLPFC increased proactive control. After right DLPFC HF-rTMS, participants showed slower RTs on AX trials, suggesting more reactive control. However, this latter result was not supported by RTs on BX trials (i.e. the trial that specifically assess reactive control). Pupil measures showed a sustained increase in resource allocation after both active left and right HF-rTMS. Our results with RT data provide evidence on the role of the left DLPFC in proactive control and suggest that the right DLPFC is implicated in reactive control.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joram van Driel ◽  
Eduard Ort ◽  
Johannes J. Fahrenfort ◽  
Christian N. L. Olivers

AbstractMany important situations require human observers to simultaneously search for more than one object. Despite a long history of research into visual search, the behavioral and neural mechanisms associated with multiple-target search are poorly understood. Here we test the novel theory that the efficiency of looking for multiple targets critically depends on the mode of cognitive control the environment affords to the observer. We used an innovative combination of EEG and eye tracking while participants searched for two targets, within two different contexts: Either both targets were present in the search display and observers were free to prioritize either one of them, thus enabling proactive control over selection; or only one of the two targets would be present in each search display, which requires reactive control to reconfigure selection when the wrong target is prioritized. During proactive control, both univariate and multivariate signals of beta-band (15–35 Hz) power suppression prior to display onset predicted switches between target selections. This signal originated over midfrontal and sensorimotor regions and has previously been associated with endogenous state changes. In contrast, imposed target selections requiring reactive control elicited prefrontal power enhancements in the delta/theta-band (2–8 Hz), but only after display onset. This signal predicted individual differences in associated oculomotor switch costs, reflecting reactive reconfiguration of target selection. The results provide compelling evidence that multiple target representations are differentially prioritized during visual search, and for the first time reveal distinct neural mechanisms underlying proactive and reactive control over multiple-target search.Significance StatementSearching for more than one object in complex visual scenes can be detrimental for search performance. While perhaps annoying in daily life, this can have severe consequences in professional settings such as medical and security screening. Previous research has not yet resolved whether multiple-target search involves changing priorities in what people attend to, and how such changes are controlled. We approached these questions by concurrently measuring cortical activity and eye movements using EEG and eye tracking, while observers searched for multiple possible targets. Our findings provide the first unequivocal support for the existence of two modes of control during multiple-target search, which are expressed in qualitatively distinct time-frequency signatures of the EEG both before and after visual selection.


2013 ◽  
Vol 221 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerstin Jost ◽  
Wouter De Baene ◽  
Iring Koch ◽  
Marcel Brass

The role of cue processing has become a controversial topic in research on cognitive control using task-switching procedures. Some authors suggested a priming account to explain switch costs as a form of encoding benefit when the cue from the previous trial is repeated and hence challenged theories that attribute task-switch costs to task-set (re)configuration. A rich body of empirical evidence has evolved that indeed shows that cue-encoding repetition priming is an important component in task switching. However, these studies also demonstrate that there are usually substantial “true” task-switch costs. Here, we review this behavioral, electrophysiological, and brain imaging evidence. Moreover, we describe alternative approaches to the explicit task-cuing procedure, such as the usage of transition cues or the task-span procedure. In addition, we address issues related to the type of cue, such as cue transparency. We also discuss methodological and theoretical implications and argue that the explicit task-cuing procedure is suitable to address issues of cognitive control and task-set switching.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Laura Kranz

<p>According to the Dual Mechanisms of Control (DMC) framework (Braver, 2012) distraction can be controlled either proactively (i.e., before the onset of a distractor) or reactively (i.e., after the onset of a distractor). Research clearly indicates that, when distractors are emotionally neutral, proactive mechanisms are more effective at controlling distraction than reactive mechanisms. However, whether proactive control mechanisms can control irrelevant emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distraction is not known. In the current thesis I examined cognitive control over emotional distraction. In Experiment 1, I tested whether proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction as effectively as neutral distraction. Participants completed a distraction task. On each trial, they determined whether a centrally presented target letter (embedded amongst a circle of ‘o’s) was an ‘X’ or an ‘N’, while ignoring peripheral distractors (negative, neutral, or positive images). Distractors were presented on either a low proportion (25%) or a high proportion (75%) of trials, to evoke reactive and proactive cognitive control strategies, respectively. Emotional images (both positive and negative) produced more distraction than neutral images in the low distractor frequency (i.e., reactive control) condition. Critically, emotional distraction was almost abolished in the high distractor frequency condition; emotional images were only slightly more distracting than neutral images, suggesting that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distraction almost as effectively as neutral distraction. In Experiment 2, I replicated and extended Experiment 1. ERPs were recorded while participants completed the distraction task. An early index (the early posterior negativity; EPN) and a late index (the late positive potential; LPP) of emotional processing were examined to investigate the mechanisms by which proactive control minimises emotional distraction. The behavioural results of Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1, providing further support for the hypothesis that proactive mechanisms can control emotional distractions as effectively as neutral distractions. While proactive control was found to eliminate early emotional processing of positive distractors, it paradoxically did not attenuate late emotional processing of positive distractors. On the other hand, proactive control eliminated late emotional processing of negative distractors. However, the early index of emotional processing was not a reliable index of negative distractor processing under either reactive or proactive conditions. Taken together, my findings show that proactive mechanisms can effectively control emotional distraction, but do not clearly establish the mechanisms by which this occurs.</p>


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. S89-S89
Author(s):  
Anita Kwashie ◽  
Yizhou Ma ◽  
Andrew Poppe ◽  
Deanna Barch ◽  
Cameron Carter ◽  
...  

Abstract Background Cognitive control mechanisms enable an individual to regulate, coordinate, and sequence thoughts and actions to obtain desired outcomes. A theory of control specialization posits that proactive control is necessary for anticipatory planning and goal maintenance and recruits sustained lateral prefrontal activity, whereas reactive control, essential for adapting to transient changes, marshals a more extensive brain network (Braver, 2012). Increased task errors and reduced frontoparietal activity in proactive contexts is observed in severe psychopathology, including schizophrenia (Poppe et al., 2016), leading to the prediction that patients rely on reactive control more when performing such tasks. However, evidence of primate prefrontal ‘switch’ neurons, active during both proactive and reactive contexts, challenges the notion that cognitive control relies on discrete processing networks (Blackman et al., 2016). To examine this contradiction, we sought to characterize the distinctiveness between proactive and reactive control in healthy and patient populations using the Dot Pattern Expectancy Task (DPX). We also examined if a bias toward proactive or reactive control predicted behavioral metrics. Methods 44 individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and 50 matched healthy controls (HC) completed 4 blocks of the DPX during a 3-Tesla fMRI scan (Poppe et al., 2016). Participants followed the ‘A-then-X’ rule, in which they pressed one button whenever an A cue followed an X probe, and pressed a different button for any other non-target stimulus sequence. We examined bilateral frontoparietal ROIs from the literature for evidence of cognitive control specialization as well as whole-brain analyses. Subsequent nonparametric tests and measures of neural response variation strengthened our interpretations. Participant d’-context (dependent on task accuracy) measured their tendency to engage in proactive control. Results Behavioral data revealed that HC participants showed a greater proclivity for proactive control than did their SZ counterparts. HC reaction time outpaced SZ reaction time in trials requiring successful marshalling of proactive control. Preliminary neuroimaging analyses suggest marginal between-group differences in control specialization. HC specialization appeared to be most apparent in diffuse frontal lateral regions, and bilateral posterior parietal cortex. Within the SZ group, specialization was most evident in bilateral posterior parietal cortex. Between-group control specialization differences were most apparent in right hemisphere frontal regions. Superior frontal gyrus and medial temporal lobe activity during proactive processes accounted for modest variance in d’-context. Discussion There were significant between-group differences in goal maintenance behavioral metrics such as reaction time and a tendency to engage in proactive control. Control specialization occurred more diffusely in controls compared to patient counterparts. However, activity in these regions had minimal ability to predict behavioral metrics. Overall, the relatively small size of control-specific areas compared to regions involved in dual processing offers support for the malleable nature of regions implicated in human cognitive control.


2020 ◽  
pp. 174702182095892
Author(s):  
Josie Briscoe ◽  
Iain D Gilchrist

Reactive and proactive cognitive control are fundamental for guiding complex human behaviour. In two experiments, we evaluated the role of both types of cognitive control in navigational search. Participants searched for a single hidden target in a floor array where the salience at the search locations varied (flashing or static lights). An a-priori rule of the probable location of the target (either under a static or a flashing light) was provided at the start of each experiment. Both experiments demonstrated a bias towards rule-adherent locations. Search errors, measured as revisits, were more likely to occur under the flashing rule for searching flashing locations, regardless of the salience of target location in Experiment 1 and at rule-congruent (flashing) locations in Experiment 2. Consistent with dual mechanisms of control, rule-adherent search was explained by engaging proactive control to guide goal-maintained search behaviour and by engaging reactive control to avoid revisits to salient (flashing) locations. Experiment 2 provided direct evidence for dual mechanisms of control using a Dot Pattern Expectancy task to distinguish the dominant control mode for a participant. Participants with a reactive control mode generated more revisits to salient (flashing) locations. These data point to complementary roles for proactive and reactive control in guiding navigational search and propose a novel framework for interpreting navigational search.


2015 ◽  
Vol 27 (6) ◽  
pp. 1125-1136 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Chevalier ◽  
Shaina Bailey Martis ◽  
Tim Curran ◽  
Yuko Munakata

Young children engage cognitive control reactively in response to events, rather than proactively preparing for events. Such limitations in executive control have been explained in terms of fundamental constraints on children's cognitive capacities. Alternatively, young children might be capable of proactive control but differ from older children in their metacognitive decisions regarding when to engage proactive control. We examined these possibilities in three conditions of a task-switching paradigm, varying in whether task cues were available before or after target onset. RTs, ERPs, and pupil dilation showed that 5-year-olds did engage in advance preparation, a critical aspect of proactive control, but only when reactive control was made more difficult, whereas 10-year-olds engaged in proactive control whenever possible. These findings highlight metacognitive processes in children's cognitive control, an understudied aspect of executive control development.


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