scholarly journals Group size and collective action in a binary contribution game

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Georg Nöldeke ◽  
Jorge Peña
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Group Size ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Expected Number ◽  
Fixed Amount ◽  
The Public ◽  
Contribution Game ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
Large Groups

AbstractWe consider how group size affects the private provision of a public good with non-refundable binary contributions. A fixed amount of the good is provided if and only if the number of contributors reaches an exogenous threshold. The threshold, the group size, and the identical, non-refundable cost of contributing to the public good are common knowledge. Our focus is on the case in which the threshold is larger than one, so that teamwork is required to produce the public good. We show that both expected payoffs and the probability that the public good is obtained in the best symmetric equilibrium are decreasing in group size. We also characterize the limit outcome when group size converges to infinity and provide precise conditions under which the expected number of contributors is decreasing or increasing in group size for sufficiently large groups.JEL classificationC72, D71, H41.

The Ethics Problem

2014 ◽  
pp. 634-650
Author(s):  
David M. Levy ◽  
Sandra J. Peart
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
John Rawls ◽  
Code Of Ethics ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
American Economic Association ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
The Public ◽  
Economic Association

The collective action problem of economic experts was diagnosed acutely by Knight and Pigou in the 1930s. The interest of economists as a group is in pursuing the public good of truth; the interest of an individual economist is in pursuing the private good of happiness. Pigou’s example is the pursuit of political influence. Deviation from truth-seeking devastates the theory of governance as objective inquiry laid out by Knight and John Rawls, as we saw in the eugenic era. We reformulate the Knight–Rawls position as truth-seeking contingent on a presupposed system. The best case for the Knight–Rawls position is transparency, where presuppositions are common knowledge. If transparency is infeasible making the nontransparency of inquiry itself transparent will serve as a second-best solution to warn third parties to make adjustments. A code of ethics can itself serve as a warning about the temptation. Pigou’s concern about nonpecuniary temptation should be added to the American Economic Association code of ethics.

The Minimal Contributing Set as a Solution to Public Goods Problems

1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 112-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alphons J. C. van de Kragt ◽  
John M. Orbell ◽  
Robyn M. Dawes
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Small Group ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Essential Property ◽  
Fixed Amount ◽  
The Public ◽  
Reasonable Behavior

This article reports small group experiments in which subjects may choose to contribute a fixed amount of money toward a monetary public good, and in which the good itself is supplied only if a specified number of contributions (or more) are made. Given the opportunity to communicate, our subjects organized themselves by specifying precisely the number of required contributors and who they would be. This organization, which we call designation of a minimal contributing set, always resulted in provision of the public good, and provision in a nearly optimal manner. In contrast, groups presented with the identical problem but not allowed to communicate failed to generate a sufficient number of contributions 35 percent of the time, and in slightly over half of the successful groups, overprovision produced inefficiency.We present hypotheses about why designating a minimal contributing set works, and data indicating that the mechanism results in reduced normative conflict and felt risk, as well as increased efficiency. The essential property of the minimal contributing set, we hypothesize, is criticalness: the contributions of the members of the minimal contributing set are each critical to obtaining the public good the members desire, and they know it. It is reasonable (albeit not a dominant strategy) to contribute because reasonable behavior can be expected from other minimal contributing set members who are in the same situation. Unreasonableness is a problem that increases with the size of groups, but adaptations exist that, we argue, can reduce its seriousness.

scholarly journals Educating the Commons and Commoning Education: Thinking Radical Education with Radical Technology

2021 ◽  
pp. 117-129
Author(s):  
Grégoire Rousseau ◽  
Nora Sternfeld
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Digital Society ◽  
The Public ◽  
The World ◽  
New Models ◽  
Radical Education ◽  
The Commons ◽  
Means Of Production

AbstractAll over the world, education—which could be understood as a universal right and public good—is facing processes of economization and privatization. Technology—which could be understood as a common means of production, collaboratively developed—is taken away from the public and put into corporate hands. This article is designed as a conversation investigating the question of shared and common knowledge from the perspectives of an educator and an engineer, respectively. The dialogue explores necessary convergences in radical practices of commoning, and possible future strategies for education and Open Technology. It asks how new models can challenge the neoliberal agenda and move away from established policies, and how a collective re-appropriation of the means of production could emerge within a post-digital society.

scholarly journals Common Knowledge Promotes Cooperation in the Threshold Public Goods Game by Reducing Uncertainty

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Deutchman ◽  
Dorsa Amir ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe ◽  
Matthew Jordan
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Equation Modeling ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Group Members ◽  
Threshold Public Goods

Recent work suggests that an important cognitive mechanism promoting coordination is common knowledge—a heuristic for representing recursive mental states. Yet, we know little about how common knowledge promotes coordination. We propose that common knowledge increases coordination by reducing uncertainty about others’ cooperative behavior. We examine how common knowledge increases cooperation in the context of a threshold public goods game, a public good game in which a minimum level of contribution—a threshold—is required. Across two preregistered studies (N = 4,111), we explored how varying (1) the information participants had regarding what their group members knew about the threshold and (2) the threshold level affected contributions. We found that participants were more likely to contribute to the public good when there was common knowledge of the threshold than private knowledge. Using structural equation modeling, we found that the predicted number of group members contributing to the public good and certainty about the predicted number of contributors mediated the effect of information condition on contributions. Our results suggest that common knowledge of the threshold increases public good contributions by reducing uncertainty around other people’s cooperative behavior. These findings point to the influential role of common knowledge in helping to solve large-scale cooperation problems.

scholarly journals Promoting Competition or Helping the Less Endowed? Distributional Preferences and Collective Institutional Choices under Intragroup Inequality

2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 626-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenju Kamei
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Collective Decision ◽  
Voting Rules ◽  
Distributed Resources ◽  
The Public ◽  
Distributional Preferences ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Expected Payoffs ◽  
Institutional Choices

Unequally distributed resources are ubiquitous. The decision of whether to promote competition or equality is often debated in societies and organizations. With heterogeneous endowments, we let subjects collectively choose between a public good that most benefits the less endowed and a lottery contest in which only one individual in a group receives a prize. Unlike standard theoretical predictions, the majority of subjects, including a substantial number of subjects who believe that their expected payoffs are better in the contest, vote for the public good. Our data suggest that people’s collective institutional choices may be driven by inequality-averse concerns. It also suggests that the collective decision to select the option for the public good depends on voting rules.

Positional Commitments and the Public Good: Perceptions of a Defecting Group Leader

1999 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark E. Sibicky ◽  
Cortney B. Richardson ◽  
Anna M. Gruntz ◽  
Timothy J. Binegar ◽  
David A. Schroeder ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Group Leader ◽  
The Public

Finding Fault with the Nexus Pipeline? Agency Capture and the Public Good

2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-8
Author(s):  
Andrew R. Kear
Keyword(s):  
Natural Gas ◽  
Environmental Impact ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Health And Safety ◽  
Environmental Impact Statement ◽  
Gas Industry ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fracturing Process ◽  
Natural Gas Industry ◽  
Regulatory Commission

Natural gas is an increasingly vital U.S. energy source that is presently being tapped and transported across state and international boundaries. Controversy engulfs natural gas, from the hydraulic fracturing process used to liberate it from massive, gas-laden Appalachian shale deposits, to the permitting and construction of new interstate pipelines bringing it to markets. This case explores the controversy flowing from the proposed 256-mile-long interstate Nexus pipeline transecting northern Ohio, southeastern Michigan and terminating at the Dawn Hub in Ontario, Canada. As the lead agency regulating and permitting interstate pipelines, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is also tasked with mitigating environmental risks through the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act's Environmental Impact Statement process. Pipeline opponents assert that a captured federal agency ignores public and scientific input, inadequately addresses public health and safety risks, preempts local control, and wields eminent domain powers at the expense of landowners, cities, and everyone in the pipeline path. Proponents counter that pipelines are the safest means of transporting domestically abundant, cleaner burning, affordable gas to markets that will boost local and regional economies and serve the public good. Debates over what constitutes the public good are only one set in a long list of contentious issues including pipeline safety, proposed routes, property rights, public voice, and questions over the scientific and democratic validity of the Environmental Impact Statement process. The Nexus pipeline provides a sobering example that simple energy policy solutions and compromise are elusive—effectively fueling greater conflict as the natural gas industry booms.

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