scholarly journals Are US Industries Becoming More Concentrated?*

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 697-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gustavo Grullon ◽  
Yelena Larkin ◽  
Roni Michaely

Abstract Since the late 1990s, over 75% of US industries have experienced an increase in concentration levels. We find that firms in industries with the largest increases in product market concentration show higher profit margins and more profitable mergers and acquisitions deals. At the same time, we find no evidence for a significant increase in operational efficiency. Taken together, our results suggest that market power is becoming an important source of value. These findings are robust to the inclusion of (i) private firms; (ii) factors accounting for foreign competition; and (iii) the use of alternative measures of concentration. We also show that the higher profit margins associated with an increase in concentration are reflected in higher returns to shareholders. Overall, our results suggest that the US product markets have undergone a shift that has potentially weakened competition across the majority of industries.

Author(s):  
Ariel Ezrachi

‘Mergers and acquisitions’ discusses mergers and acquisitions. While of potential benefit to society, mergers, takeovers, share acquisitions, and joint ventures also affect the market structure, and at times may reduce competition. When markets become more concentrated following a merger, we move further away from a competitive market structure to a structure in which market power might undermine the competitive process. To address this risk, the competition agency must assess the impact of the transaction. There are important procedural differences between the European administrative system and the US system in terms of the appraisal of mergers and acquisitions. Other types of mergers include: horizontal mergers, vertical mergers, and conglomerate transactions.


2020 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 871-890 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Stelzner ◽  
Mayuri Chaturvedi

Abstract Starting in the 1980s, market concentration began to rise dramatically decreasing competition and increasing market power for the firms that remain. Such developments have important effects on a number of economic variables such as the efficiency of our economy and income inequality. Thus, it is important to ask: how has the administration of antitrust policy changed over the last half century? To shed more light on these important questions, we explore both change in policy outline by the Department of Justice in its Horizontal Merger Guidelines and change in administrative actions looking at both secondary requests for mergers and acquisitions of different sizes, and pre, post and change in Herfindahl–Hirschman Index in mergers and acquisitions contested by the Department of Justice through the courts.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 468-488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jingbo Yuan ◽  
Zhimin Zhou ◽  
Nan Zhou ◽  
Ge Zhan

Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of product market competition on firms’ unethical behavior (FUB) in the Chinese insurance industry and to further explore the boundary conditions of the main effects. On the basis of China’s commercial foundation, the study constructs a conceptual framework of FUB by drawing from the perspective of horizontal competition. Design/methodology/approach Data were collected from 52 property insurance firms at the branch level observed over the six-year period, 2011-2016. Within this framework, market power and market concentration were used to describe product market competition at firm and industry levels, respectively. The moderating effect of market munificence was analyzed to reveal the theoretical boundaries of the main effect. By drawing upon cost–benefit analysis and social network theory, the study used negative binomial model and Poisson model to quantitatively examine the relationship. Findings The relationship between product market competition and FUB is curvilinear. Especially at the firm level, market power exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB; at the industry level, market concentration exhibits a U-shape relationship with FUB. In addition, market munificence positively moderates the impact of firm’s market power on FUB, whereas, market munificence negatively moderates the impact of industrial market concentration on FUB. Research limitations/implications This paper explored a new type of unethical behavior that concerns consumers or the third party by emphasizing horizontal competitive contexts; it also provides a better understanding of the FUB–financial performance relationship from the perspective of competition. The moderating effects suggest that when the cause of FUB is different (market power vs market concentration), firms may make opposite ethical choice. However, the sample is from a single industry; it will be fruitful to further verify these findings in other industries such as the manufacturing sector. Moreover, the definition of FUB is confined to explicit forms such as participation or collusion but there is no way to measure the implicit forms of FUB. Practical implications First, the governance of FUB should not only focus on the firms themselves, but also take into account the industrial market structure. Second, proper use of governance measures for FUB can increase firms’ benefits from “compliance with the law”, enticing firms to decrease FUB. The third, firms with weak market positions, facing fierce competition, should not be involved in FUB for short-term benefit; indeed, a low-cost strategy can be adopted as the dominant competitive strategy. While, in cases of highly concentrated market structure, firms should strive to avoid involvement in FUB through collusion with other rivals. Social implications As it is a very common phenomenon that firms in competitive relationships may adopt FUB toward third parties or consumers, this trend has become a hot topic in the economic and social development in China. The study’s conclusions reveal that a more proactive and ambitious ethical decision is desirable for all kinds of firms; moreover, firms should make a rational choice between “short-term interest” and “long-term survival”. When firms identify the compliance of business ethics as an opportunity to differentiate themselves and perceive the benefits of decreasing FUB as outweighing the costs, the level of FUB will be inhibited, and social welfare will increase. Originality/value The primary contribution of this research resides in identifying product market competition as a previously unexplored predictor of FUB, thus revealing the dark side of product market competition. In addition, nonlinear relationships between product market competition and FUB indicate that situations of competition exert an important influence on FUB both at the firm and industry level. This paper’s conclusion provides a more meticulous theoretical explanation for FUB. This research demonstrates that the traditional ethical framework is not sufficient to explain FUB in a horizontal competitive context. Indeed, resource constraints and competitive pressures should also be considered.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Anita Manatschal

AbstractMuch has been written on the positive effect of direct democracy (initiatives, referendums) on voter turnout. However, we have limited knowledge about potential differential effects on voters belonging to various ethnic groups. The paper argues that depending on a group’s responsiveness to the political context, direct democracy can (dis-)integrate voters (from) into the electorate. Empirical analysis of Current Population Survey (CPS) voting supplement survey data, together with data on the absolute use of direct democracy across US states, corroborates this theoretical expectation, however lending more support for the disintegrating assumption. Frequent direct democratic elections further widen the negative voting gap between first-generation Asian voters and voters living in the US for three generations or longer, whereas they tend to diminish this voting gap for first-generation Hispanic voters. The disintegrative pattern for first-generation Asian voters remains even significant when excluding California from the state sample, yet not the integrative tendency for first-generation Hispanics. Additional analyses using alternative measures of direct democracy and voting, and applying statistical adjustments to address causality concerns, confirm the robustness of these findings, which shed light on the so-far underexplored (dis-)integrative potential of political institutions.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 251-265
Author(s):  
Timothy Besley ◽  
Nicola Fontana ◽  
Nicola Limodio

Firms in tradable sectors are more likely to be subject to external competition to limit market power, while nontradable firms are more dependent on domestic policies and institutions. This paper combines an antitrust index available for multiple countries with firm-level data from Orbis covering more than 12 million firms from 94 countries, including 20 sectors over 10 years and finds that profit margins of firms operating in nontradable sectors are significantly lower in countries with stronger antitrust policies compared to firms operating in tradable sectors. The results are robust to a wide variety of empirical specifications. (JEL D22, E02, L44)


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-67
Author(s):  
Hottua Manalu

This article discusses about corporation action notification on the competition law perspective. Corporation action notification is a notification obligations by the business actor to the Business Competition Supervisory Commision about corporation action in the form of incorporation, fusion, or company share acquition that caused asset value or sales value is ecxceed specific value. This article concluded that notification is an important instrument to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because a corporation action has an influence towards business competition, that can increase market concentration and this can make a product price more higher and business actor’s market power become bigger so that can threatening small business actor. However, the notification nowadays applied in Indonesia is notification to the commission after the corporation action has been done, or as known as post-notification, actually is not effective to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because of the notification is delivered after the corporation action has been done, so that in case the Commission assess that the corporation action is causing monopolistic practices and unfair competition then the revocation is complicated. Therefore, this article is encouraging notification to be done before corporation action is started, as known as pra-notification, so monopolistic  practices and unfair competition possibility can be detected earlier and can be prevented. Abstrak Artikel ini membahas notifikasi aksi korporasi dalam perspektif hukum persaingan usaha. Notifikasi aksi korporasi adalah kewajiban pemberitahuan oleh pelaku usaha kepada Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha atas aksi korporasi baik dalam bentuk penggabungan, peleburan, maupun pengambilalihan saham perseroan yang berakibat nilai aset dan atau nilai penjualannya melebihi jumlah tertentu. Artikel ini menyimpulkan, notifikasi merupakan instrumen penting dalam mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan aksi korporasi berpengaruh terhadap persaingan usaha, yaitu menyebabkan bertambahnya konsentrasi pasar yang dapat menyebabkan harga produk semakin tinggi dan kekuatan pasar pelaku usaha menjadi semakin besar sehingga dapat mengancam pebisnis kecil. Namun demikian, notifikasi yang saat ini berlaku di Indonesia, yaitu pemberitahuan kepada Komisi setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, atau yang dikenali dengan post-notifikasi, sesungguhnya tidak efektif mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan notifikasi disampaikan setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, sehingga dalam hal Komisi menilai aksi korporasi menyebabkan praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat maka pembatalan jelas mengalami kerumitan. Oleh karenanya, artikel ini mendorong notifikasi dilakukan sebelum aksi korporasi dilakukan, yang disebut dengan pra-notifikasi, agar kemungkinan terjadinya praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat diketahui sejak dini dan dapat dicegah.


Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bogojević

Contemporary directions of the market liberalization should lead to a bigger number of market participants and to a bigger degree of competition among them. This again, leads to a more diversified offer and to bigger quality products along with higher level of services with cheaper rates. In order to control the mentioned processes, analysis of market concentration is needed, as well as studying and perfection of the methods that allow measurement of market concentration. The degree of market concentration which on a specific market one or more economic subjects have is defined as ‘’market power’’. Economic efficiency on a specific market largely depends on whether non competitive market structures which produce adverse effects on economic efficiency are existent on that market, which ultimately affects on the overall well – being. Conversance of the degree of concentration of a specific (relevant) market is important so that breaching of the market principles can be timely spotted and so that appropriate measures can be taken. Supervision over the market and the market processes, as well as appliance of specific measuring methods of market concentration have the goal of establishing and maintenance of free market competition in which all of the economic subjects participate under the same conditions.


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