Judicial Review and the Protection of Constitutional Rights

2002 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 275-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Sadurski
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Rights

Republicanizing Rights?

2019 ◽  
pp. 197-218
Author(s):  
Eoin Daly
Keyword(s):  
Human Dignity ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Public Authorities ◽  
Constitutional Adjudication

This chapter contends that the republican argument against judicial review is misplaced, illustrating this argument by reference to the doctrine of proportionality. Whereas constitutional rights are often understood as placing fixed limits on politics, transcending historical and political contingencies, the doctrine of proportionality in particular enables the understanding of constitutional adjudication as accounting for the instability, the contestability, and even the indeterminacy of rights. In short, the doctrine is consistent with an understanding of rights as falling within the ‘circumstances of politics.’ In particular, constitutional rights can be understood not as guaranteeing spheres of presumptive immunity for particular kinds of activities presumed as essential to human dignity or autonomy, but rather as requiring public authorities to provide special kinds of justifications for specific kinds of acts (just as Forst, in particular, suggests).

Constitutional Rights and Democracy: A Reply to Professor Bellamy

2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (8) ◽  
pp. 1039-1051 ◽  
Author(s):  
W.J. Waluchow
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Social Cooperation ◽  
Bill Of Rights ◽  
Political Equality ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
The People ◽  
Democratic Character ◽  
Self Rule ◽  
Elected Representatives

In his rich and thoughtful paper, Richard Bellamy sketches a theory of individual rights that ascribes to them an inherently democratic character that “is best captured by a republican view of liberty as non-domination, rather than the standard liberal account of liberty as non-interference.” According to this view, “rights involve an implicit appeal to democratic forms of reasoning.” That is, the only justifiable “foundation of rights must be some form of ongoing democratic decision making that allows rights to be claimed under conditions of political equality.” Bellamy uses this particular model of rights to defend a somewhat unique thesis concerning the legitimacy of judicial review under a constitutional charter or bill of rights (henceforth constitutional review). Many legal theorists question whether constitutional review can ever be rendered consistent with the theoretical and practical demands of democracy. According to these theorists, democracy embodies a form of self-rule whereby the members of a society establish and exercise legitimate authority over themselves. But self-rule seems seriously compromised once constitutional review enters the picture. Instead of having the people and their elected representatives setting the basic terms of social cooperation, we have instead a small group of elite, unelected, and unaccountable judges performing this vital task. Constitutional review empowers these individuals, in constitutional review cases, to substitute their own contestable views and preferences with respect to the basic terms of social cooperation for the duly considered views and preferences of the people and those whom they have duly elected to represent them. This is something one simply cannot tolerate in a democracy.

Rights Review in the High Court and the Cultural Limits of Judicial Power

2013 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 585-608
Author(s):  
Robert Woods
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Judicial Politics ◽  
Legal Culture ◽  
Judicial Power ◽  
Institutional Constraints ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
High Court ◽  
Rights Protection

How are we to explain the High Court's reluctance to move into stronger forms of rights protection, as evinced by the disparity between its federalism and rights-based judicial review practices? It has been suggested that the federal and ‘rights’ provisions of the Constitution are equally indeterminate, calling into question the notion that the legal materials themselves compel a preference for one or another type of review. And the Court's record of rendering politically consequential decisions in its federalism jurisdiction suggests that political-institutional constraints may not preclude it from expanding its rights review powers. This article contends that the disparity in the Court's review practices can be explained only by way of a theory of judicial politics that is sensitive to notions of cultural as well as political constraint. It traces the historical emergence of an Australian politico-legal culture, before examining its role in restraining the further protection of constitutional rights.

scholarly journals Menyoal Kebebasan Beragama dan Penodaan Agama Di Indonesia

2015 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Yayan Sopyan
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Religious Beliefs ◽  
Freedom Of Expression ◽  
Freedom Of Speech ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Reform Era ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

Abstract: Questioning the Religious Freedom and blasphemy in Indonesia. The presence of the Constitutional Court in the reform era is the strengthening of the foundations of constitutionalism in the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia Year 1945. The Court in this case a role to enforce and the protector of the citizen's constitutional rights and the protector of the human rights. Including in this case, the right to religion and religious practices and teachings of their respective religions, in accordance with the constitutional mandate. However, on the other hand there is the discourse of freedom of expression and freedom of speech includes freedom to broadcast religious beliefs and understanding of the "deviant" and against the "mainstream" religious beliefs and understanding in general, as in the case of Ahmadiyah. The Court in this case is required to provide the best attitude when faced judicial review in this case still required in addition to guarding the constitution in order to run properly.   Abstrak: Menyoal Kebebasan Beragama dan Penodaan Agama di Indonesia. Kehadiran lembaga Mahkamah Konstitusi di era reformasi merupakan upaya penguatan terhadap dasar-dasar konstitusionalisme pada Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945. MK dalam hal ini berperan menegakkan dan melindungi hak-hak konstitusional warga negara (the protector of the citizen’s constitutional rights) dan pelindung HAM (the protector of the human rights). Termasuk dalam hal ini, hak untuk memeluk agama dan menjalankan ibadah serta ajaran agamanya masing-masing, sesuai dengan amanat konstitusi. Namun, disisi lain ada wacana kebebasan berekspresi dan kebebasan berpendapat termasuk didalamnya kebebasan untuk menyiarkan keyakinan dan pemahaman keagamaan yang “menyimpang” dan bertentangan dengan “mainstream” keyakinan dan pemahaman keagamaan pada umumnya, seperti dalam kasus Ahmadiyah. MK dalam hal ini dituntut untuk mampu memberikan sikap terbaik saat dihadapkan judicial review dalam kasus ini selain tetap dituntut untuk mengawal konstitusi agar dapat berjalan sebagaimana mestinya. DOI: 10.15408/jch.v2i2.2314

scholarly journals Penegakan Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 13/PUU-XV/2017 Mengenai Hak Mendapatkan Pekerjaan dan Hak Membentuk Keluarga

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 858
Author(s):  
Muhammad Reza Winata ◽  
Intan Permata Putri
Keyword(s):  
Qualitative Research ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Freedom Of Contract ◽  
Legal Power ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Republic ◽  
The Right

Jaminan konstitusi terkait hak konstitusional untuk mendapatkan pekerjaan dalam Pasal 28D ayat (2) UUD NRI 1945 dan hak konstitusional untuk membentuk keluarga dalam Pasal 28B ayat (1) UUD 1945 telah dibatasi dengan adanya ketentuan Pasal 153 ayat (1) huruf f Undang-Undang No 13 Tahun 2003 tentang Ketenagakerjaan. Keberadaan perjanjian kerja menghalangi hak pekerja untuk menikah dalam satu institusi karena pekerja harus mengalami pemutusan hubungan kerja untuk dapat melaksanakan haknya membentuk keluarga yang sebenarnya dijamin dalam konstitusi dan peraturan perundang- undangan. Pengujian Pasal 153 ayat (1) huruf f UU No 13 Tahun 2003 dalam Putusan Mahkamah Konstitusi Nomor 13/PUU-XV/2017 telah menyatakan frasa "kecuali telah diatur dalam perjanjian kerja, peraturan Perusahaan, atau perjanjian kerja bersama" bertentangan dengan UUD 1945. Artikel ini hendak menjawab kekuatan mengikat dan akibat hukum putusan, sekaligus Penegakan putusan dengan memetakan penyelesaian terkait peraturan perundang-undangan dan perjanjian kerja yang tidak tidak sesuai dengan putusan dan bertentangan dengan prinsip kebebasan berkontrak. Penelitian ini didasarkan pada penelitian kualitatif, dimana sumber analisis yakni Putusan MK terkait permasalahan yang diangkat, peraturan perundang-undangan, buku dan artikel ilmiah. Artikel ini hendak memetakan penyelesaian yang sesuai terkait kepada perjanjian kerja yang tidak menjamin hak pekerja yang dijamin dalam konstitusi, serta bertentangan dengan prinsip kebebasan berkontrak. yakni: pertama, penyelarasan peraturan perundang undangan di bawah Undang-undang judicial review di Mahkamah Agung, kedua, penyelesaian perselisihan hak melalui Pengadilan Hubungan Industrian yang akan menguji penegakan putusan dalam perjanjian kerja, peraturan perusahaan, atau perjanjian kerja bersama.The constitutional guarantee regarding constitutional rights to obtain employment in Article 28 D paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and the constitutional rights to form a family in Article 28 B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution has been limited by the provisions of Article 153 paragraph (1) letter f Law No. 13 of 2003 concerning Labor. The existence of a work agreement prevents the right of workers to get married in one institution because workers must experience termination of employment to be able to exercise their rights to form a family which is actually guaranteed in the constitution and legislation. Testing Article 153 paragraph (1) letter f of Law No. 13 of 2003 in the Decision of the Constitutional Court Number 13/PUU-XV/2017 has stated the phrase "except as stipulated in work agreements, company regulations, or collective labor agreements" contrary to the 1945 Constitution. This article is about to answer the binding and consequent legal power of the decision, as well as Enforcement of decisions by mapping out solutions related to legislation and work agreements that are not incompatible with decisions and are contrary to the principle of freedom of contract. This research is based on qualitative research, where the source of analysis is the Constitutional Court Decision related to the issues raised, legislation, scientific books, and articles. This article intends to map appropriate solutions related to work agreements that do not guarantee workers’ rights guaranteed in the constitution, as well as contrary to the principle of freedom of contract. namely: first, alignment of legislation under the judicial review law in the Supreme Court, secondly, settlement of rights disputes through the Industrial Relations Court which will test enforcement of decisions in work agreements, company regulations, or collective labor agreements.

scholarly journals POLITIK HUKUM PERUNDANG-UNDANGAN TERHADAP ANAK LUAR NIKAH

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-126
Author(s):  
Muammar Rachman
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Review ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Legal Protection ◽  
Research Problem ◽  
Research Approach ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
Constitutional Rights ◽  
Marriage Law ◽  
The Public ◽  
The Status

The formation of the 1974 Marriage Law is based on Islamic Law, which became a problem when the Constitutional Court gave a decision on the judicial review of the Marriage Law with a decision that was considered by the public that the decision was against Islamic law. The research problem in this article is, How is the Politics of Law in the Reform of Legislation in the Post-Constitutional Court Ruling on Marriage related to the status of children outside of marriage? Does the Constitutional Court Decision No 46 / PUU-VII / 2010 contradict Islamic law?The research approach used in this research is normative juridical. The results of the study indicate that children who are born must receive legal protection. If this is not the case, then the children who are born outside of marriage will suffer losses. The relationship between the child and the father does not only occur because of a legal marriage, but can also be based on evidence of a blood relationship between the child and the boy as the father. This is because birth is a legal result of a legal relationship in which there are reciprocal rights and obligations between the child, mother and father. This decision refers, because there is a relationship that is carried out without any legal conditions for marriage, both religiously and in a state, so that it does not cause harm which implies a child who has not done anything wrong. In conclusion, the Constitutional Court granted the renewal of the norm in article 43 of the Marriage Law No. 1 of 1974, which is to provide constitutional rights for children born out of wedlock whether born from a legally valid marriage or not. The decision of the Constitutional Court related to the addition of article 43 paragraph (1) of this marriage law is still in the spirit of Islam as the struggle of Muslims to be able to apply their religious values in this law is not only legally religiously or nationally. Abstrak Pembentukan Undang-Undang (UU) Perkawinan Tahun 1974 berdasarkan Hukum Islam, menjadi permasalahan saat Mahkamah Konstitusi (MK) memutuskan judicial review atas UU perkawinan, bagi masyarakat bertentangan dengan hukum Islam. Permasalahan penelitian ini,  Bagaimana Politik Hukum dalam Pembaharuan Peraturan Perundang-Undangan dalam UU Perkawinan Pasca Putusan MK terkait dengan status anak diluar nikah? Apakah Putusan MK No 46/PUU-VII/2010 bertentangan dengan hukum Islam? Pendekatan penelitian ini yuridis normatif. Hasil penelitian menguraikan, anak yang lahir harus mendapat perlindungan hukum. Jika tidak, yang dirugikan adalah anak yang dilahirkan diluar perkawinan. hubungan anak dengan bapak tidak semata-mata terjadi karena adanya sebuah perkawinan yang sah, tapi berdasar pembuktian adanya hubungan darah antara anak dan laki-laki sebagai bapak. Hal ini karena kelahiran adalah akibat hukum dari hubungan hukum yang terdapat hak dan kewajiban secara timbal balik. Putusan ini mengacu, sebab adanya hubungan yang dilakukan tanpa adanya syarat pernikahan yang sah, baik secara agamadan negara, sehingga tidak menimbulkan kerugian yang berimplikasi pada anak yang tidak melakukan kesalahan. Pembaharuan norma dalam pasal 43 UU  Perkawinan No. 1 Tahun 1974, memberikan hak konstitusional  anak yang dilahirkan di luar nikah baik yang lahir dari pernikahan yang sah secara agama atau tidak. Putusan MK terkait penambahan pasal 43 ayat (1) UU perkawinan masih bernafaskan Islam sesuai perjuangan ummat Islam untuk dapat menjalankan nilai-nilai agamanya dalam UU ini hannya tidak sah secara agama  dan Negara.

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