scholarly journals Switch costs in inhibitory control and voluntary behavior: A computational study of the antisaccade task

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo A. Aponte ◽  
Klaas E. Stephan ◽  
Jakob Heinzle

AbstractAn integral aspect of human cognition is the ability to inhibit habitual responses in order to initiate complex, rule-guided actions. Moreover, humans have also the ability to alternate between different sets of rules or tasks, at the cost of degraded performance when compared to repeating the same task, a phenomenon called the ‘task switch cost’. While it is recognized that switching between tasks requires often to inhibit habitual responses, the interaction between these two forms of cognitive control has been much less studied than each of them separately. Here, we use a computational model to draw a bridge between inhibitory control and voluntary action generation and thereby provide a novel account of seemingly paradoxical findings in the task switch literature. We investigated task switching in the mixed antisaccade task, in which participants are cued to saccade either in the same or in the opposite direction to a peripheral stimulus. Our model demonstrates that stopping a habitual action leads to increased inhibitory control that persists on the next trial. However, enhanced inhibition affects only the probability of generating habitual responses, and, contrary to previous accounts, cannot be characterized as proactive task interference. In addition, our model demonstrates that voluntary actions (but not habitual responses) are slower and more prompt to errors on switch trials compared to repeat trials. We conclude that precisely the interaction between these two effects explains a variety of contradictory findings reported in the literature.

2005 ◽  
Vol 17 (9) ◽  
pp. 1483-1496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Everling ◽  
Joseph F. X. DeSouza

Everyday life typically requires behavior that involves far more than simple stimulus-response associations. Environmental cues are often ambiguous and require different actions depending on the situation. The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is thought to be crucial for this flexible control of behavior. An important task that probes this ability is the antisaccade task in which subjects have to suppress a glance towards a suddenly presented peripheral stimulus and instead look away from the stimulus to its mirror location. Here we recorded the activity of PFC neurons in monkeys trained to alternate between blocks of prosaccade and antisaccade trials with no external instruction cues. We found that the activity of many neurons was different between the two tasks during the fixation period before the peripheral stimulus was presented. These differences were already present on the first correct trials after a task switch. The activity of these neurons also discriminated between correct responses and errors. We hypothesize that the PFC provides bias signals to saccade-related areas that are necessary to preset the oculomotor system for different tasks.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eduardo A. Aponte ◽  
Dario Schöbi ◽  
Klaas E. Stephan ◽  
Jakob Heinzle

AbstractBackgroundPatients with schizophrenia make more errors than healthy subjects on the antisaccade task. In this paradigm, participants are required to inhibit a reflexive saccade to a target and to select the correct action (a saccade in the opposite direction). While the precise origin of this deficit is not clear, it has been connected to aberrant dopaminergic and cholinergic neuromodulation.MethodsTo study the impact of dopamine and acetylcholine on inhibitory control and action selection, we administered two selective drugs (levodopa 200mg/galantamine 8mg) to healthy volunteers (N=100) performing the antisaccade task. A computational model (SERIA) was employed to separate the contribution of inhibitory control and action selection to empirical reaction times and error rates.ResultsModeling suggested that levodopa improved action selection (at the cost of increased reaction times) but did not have a significant effect on inhibitory control. By contrast, according to our model, galantamine affected inhibitory control in a dose dependent fashion, reducing inhibition failures at low doses and increasing them at higher levels. These effects were sufficiently specific that the computational analysis allowed for identifying the drug administered to an individual with 70% accuracy.ConclusionsOur results do not support the hypothesis that elevated tonic dopamine strongly impairs inhibitory control. Rather levodopa improved the ability to select correct actions. Instead, inhibitory control was modulated by cholinergic drugs. This approach may provide a starting point for future computational assays that differentiate neuromodulatory abnormalities in heterogeneous diseases like schizophrenia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 720-724
Author(s):  
Z. I. Storozheva ◽  
V. M. Brodyansky ◽  
A. V. Kirenskaya ◽  
A. A. Tkachenko ◽  
A. O. Kibitov

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (7) ◽  
pp. 658-672 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Prada ◽  
Francisco Barceló ◽  
Christoph S. Herrmann ◽  
Carles Escera

2011 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 548-555
Author(s):  
Emilio G. Milán ◽  
María Ángeles Rodríguez Artacho ◽  
Sergio Moreno-Ríos ◽  
Mª José de Córdoba ◽  
Alex Pereda ◽  
...  

In this study we present an experiment investigating the reconfiguration process elicited by the task switching paradigm in synaesthesia. We study the time course of the operations involved in the activation of photisms. In the experimental Group, four digit-color synaesthetes alternated between an odd-even task and a color task (to indicate the photism elicited by each digit). In both tasks, the target stimuli were numbers between 1 and 9 written in white. One of the control groups ran the same tasks but this time with colored numbers (Naïve Control Group). The results of these studies showed the expected pattern for the control group in the case of regular shift: a significant task switch cost with an abrupt offset and a cost reduction in long RSI. However for the experimental group, we found switch cost asymmetry in the short RSI and non-significant cost in the long RSI. A second control group performed exactly the same tasks as the experimental group (with white numbers as targets and a second imaginary color task) -Trained Control Group-. We found no cost for this second control group. This means that the cost of mental set reconfiguration between numbers (inducers) and their photisms (concurrent sensations) occurs, that there is a specific cost asymmetry (from photisms to inducers) and that this cost cannot be explained by associative learning. The results are discussed in terms of exogenous and endogenous components of mental set reconfiguration.


1991 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 471-485 ◽  
Author(s):  
John R. Anderson

AbstractCan the output of human cognition be predicted from the assumption that it is an optimal response to the information-processing demands of the environment? A methodology called rational analysis is described for deriving predictions about cognitive phenomena using optimization assumptions. The predictions flow from the statistical structure of the environment and not the assumed structure of the mind. Bayesian inference is used, assuming that people start with a weak prior model of the world which they integrate with experience to develop stronger models of specific aspects of the world. Cognitive performance maximizes the difference between the expected gain and cost of mental effort. (1) Memory performance can be predicted on the assumption that retrieval seeks a maximal trade-off between the probability of finding the relevant memories and the effort required to do so; in (2) categorization performance there is a similar trade-off between accuracy in predicting object features and the cost of hypothesis formation; in (3) casual inference the trade-off is between accuracy in predicting future events and the cost of hypothesis formation; and in (4) problem solving it is between the probability of achieving goals and the cost of both external and mental problem-solving search. The implemention of these rational prescriptions in neurally plausible architecture is also discussed.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nura Sidarus ◽  
Patrick Haggard ◽  
Frederike Beyer

Living in complex social structures, humans have evolved a unique aptitude for mentalizing. On one view, mentalizing has shaped neurocognitive evolution, yet, little is known about how mentalizing interacts with other cognitive processes. For social animals, the actions of one individual often impact others. “Sense of agency” refers to the feeling of control over the outcomes of one’s actions, providing a precursor of responsibility. Here, we test a model of how social context influences this key feature of human action, even when action outcomes are not specifically social.We show that the presence of another potential agent reduces sense of agency for both positive and negative outcomes. This dissociates social modulation of sense of agency from classical self-serving bias, since the latter would reduce sense of agency only for undesirable outcomes. Instead, we propose that the cognitive load involved in decision-making is increased by the requirement to mentalize, and compute the possible actions of others, and their outcomes. In a second experiment, we test this hypothesis by comparing two situations, in which participants either need to consider potential actions of another person, or potential failures of a causal mechanism not involving any person. We find reduced sense of agency only in the social condition, suggesting that the presence of another intentional agent has a unique influence on the cognitive processes underlying one’s own voluntary action. Previous work primarily focussed on social facilitation of human cognition. However, when people must incorporate the potential actions of others into their decision-making, we show that the resulting cognitive load reduces individuals’ feelings of control.


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