scholarly journals Defectors, not norm violators, are punished by third-parties

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (7) ◽  
pp. 20140388 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Bone ◽  
Antonio S. Silva ◽  
Nichola J. Raihani
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Alternative Possibility ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
The Social ◽  
Typical Behaviour ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Number Of Individuals ◽  
Proximate Explanation

Punishment of defectors and cooperators is prevalent when their behaviour deviates from the social norm. Why atypical behaviour is more likely to be punished than typical behaviour remains unclear. One possible proximate explanation is that individuals simply dislike norm violators. However, an alternative possibility exists: individuals may be more likely to punish atypical behaviour, because the cost of punishment generally increases with the number of individuals that are punished. We used a public goods game with third-party punishment to test whether punishment of defectors was reduced when defecting was typical, as predicted if punishment is responsive to norm violation. The cost of punishment was fixed, regardless of the number of players punished, meaning that it was not more costly to punish typical, relative to atypical, behaviour. Under these conditions, atypical behaviour was not punished more often than typical behaviour. In fact, most punishment was targeted at defectors, irrespective of whether defecting was typical or atypical. We suggest that the reduced punishment of defectors when they are common might often be explained in terms of the costs to the punisher, rather than responses to norm violators.

scholarly journals Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Indrajeet Patil ◽  
Nathan Dhaliwal ◽  
Fiery Andrews Cushman
Keyword(s):  
Social Norm ◽  
Third Parties ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Honest Signal ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
The Social ◽  
Comprehensive Examination ◽  
Social Partners

Sometimes people intervene in others’ conflicts—so called “third-party responding”. In some cases, third parties punish perpetrators; in others, they aid victims. Across 22 studies (N > 20,000), we provide a comprehensive examination of the consequences of this choice between punishment and compensation. What do people infer from, and how do they respond to, the choice of punishment versus compensation? We find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and cooperative benefits than punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating may be an honest signal of trustworthiness. Furthermore, we find that people accurately anticipate that observers would prefer them to compensate victims than to punish perpetrators and that participants personal decisions about whether to compensate or punish is based in part on the belief that the social norm is to compensate. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.

scholarly journals When norm violations are spontaneously detected: an electrocortical investigation

2020 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cristina E Salvador ◽  
Yan Mu ◽  
Michele J Gelfand ◽  
Shinobu Kitayama
Keyword(s):  
Social Relations ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Fundamental Function ◽  
Norm Violations ◽  
Norm Violation ◽  
Social Coordination ◽  
Societal Norms ◽  
Priming Condition ◽  
The Social ◽  
Relational Priming

Abstract One fundamental function of social norms is to promote social coordination. Moreover, greater social coordination may be called for when tight norms govern social relations with others. Hence, the sensitivity to social norm violations may be jointly modulated by relational goals and a belief that the social context is tight (vs loose). We tested this analysis using an electrocortical marker of norm-violation detection (N400). Ninety-one young American adults were subliminally primed with either relational or neutral goals. Then they saw behaviors that were either norm-violating or normal. In the relational priming condition, the norm-violation N400 increased as a function of the perceived tightness of societal norms. In the control priming condition, however, the norm-violation N400 was weak regardless of perceived tightness. Thus, normative tightness was associated with increased neural processing of norm violations only when relational goals were activated. Implications for norm psychology are discussed.

scholarly journals Humans prefer to copy success rather than the social norm in a cooperative game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell Burton-Chellew ◽  
Victoire D'Amico
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Personal Success

It is often claimed that human cooperation is special, and can only be explained by gene-culture co-evolution favouring a desire to follow pro-social norms. If this is true then individuals should be motivated to both observe, and copy, common social behaviours (social norms). Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals are motivated to follow social norms. However, natural selection should favour individuals whom prefer to discover and copy successful behaviours, and previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, if individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same cooperative game and instructions, we find that individuals are primarily motivated to copy successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavours costly cooperation, even when individuals can observe a stable, pro-social, norm. Our results suggest that human social learning mechanisms have evolved to maximize personal success, and call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to follow social norms.

scholarly journals Humans prefer to copy success rather than the social norm in a cooperative game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maxwell Burton-Chellew ◽  
Victoire D'Amico
Keyword(s):  
Social Learning ◽  
Social Norms ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Cultural Evolution ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
Learning Mechanisms ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Social ◽  
Personal Success

It is often claimed that human cooperation is special, and can only be explained by gene-culture co-evolution favouring a desire to follow pro-social norms. If this is true then individuals should be motivated to both observe, and copy, common social behaviours (social norms). Previous economic experiments, using the public goods game, have suggested individuals are motivated to follow social norms. However, natural selection should favour individuals whom prefer to discover and copy successful behaviours, and previous experiments have often not shown examples of success. Here we test, on 489 participants, if individuals are more motivated to learn about, and more likely to copy, either common or successful behaviours. Using the same cooperative game and instructions, we find that individuals are primarily motivated to copy successful rather than common behaviours. Consequently, social learning disfavours costly cooperation, even when individuals can observe a stable, pro-social, norm. Our results suggest that human social learning mechanisms have evolved to maximize personal success, and call into question explanations for human cooperation based on cultural evolution and/or a desire to follow social norms.

scholarly journals The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-9
Author(s):  
Nobuhiro Mifune ◽  
Yang Li ◽  
Narumi Okuda
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Undergraduate Students ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Negative Evaluation ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Third Party ◽  
The Cost

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

Can Humanism be the Social Norm?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sharon D. Welch
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Human Reasoning ◽  
Individual Freedom ◽  
Social Divisions ◽  
The Social

Assaults on truth and divisions about the nature of wise governance are not momentary political challenges, unique to particular moments in history. Rather, they demonstrate fundamental weaknesses in human reasoning and core dangers in ways of construing both individual freedom and cohesive communities. It will remain an ongoing challenge to learn to deal rationally with what is an intrinsic irrationality in human cognition and with what is an intrinsic tendency toward domination and violence in human collectivities. In times of intense social divisions, it is vital to consider the ways in which humanism might function as the social norm by, paradoxically, functioning in a way different from other social norms. Humanism is not the declaration that a certain set of values or norms are universally valid. At its best and most creative, humanism is not limited to a particular set of norms, but is, rather, the commitment to a certain process in which norms are continuously created, critically evaluated, implemented, sustained or revised. Humanism is a process of connection, perception, implementation, and critique, and it applies this process as much to itself as to other traditions.

Constructing Images of Deviance: A Look at State Intervention into the Problem of Wife-Battery

1983 ◽  
Vol 31 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Patricia A. Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Social Problem ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Structural Position ◽  
Wife Battering ◽  
The Social ◽  
Class Context ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Cost

Patricia Morgan's paper describes what happens when the state intervenes in the social problem of wife-battering. Her analysis refers to the United States, but there are clear implications for other countries, including Britain. The author argues that the state, through its social problem apparatus, manages the image of the problem by a process of bureaucratization, professionalization and individualization. This serves to narrow the definition of the problem, and to depoliticize it by removing it from its class context and viewing it in terms of individual pathology rather than structure. Thus refuges were initially run by small feminist collectives which had a dual objective of providing a service and promoting among the women an understanding of their structural position in society. The need for funds forced the groups to turn to the state for financial aid. This was given, but at the cost to the refuges of losing their political aims. Many refuges became larger, much more service-orientated and more diversified in providing therapy for the batterers and dealing with other problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse. This transformed not only the refuges but also the image of the problem of wife-battering.

scholarly journals Punishment Strategies across Societies: Conventional Wisdoms Reconsidered

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Ramzi Suleiman ◽  
Yuval Samid
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Strong Predictor ◽  
Social Environments ◽  
Public Goods Game ◽  
The Public ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
The World ◽  
Emergence Of Cooperation ◽  
Using Data ◽  
The Cost

Experiments using the public goods game have repeatedly shown that in cooperative social environments, punishment makes cooperation flourish, and withholding punishment makes cooperation collapse. In less cooperative social environments, where antisocial punishment has been detected, punishment was detrimental to cooperation. The success of punishment in enhancing cooperation was explained as deterrence of free riders by cooperative strong reciprocators, who were willing to pay the cost of punishing them, whereas in environments in which punishment diminished cooperation, antisocial punishment was explained as revenge by low cooperators against high cooperators suspected of punishing them in previous rounds. The present paper reconsiders the generality of both explanations. Using data from a public goods experiment with punishment, conducted by the authors on Israeli subjects (Study 1), and from a study published in Science using sixteen participant pools from cities around the world (Study 2), we found that: 1. The effect of punishment on the emergence of cooperation was mainly due to contributors increasing their cooperation, rather than from free riders being deterred. 2. Participants adhered to different contribution and punishment strategies. Some cooperated and did not punish (‘cooperators’); others cooperated and punished free riders (‘strong reciprocators’); a third subgroup punished upward and downward relative to their own contribution (‘norm-keepers’); and a small sub-group punished only cooperators (‘antisocial punishers’). 3. Clear societal differences emerged in the mix of the four participant types, with high-contributing pools characterized by higher ratios of ‘strong reciprocators’, and ‘cooperators’, and low-contributing pools characterized by a higher ratio of ‘norm keepers’. 4. The fraction of ‘strong reciprocators’ out of the total punishers emerged as a strong predictor of the groups’ level of cooperation and success in providing the public goods.

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