Strategic Voting in Plurality Elections

2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 227-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Kselman ◽  
Emerson Niou

This paper extends the Calculus of Voting of McKelvey and Ordeshook, providing the first direct derivation of the conditions under which voters will vote strategically: choose their second-most preferred candidate in order to prevent their least-preferred candidate from winning. Addressing this theoretical problem is important, as nearly all empirical research on strategic voting either implicitly or explicitly tests hypotheses which originate from this seminal model. The formal result allows us to isolate the subset of voters to which strategic voting hypotheses properly apply and in turn motivates a critical reevaluation of past empirical work. In making this argument, we develop a unified and parsimonious framework for understanding competing models of tactical voter choice. The typology helps to elucidate the methodological difficulties in studying tactical behavior when faced with heterogeneous explanatory models and suggests the need for both theoretical caution and more precise data instruments in future empirical work.

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-164
Author(s):  
Lada Kuletskaya ◽  

As for today, political elections are the key form of people’s participation in the formation of the state in all democratic countries, which is why theoretical works in the field of spatial modeling of voter choice appeared relatively long ago and played a major role in the development of both further theoretical and empirical research in this area. In this survey we firstly give a brief overview of the history of the formation of spatial modeling in relation to election results and political preferences of individuals from the point of view of research methodology, based on the classical theoretical ‘proximity model’ and ‘directional model’, where rational individuals determine their political positions and compare them with the positions of candidates. Secondly, we explain the appearance of the studies of the mutual influence of voters living in neighboring territories on each other as one of the factors that determine the voters’ political positions and, accordingly, the final choice of a candidate. We also point out the authors’ different explanations of the reasons for the appearance of such mutual influence of voters and other factors affecting voters living in neighboring territories (also called as ‘contextual effects’) and emphasize the importance of taking them into account in the studies of electoral preferences. A separate chapter in this paper presents the systematization and description of the main empirical approaches to spatial modeling of electoral choice: at the beginning, we present the basic econometric spatial models (used by the authors regardless of the subject of the study), and then we describe the empirical work in the field of voter choice, depending on the hypotheses, focusing on the research methodology and the data used. In conclusion, we define the main directions for the research development and the vector of further practical work in this area. This paper will help researchers understand existing fundamental works, evaluate current approaches to the modeling of electoral choice, and improve theoretical or empirical spatial analysis


2011 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
Orit Kedar

This article offers organizing principles to an emerging research agenda that analyses how parliamentary politics affects voter considerations. It uses the process by which votes are turned into policy as a unifying framework: every step in the process poses incentives for voters and encourages different types of strategic behaviour by voters. The standard version of strategic voting commonly found in analyses of voter choice is about the step familiar from the Anglo-American model – the allocation of seats based on votes – yet insights about voter behaviour originated from that model have been inadvertently reified and assumed to apply universally. The article identifies a set of empirical implications about the likelihood of voters employing policy-oriented strategies under different circumstances.


1999 ◽  
Vol 93 (3) ◽  
pp. 535-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
John D. Wilkerson

For more than three decades, social choice theorists and legislative scholars have studied how legislative outcomes in Congress can be manipulated through strategic amendments and voting. I address the central limitation of this research, a virtual absence of systematic empirical work, by examining 76 “killer” amendments considered during the 103d and 104th congresses. I trace the effects of these amendments on their related bills using archival sources, test for strategic voting using NOMINATE as the baseline measure of legislator preferences across a range of issues, and explore with OLS regression why some killer amendments are more strategically important than others. The findings indicate that successful killer amendments and identifiable strategic voting are extremely rare. In none of the cases examined could the defeat of a bill be attributed to adoption of an alleged killer amendment.


1987 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 1323-1330 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Austen-Smith

The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.


2020 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-16 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Meeßen ◽  
Meinald T. Thielsch ◽  
Guido Hertel

Abstract. Digitalization, enhanced storage capacities, and the Internet of Things increase the volume of data in modern organizations. To process and make use of these data and to avoid information overload, management information systems (MIS) are introduced that collect, process, and analyze relevant data. However, a precondition for the application of MIS is that users trust them. Extending accounts of trust in automation and trust in technology, we introduce a new model of trust in MIS that addresses the conceptual ambiguities of existing conceptualizations of trust and integrates initial empirical work in this field. In doing so, we differentiate between perceived trustworthiness of an MIS, experienced trust in an MIS, intentions to use an MIS, and actual use of an MIS. Moreover, we consider users’ perceived risks and contextual factors (e. g., autonomy at work) as moderators. The introduced model offers guidelines for future research and initial suggestions to foster trust-based MIS use.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document