Sophisticated Sincerity: Voting Over Endogenous Agendas
1987 ◽
Vol 81
(4)
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pp. 1323-1330
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Keyword(s):
The empirical findings on whether or not legislators vote strategically are mixed. This is at least partly due to the fact that to establish any hypothesis on strategic voting, legislators' preferences need to be known, and these are typically private data. I show that under complete information, if decision making is by the amendment procedure and if the agenda is set endogenously, then sophisticated (strategic) voting over the resulting agenda is observationally equivalent to sincere voting. The voting strategies, however, are sophisticated. This fact has direct implications for empirical work on sophisticated voting.
Keyword(s):
2015 ◽
Vol 16
(1)
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pp. 174-198
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2012 ◽
Vol 25
(2)
◽
pp. 359-391
Keyword(s):
2016 ◽
Vol 44
(11)
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pp. 1100-1117
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2019 ◽
Vol 48
(2)
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pp. 107-132
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