scholarly journals Probabilistic participation in public goods games

2007 ◽  
Vol 274 (1625) ◽  
pp. 2639-2642 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tatsuya Sasaki ◽  
Isamu Okada ◽  
Tatsuo Unemi
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Voluntary Participation ◽  
Dynamical Regime ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Public Enterprises ◽  
Interior Equilibrium ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Pure Strategies

Voluntary participation in public goods games (PGGs) has turned out to be a simple but effective mechanism for promoting cooperation under full anonymity. Voluntary participation allows individuals to adopt a risk-aversion strategy, termed loner. A loner refuses to participate in unpromising public enterprises and instead relies on a small but fixed pay-off. This system leads to a cyclic dominance of three pure strategies, cooperators, defectors and loners, but at the same time, there remain two considerable restrictions: the addition of loners cannot stabilize the dynamics and the time average pay-off for each strategy remains equal to the pay-off of loners. Here, we introduce probabilistic participation in PGGs from the standpoint of diversification of risk, namely simple mixed strategies with loners, and prove the existence of a dynamical regime in which the restrictions no longer hold. Considering two kinds of mixed strategies associated with participants (cooperators or defectors) and non-participants (loners), we can recover all basic evolutionary dynamics of the two strategies: dominance; coexistence; bistability; and neutrality, as special cases depending on pairs of probabilities. Of special interest is that the expected pay-off of each mixed strategy exceeds the pay-off of loners at some interior equilibrium in the coexistence region.

scholarly journals Evolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion

2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (10) ◽  
pp. 103105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Linjie Liu ◽  
Shengxian Wang ◽  
Xiaojie Chen ◽  
Matjaž Perc
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Games

scholarly journals Ecological feedback on diffusion dynamics

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 181273 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hye Jin Park ◽  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Spatial Patterns ◽  
Spatial Organization ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Reaction Diffusion ◽  
Reaction Diffusion Equations ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Diffusion Dynamics ◽  
Spatially Extended

Spatial patterns are ubiquitous across different scales of organization in ecological systems. Animal coat pattern, spatial organization of insect colonies and vegetation in arid areas are prominent examples from such diverse ecologies. Typically, pattern formation has been described by reaction–diffusion equations, which consider individuals dispersing between subpopulations of a global pool. This framework applied to public goods game nicely showed the endurance of populations via diffusion and generation of spatial patterns. However, how the spatial characteristics, such as diffusion, are related to the eco-evolutionary process as well as the nature of the feedback from evolution to ecology and vice versa, has been so far neglected. We present a thorough analysis of the ecologically driven evolutionary dynamics in a spatially extended version of ecological public goods games. Furthermore, we show how these evolutionary dynamics feed back into shaping the ecology, thus together determining the fate of the system.

scholarly journals Mistakes can stabilise the dynamics of rock-paper-scissors games

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maria Kleshnina ◽  
Sabrina S. Streipert ◽  
Jerzy A. Filar ◽  
Krishnendu Chatterjee
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Stable Equilibrium ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Strategy Execution ◽  
Cyclic Pattern ◽  
Behavioural Patterns ◽  
Observed Behaviour ◽  
Pure Strategies

AbstractA game of rock-paper-scissors is an interesting example of an interaction where none of the pure strategies strictly dominates all others, leading to a cyclic pattern. In this work, we consider an unstable version of rock-paper-scissors dynamics and allow individuals to make behavioural mistakes during the strategy execution. We show that such an assumption can break a cyclic relationship leading to a stable equilibrium emerging with only one strategy surviving. We consider two cases: completely random mistakes when individuals have no bias towards any strategy and a general form of mistakes. Then, we determine conditions for a strategy to dominate all other strategies. However, given that individuals who adopt a dominating strategy are still prone to behavioural mistakes in the observed behaviour, we may still observe extinct strategies. That is, behavioural mistakes in strategy execution stabilise evolutionary dynamics leading to an evolutionary stable and, potentially, mixed co-existence equilibrium.Author summaryA game of rock-paper-scissors is more than just a children’s game. This type of interactions is often used to describe competition among animals or humans. A special feature of such an interaction is that none of the pure strategies dominates, resulting in a cyclic pattern. However, in wild communities such interactions are rarely observed by biologists. Our results suggest that this lack of cyclicity may stem from imperfectness of interacting individuals. In other words, we show analytically that heterogeneity in behavioural patterns may break a cyclic relationship and lead to a stable equilibrium in pure or mixed strategies.

scholarly journals Neighborhood size-effects in nonlinear public goods games

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Kimmel ◽  
Philip Gerlee ◽  
Joel S. Brown ◽  
Philipp M. Altrock
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Size Effects ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Logistic Growth ◽  
Neighborhood Size ◽  
Frequency Dependent ◽  
Frequency Dependent Selection ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Goods Games

Ecological and evolutionary dynamics can be strongly affected by population assortment and frequency-dependent selection. In growing populations, a particular challenge is to disentangle global ecological effects from local frequency-dependent effects. Here we implement a logistic growth and death model on the global scale, coupled to frequency-dependent growth rates influenced by a public goods game between cooperators and defectors. For each individual, the public good is only effective within a neighborhood of other individuals, and the public good-growth rate relationship can be nonlinear. At low numbers of cooperators, increases of public good accumulate synergistically; at high numbers, increases in public good only provide diminishing returns-the inflection point of this pattern is given by the strength of frequency-dependent selection in relation to the background fitness effect. We observed complex critical behavior in the evolutionary dynamics’ equilibria, determined by the relative magnitude of frequency-dependent to constant (background) growth benefits. We predict neighborhood-size-driven state changes, hysteresis between polymorphic and monomorphic equilibria, and observed that type-dependent differences in neighborhood sizes can destabilize monomorphic cooperative states but increase coexistence of cooperators and defectors. Stochastic neighborhood size fluctuations also led to coexistence and could stabilize the purely cooperative equilibrium. Our results quantify the role of assortment through neighborhood-size effects and nonlinearity of the gains function in eco-evolutionary dynamics, which is relevant for a variety of microbial and cellular public goods games.

scholarly journals Altruism Design in Networked Public Goods Games

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sixie Yu ◽  
David Kempe ◽  
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Acting Out ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Algorithmic Question ◽  
Conventional Models ◽  
Individual Self

Many collective decision-making settings feature a strategic tension between agents acting out of individual self-interest and promoting a common good. These include wearing face masks during a pandemic, voting, and vaccination. Networked public goods games capture this tension, with networks encoding strategic interdependence among agents. Conventional models of public goods games posit solely individual self-interest as a motivation, even though altruistic motivations have long been known to play a significant role in agents' decisions. We introduce a novel extension of public goods games to account for altruistic motivations by adding a term in the utility function that incorporates the perceived benefits an agent obtains from the welfare of others, mediated by an altruism graph. Most importantly, we view altruism not as immutable, but rather as a lever for promoting the common good. Our central algorithmic question then revolves around the computational complexity of modifying the altruism network to achieve desired public goods game investment profiles. We first show that the problem can be solved using linear programming when a principal can fractionally modify the altruism network. While the problem becomes in general intractable if the principal's actions are all-or-nothing, we exhibit several tractable special cases.

scholarly journals Ecological feedback on diffusion dynamics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hye Jin Park ◽  
Chaitanya S. Gokhale
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Spatial Patterns ◽  
Spatial Organization ◽  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Reaction Diffusion ◽  
Reaction Diffusion Equations ◽  
Public Goods Games ◽  
Diffusion Dynamics ◽  
Spatially Extended

AbstractSpatial patterns are ubiquitous across different scales of organization. Animal coat pattern, spatial organization of insect colonies, and vegetation in arid areas are prominent examples from such diverse ecologies. Typically, pattern formation has been described by reaction-diffusion equations, which considers individuals dispersing between sub-populations of a global pool. This framework applied to public goods game nicely showed the endurance of populations via diffusion and generation of spatial patterns. However, how the spatial characteristics, such as diffusion, are related to the eco-evolutionary process as well as the nature of the feedback from evolution to ecology and vice versa, has been so far neglected. We present a thorough analysis of the ecologically driven evolutionary dynamics in a spatially extended version of ecological public goods games. We show how these evolutionary dynamics feedback into shaping the ecology thus together determining the fate of the system.

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